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Introducing the Issues of Resettlement 
This chapter is composed of three sections: research purposes, the state of art of 
resettlement studies, and a brief review of China's historical population 
movement. The first section introduces why I chose my topic and the aims of 
the research. The second reviews some relevant literature on resettlement, 
which helps to position my own study. The last reviews the present status of 
China's resettlement experience but also traces this back to China's ancient 
resettlement history. This provides a profile of resettlement in China, so that 
one can appreciate resettlement as an historical phenomenon and draw lessons 
from the past. 
1.1 Research Purposes 
In locations with very unfavourable human living conditions, resettlement has 
been widely practiced, both in China and elsewhere in the world, as a way of 
eliminating poverty. In many cases it has indeed provided some positive results 
for poverty alleviation. But it has also had its negative outcomes, due mainly to 
a lack of attention given to the complex interconnections between social, 
economic, technical, cultural and political factors. Despite these mixed results 
and the lessons to be learnt nationally and internationally, both central and 
local governments in China still consider resettlement an appropriate and 
effective strategy for poverty alleviation. This favourable impression mainly 
results from the lack of systematic information regarding the positive and 
negative impacts of resettlement, particularly in respect to whom finally 
benefits from such huge government investment. This lacuna can be attributed 
to the top-down approach adopted in developing strategies for poverty 
reduction and also to the failure to undertake systematic assessments of the 
impact of particular resettlement schemes. Systematic studies of this kind are 
therefore essential for providing a comprehensive understanding of the 
processes involved and, if possible, for making recommendations regarding 
future resettlement plans. 
A widely accepted assumption in China is that resettlement will be 
successful so long as there is a comparative natural resource advantage in the 
resettlement area matched by financial investment. However, national and 
international experience shows that resettlement also involves a complicated 
mixture of issues relating to property rights, power structures and gender 
differences. Despite the enormous investments made by the Chinese 
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government in resettlement schemes aimed at reducing poverty and 
stimulating local development, there are many cases where the resettled 
population has moved back to its places of origin, or where the resettled 
population has been shown to be composed of the better-off rather than the 
poorer households of the places of origin. 
One argument predominating in academic discussions in China concerns 
who the principal beneficiaries of such government-supported resettlement 
programmes should be. The range of viewpoints or approaches to this issue is 
wide and based upon a variety of assumptions. These include the view that the 
single function of resettlement is poverty reduction (what is called the 'poverty 
reduction' approach); that the richer households should not be excluded as 
beneficiaries because they are more financially able to supplement the 
necessarily limited government investment available (a 'middle line' approach); 
and that the newly developed area should be a growth point for the regional 
economy (an 'economic growth' approach). Within such approaches, strategic 
viewpoints range from prioritising social justice to promoting economic 
efficiency. The research of this thesis hypothesizes that if social justice and 
economic efficiency are parallel objectives of one program/project, then 
economic efficiency will overshadow social justice and become the principal 
focus. 
My research views gender equality as an essential component of both social 
justice and economic efficiency. It explores how resettlement has affected 
women and men differently, and thus aims to establish the need to look at 
gender issues at the outcome level in resettlement projects, and to include 
gender-specific decision-making at household level as part of the social 
dynamics. In summary, there is an important need, especially in China, to 
understand how the social, gender, political and economic aspects of 
resettlement are interrelated. 
In the end, I hope that the results will contribute to a comprehensive 
understanding of the social complexities involved in resettlement programmes, 
as well as to the formulation of sound resettlement strategies based on a 
consultative process of government. 
1.2 The state of the art 
Resettlement Categorization 
Different terms are used to describe population movement, such as 
"resettlement", "migration" and "transmigration". No clear distinction between 
the terms is found in the literature. Resettlement and migration are sometimes 
used interchangeably, even within the same article; and "transmigration" is 
used to refer to government-sponsored resettlement programs in the case of 
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Indonesia. The term "settlement" is used to emphasis the result of population 
movement in the case of moving to new land areas. The following quotations 
provide a glimpse of how these terms are used and defined by different 
researchers in different research projects: 
'Resettlement is population movement from one place to another, in other words, from places 
of origin to other locations. It must involve spatial changes of daily and long-term 
livelihoods'. (Shi Guoqing, 1995:47) 
'New land settlement is generally defined as the spontaneous and sponsored settlement of 
areas which are largely uncultivated at the time of their occupation. It includes what is 
referred to in the literature as "colonization" (especially in latin America and in pre-
independence Indonesia), "resettlement" and "transmigration." All these terms emphasize 
the settlement of land by people rather than the reclamation or initial preparation of land.' 
(Scudder, 1991:152) 
'Colonisation under Dutch rule before the Second World War, and transmigration under the 
Indonesian Republic's administration after 1950 as programmes to promote and sponsor 
inter-island population movement do have one element in common, i.e. to transfer people 
from densely to sparsely populated islands within the Indonesian archipelago 77its 
population movement was not to send subsistence farmers into a huge labour reservoir in the 
outer islands, but to promote independent farmers, who would be able to sustain a modern 
type of farming.' (Mollett, 1991:29-30) 
'Migration involves the movement of a person (a migrant) between two places for a certain 
period of time. The problem is defining how far someone needs to move and for how long.' 
(Boyle, 1998:34) 
'Provided migration is freely determined and not caused by repression of one kind or another, 
it is usually prompted by people's desire to improve their lives (especially their incomes) and 
those of their children.' (Mollett, 1991:9) 
Scudder (1991:154) categorizes settlement/resettlement into four types. He 
explains: 
'In classifying settlement it is necessary to distinguish both the type of settler and the nature 
of the involvement of the sponsoring agency or agencies. Four types are distinguished for the 
purpose of analysis, although several may in fact be represented in a single settlement: 
- Spontaneous settlement with very little government or other assistance 
- Spontaneous settlement facilitated by government and other agencies 
- Voluntary settlement sponsored by government and other agencies 
- Compulsory resettlement sponsored primarily by government agencies.' 
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The attempt to categorize serves a specific research purpose; but once categories 
are constructed, reality is to a degree distorted since the reality always turns out 
to be far more complicated than any categorized version of it. For the 
convenience of my research, I have categorized population movement into four 
types: 
(1) Government-organized/sponsored voluntary resettlement: Voluntary 
resettlement takes place under planned intervention, but the resettled 
population is not forced to move by government decree. Such voluntary 
resettlement includes both new land settlement programmes and 'fill-in' 
programs1 aimed at solving pressures and conflicts over scarce resources, and 
forms part of China's policy instruments for poverty reduction. 
(2) Involuntary resettlement: Government uses its coercive powers to move 
people from one place to another in the interest of state or powerful groups. 
(3) Spontaneous resettlement: People move from one place to another to seek 
better opportunities. Spontaneous migration exists as a continuous 
phenomenon in most societies. 
(4) Refugee resettlement: People move with or without government support to 
prevent damage from military conflict, conflicts between different ethnic 
groups, and/or other deleterious situations such as natural disasters. 
Hence, resettlement is used as an umbrella concept for population 
movement involving permanent settlement or the intention of permanent 
settlement. Resettlement is a worldwide practice and social phenomenon. 
Despite some common features shared by resettlement activities, in different 
places and different countries resettlement always has its unique social, cultural 
and political complexities. The following three snapshot cases highlight the 
kinds of differences and complexities involved. 
Niels Fold (2000:473) gives a high opinion of Malaysia's oil palm 
production resettlement scheme: 
"The FELDA [Federal Land Development Authority] resettlement program in Malaysia is 
internationally recognized as a success story in terms of cultivated area, number of settlers, 
and scope of vertical integration in the Malaysian palm oil industry. The Malaysian way of 
organizing poor and landless people in commercial agricultural production has been stressed 
by many observers as an ideal model to deal with rural poverty.' 
Rebecca Elmhirst (1999:813) interprets Indonesia's transmigration program as a 
process of spatial politics: 
'Indonesia's recent history has revealed the fragility of a national unity created under a 
political authoritarianism that was itself underpinned by the country's relative economic 
success. The government's transmigration resettlement scheme has been one particularly 
powerful mechanism through which the New Order government (under President Soeharta) 
1
 'Fill-in' programs refer to the kind of resettlement programs where receiving areas have 
residents already. 
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has sought to achieve unity amidst the country's disparate ethnic groups. By resettling 
Javanese people, Indonesia's largest and most politically central cultural group, the state has 
attempted to achieve a presence of the "centre" in the country's "margins", and in turn, 
extend a particular imagined geography across the archipelago.' 
Kofi Akwabi-Ameyaw (1997:437) critically appraises producer cooperative 
resettlement projects in Zimbabwe as a completely failed agricultural 
development strategy. Under this strategy, the government had projected that it 
would acquire an estimated nine million hectares of European land for 
resettlement between 1980-85, and resettle 162,000 farm families under the 
cooperative production model. Kofi concludes: 
'In fact, while the overall necessity and importance of resettlement to nation-building cannot 
be emphasized enough, the real plight of ordinary rural Zimbabweans is not likely to be 
ameliorated by a development strategy that largely focuses on land acquisition for 
resettlement to the neglect of available supplementary and complementary resource use 
options including those outside the agricultural sector Producer cooperatives are 
unproductive because of the prevailing organizational culture which enables leading members 
to seek individual self-interest and private gain, making it hard for the rank and file to 
cooperate and work for the common good.' 
In a broad sense, the above-mentioned three resettlement schemes fall under 
voluntary resettlement. However, such a general category becomes less 
discriminating once one inquires carefully into the different political 
motivations, institutional settings and different methodologies involved in each 
resettlement scheme. 
Voluntary Resettlement 
Push-pull Theory 
A popular theory about the mechanisms underlying voluntary and 
spontaneous resettlement/settlement in the Chinese literature is 'Push-pull 
Theory', which provides both an explanation and a method for identifying and 
studying the internal and external processes that constitute the forces of push 
and pull. When we talk of 'internal' forces we refer to the conditions that 
pressure individuals and households to decide to move to resettlement areas. 
Often dovetailing with these are what we call 'external' forces, namely those 
conditions or advantages that attract individuals and households to resettle. 
These two kinds of forces, then, combine to profile the various disparities that 
exist between the natural and socio-economic environments of the places of 
origin and the resettlement areas. As Zhang Zhiliang (1997:36-7) puts it, 'push 
forces are all the negative factors that push people out and pull forces are the positive factors 
that attract people in.' 
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Economic factors are usually considered the most decisive in resettlement 
behaviour. Qin Junping writes: 
T. W. Schulz regarded resettlement as an investment that can generate benefits, so that 
people estimate all possible costs and benefits, and the decision to move will only be made 
when the benefits are anticipated to be bigger than the investment. Based on Schulz's theory, 
L.A. Sjasstad established a Cost-Benefit Model, which assumed that the precondition for 
someone to move was that the estimated cash benefit would be bigger than the capital cost of 
resettlement. Later, Todaro, Speare and Cebula developed the famous Cost-Benefit Theory, 
which assumed that to move and settle down were the results of rational benefit anticipation 
and the level of achievement of the anticipation.' (1999:60) 
Nevertheless, it is also well recognized that there are other important factors 
besides the economic. Indeed, there has been much research at a descriptive 
level on the push and pull forces influencing resettlement (see Zhang Lihong, 
2000; Tao Chuanjin, 2001; and Lei Youyi, 2000). These factors may be social 
(such as the level of people's participation, propaganda and mobilization, or 
religious and ethnic factors), environmental (such as the degradation caused by 
an unbalanced ratio of population to land); geographical (such as spatial distance 
between the places of origin and the resettlement areas), demographic 
(population density), legal and policy factors (such as national macro-economic 
policies, land tenure, resettlement-related regulations and legislation), and so-
called infrastructural factors (such as accessibility to water, electricity and to 
roads). 
While recognising the usefulness of this push-pull theory, one group of 
Chinese researchers has identified its main weakness: namely, that it is a theory 
primarily for qualitative rather than quantitative research. In order to redress 
this limitation, Zhang Zhiliang (1997) and his colleagues have identified several 
quantitative indicators. His theory (which he labels 'A Theory of Resettlement 
Push and Pull Forces and Mechanisms') consists of three parts, one made up of 
internal mechanisms and two parts that concern external mechanisms. The two 
external mechanisms focus on deficits in the original natural environment and 
regional disparity in socio-economic development between the areas of origin 
and resettlement. He uses four categories of indicators: First, economic 
indicators (including net income per capita per annum, and employment rate); 
second, educational levels (two indicators - literacy rate and enrolment rate for 
school age children); third, health status (including rate of infant mortality, and 
nutrition), and lastly, a characterisation of the living environment (including 
aspects such as access to piped drinking water, transportation and electricity). 
The internal mechanisms include the willingness to move in terms of 
motivations, expectations, values etc. The quantitative tension of the external 
push-pull forces can then be calculated according to the indicators identified 
and by applying a given formula; but Zang Zhiliang developed no quantitative 
indicators to measure internal forces. And so far as one can tell from a review of 
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the literature, there has been no published quantitative research to date on these 
internal forces. 
'Pull-push theory' may be good at explaining why resettlers choose to 
move, but it does not tackle well the issue of why some people choose not to 
move or are not able to move. Pull-push theory, it seems, is more relevant to 
spontaneous resettlement and voluntary resettlement than to involuntary 
resettlement. The effort to quantify pull-push theory shows that belief in 
positivist research remains strong within the community of Chinese researchers. 
Furthermore, the theory has little intention of improving policy assessment, 
even though it includes policy factors as one of the many factors. It has 
therefore played little role in policy formulation. Nevertheless, the review of 
this theory has helped me identify some of the critical factors/indicators that 
have enabled resettlers to move and what has inhibited the population 
remaining in the places of origin from doing so. 
Scudder's Sociological Framework 
In the wider international literature, Scudder's sociological framework is the 
most influential work on voluntary/agricultural resettlement/settlement 
research and practice. Thayer Scudder (1991:160-168) formulated an analysis of 
new land settlements in which he defined a four-stage model of the settlement 
process for voluntary resettlement. These are identified as: 
(1) Planning, initial infrastructural development, and settler recruitment: This 
first stage covers the initial activities related to feasibility studies, planning, and 
design - and the subsequent ones related to settler recruitment and the 
construction of such infrastructure as roads and irrigation facilities; 
(2) Transition: In this stage, settlers continue to move from one habitat to 
another. This transitional period can last for less than a year for a minority of 
families but for the majority it usually continues for at least two years and 
frequently as much as five or more years; 
(3) Economic and social development: Settlers act on a wide range of 
investment strategies to achieve higher levels of productivity through 
diversification of the family estate. Settlers begin to pay more attention to 
organizing themselves, and aggregates of households develop ties that 
represent 'communities in the process'; and 
(4) Handing over and incorporation: Settlement cannot be considered a success 
until control of project activities has been handed over to the settlers and their 
local organizations; a second generation of settlers has started to take over; and 
the project is incorporated within the encompassing region. 
In formulating this model, Scudder draws upon rich evidence from his 
thirty-year involvement in resettlement processes in many countries of the 
world. According to Cernea (1991:146), Scudder's resettlement model and his 
discussion of development issues related to different settlement stages has 
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made a great contribution to the 'design of better-phased settlement projects'. 
Underlying the four stages model is his observation that 'new land settlements have 
histories and that these histories are remarkably similar' (1991:160), though within 
particular settlement schemes, one encounters a diverse range of responses, 
especially in respect to the time span needed to adapt to the new living 
circumstances. 
Other messages that one can distil from Scudder's research include the 
following: 
The aim of resettlement projects should be to support regional development, or 
as he pu t s it, their 'success is defined in terms of the ability of a land settlement project to 
facilitate regional development' (1991:154). The social analysis of resettlement is 
important for attaining the economic goals of the project: 'Throughout the tropics 
and subtropics, sponsored settlers are overwhelmingly recruited from among low-income 
farmers or landless labourers, but if a new settlement is to initiate a process of regional 
development, obviously people with both farm and non-farm skills must be recruited' 
(1991:170). And, the focus of resettlement projects should primarily be the 
development of the resettlement area and settlers. Thus, although he believes 
that an understanding of the social and cultural origins of settlers is important, 
in his general discussion he does not stress so much the need to look closely at 
precisely who among the population of the places of origin have 
transmigrated.2 
Scudder's contribution raises a number of points directly relevant to the 
definition of my own research. In the first place, the cases I present in this thesis 
concern resettlement projects that are principally aimed at poverty reduction 
rather than regional development, although their location and activities may of 
course impact on their surrounding regional economies. Second, my research 
aims not only to analyse the dynamics of life in resettlement areas but also to 
describe the populations who remain behind in the places of origin of the 
settlers and the types of relationships they maintain with each other. This is 
important for characterising the beneficiaries of the settlement schemes funded 
by government and donor agencies. 
Comparing Cases 
At this point - and in response to Scudder's call for comparative observations -
it is illustrative to explore some similarities and differences between the 
Indonesian and Chinese programmes of resettlement. 
2
 Of course he did (together with Elizabeth Colson, his co-researcher) document the plight of the 
population of Gwembe Tonga in what was then Northern Rhodesia (now Zambia), when they 
were forced to leave their river valley homelands for resettlement in a different ecological zone 
due to the building of the Kariba dam in the late 1950s. 
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The Transmigration Program in Indonesia 
'Indonesia's programme of guided and subsidised migration, now over 80 years old (Swasono 
and Singarimbun, 1985) has always been related to agricultural development. In the days of 
the Netherlands-East Indies colonial administration a modest programme was begun in 1905 
under the heading of colonisation, providing better employment opportunities for the millions 
of peasants living on densely populated Java, with planned population movement to develop 
arable land on forest and brushland on the larger islands of the archipelago, such as Sumatra, 
Sulawesi and Kalimantan. 
'The new settlements or colonies were for food crop growers on irrigated land which Javanese 
migrants had been accustomed to in their villages of origin. The three quarter of a hectare 
allocated to each migrant family was assumed to be adequate for a family life at 'sufficiency 
level'. The Javanese colonists were however, also resettled to provide a labour force for the 
privately-owned plantations of Dutch companies, in need of rubber tappers, oil palm estate 
labourers etc. outside Java. It was intended that this work would provide them with 
additional income, to take living standards considerably above previous subsistence levels. 
'After war and revolution, Indonesia was not only badly disorganised but still facing the old 
problem of a heavily populated Java and Bali, which together had only 7 per cent of the new 
Republic's (1945) territory but 69 per cent of its population. Little wonder, then, that one of 
its first actions in 1950s was the adoption of a population policy favouring redistribution of 
population. This came under the new heading of transmigration. The old term colonisation 
was evidently jarring to a newly independent country. 
'In the first Five-Year Plan, termed Pelita I (1969/70 - 1973/74), the first migration target 
was set at 125,000 families, rising to 250,000 families in Pelita II (1974/75 - 1977/78), to 
500,000 families in Pelita III (1978/79 - 1982/83) and to 750,000 families in Pelita IV 
(1983/84 - 1988/89). During this whole period the World Bank lent the Indonesian 
Government large sums to help it to implement this huge programme. 
The transmigration programme has led to a significant expansion in arable 
land, most of it (80 per cent) dry field, while making the population in the outer 
islands more self sufficient in food supplies. Many factors are involved in any 
assessment of the programme. Certainly a thin layer of the poor farmers in Java 
(with very little capital) have been offered farming opportunities on better 
conditions, particularly with respect to size of holding, than they would ever 
have had in their village of origin. But given the fact that an average of less than 
0.75 hectares of upland could be intensively utilised with the means at their 
disposal, no family could have gained much extra reward from the produce of 
that small area. If there had been no off-farm jobs in the new settlement areas it 
remains questionable now how long the transmigrant would have felt he was 
being offered a better opportunity. 
'Official efforts are now likely to concentrate on 'fill-in' programmes which make use of 
existing infrastructure, recruiting settlers from among spontaneous migrants in receiving 
areas. Future settlements based on food crops are likely to be limited to areas where soils are 
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good and marketing prospects strong. Settlement with cash crops are likely to receive special 
attention - notably those with tree crops and in Nucleus Estates. All this, with more 
attention given to management, policy formulation, spontaneous migration, the protection of 
the environment and, not least, the rights of local people.' (Tjondronegoro, 1991: 132-
150) 
Alex Schumacher3 describes the Indonesian transmigration p rogram as an utter 
disaster. He writes: 
"There are good reasons why Java, Madura and Bali are so highly populated. The most 
significant being that these islands are situated in the volcanic fringe of the archipelago on 
which geologically young, very rich and productive soils have formed from volcanic ash. 
These are constantly being renewed by new volcanic eruptions. Because of their inherent 
productivity, these soils were capable of supporting the very dense population that developed 
on them. By contrast, in the outer islands, particularly Kalimantan, Sulawesi and much of 
Sumatra, which were the target of the program, the soils are mostly geologically old, very 
poor and highly acid. Over time and under the cover of forest vegetation, the nutrients have 
been largely washed out of them by the combination of heavy rainfall and the increasingly 
acid conditions. These soils could support transient, slash and burn agriculture, but were 
never capable of supporting dense settled populations. The small pockets of good soils are 
limited to river valleys and flood plains where periodic flooding has resulted in the deposition 
of better soils. From a purely physical standpoint, therefore, the policy of transmigration was 
highly flawed." 
Schumacher frequently paid visits to the resettlement site. After his visit to 
Central Sulawesi, he made the following observations: 
"The settlers' housing was totally substandard, and reflected no consideration of the social or 
customary habits of the settlers, who were mostly village people. The settlements consisted of 
small wooden shacks set out at intervals of about 50 m in long parallel rows in which it 
would be impossible to maintain any sense of community or village life, which would have 
been found in Java or Bali. To make it worse, if one of the houses in this rigid grid pattern 
happened to be located swamp, no attempt was made to find an alternative location for it. As 
a result, there was a proportion of the houses that were totally uninhabitable. Certainly 
resettlement sites were a complete disaster in which the settlers were committed to a 
condition of continued and abject poverty, despite that the settlers kept them employed as 
seasonal labourers."My intention in introducing this Indonesian transmigration program is 
not to suggest a direct parallel with the Chinese case, whose socio-political context is so 
markedly different, but to highlight some common features of government-organized 
voluntary resettlement. Such similarities imply that lessons can be learned across countries. 
The two examples exhibit the following common features: (1) In both cases, no systematic 
socio-economic and environmental assessments were conducted before the launching of the 
program. This implies a common feature of most large planned intervention programs: 
political gain and the interests of certain powerful groups prevail over social, economic and 
3
 Alex Schumacher is a senior manager of Agriteam Company of Canada. He has extensive 
working experiences in Indonesia. The quotation in the text is from his personal comments to 
my thesis. 
Introducing the Issues of Resettlement 11 
environmental feasibility. (2) In both, the resettled populations are small-scale peasant 
farmers. The implication here is that peasant farmer mobility is relatively low when compared 
to urban populations, since farmers are bound to land and they generally lack capital. And, 
for these reasons, government organisation is an essential support for many resettled farmers. 
Also, agricultural settlement involves much more than the decision of individual households 
to move to settle on new land, since it entails the acquisition of land through some legal 
framework established by the State (or some other official body) which also is responsible for 
the management of financial investments required for resettlement infrastructure. (3) The 
village plans in both cases cannot meet the economic aspirations and livelihood needs of the 
resettlers. The land allocated for each farmer household is very small in both the Chinese and 
Indonesia cases, and can only provide a subsistence living: it cannot make them that much 
better-off (4) Off-farm activities are therefore important for transmigrants or resettlers if 
they are to sustain their livelihoods or improve their levels of income. (5) Government 
investment is the key to facilitating the transmigration/resettlement process, though, at the 
same time, both governments face financial difficulties in sufficiently meeting the needs of the 
programs. In fact government can always excuse the poor provision and services by 
emphasizing financial difficulties, without questioning the ideology and policy framework of 
the resettlement program itself. 
The major difference between the Indonesian and Chinese cases seems to 
concern program objectives: while the primary objective of the Indonesian 
transmigration program is population distribution, that of the Chinese 
resettlement program focuses on new land development and poverty reduction. 
This underlines the importance of identifying specific program goals when 
assessing the effectiveness of particular programs. 
Voluntary Resettlement for Poverty Reduction in China 
China claims to use voluntary resettlement as an instrument for poverty 
reduction. The positive economic impact on resettlers and the level of 
'development' in resettlement areas are regarded as the most convincing of 
arguments for supporting such resettlement programmes. Here the major 
indicators used for measuring economic impact are: (1) increase in resettlers' 
incomes; (2) increase in grain production in the resettled area; (3) increase of 
arable land, mostly irrigated land or paddy fields, in the resettlement area; (4) 
and, more generally, increase in the input and output ratio for the production 
system. 
Bai Nansheng (2000:165) has evaluated the economic returns of a World 
Bank Irrigation Project in Ningxia in China involving land reclamation and 
population resettlement. Bai's conclusions are that for every 1 yuan (about 0.12 
US$) invested grain production increased by 0.37 kg and generated a further 1.4 
yuan (0.17 US$) in agricultural production value. He also found that the 
poverty level of the resettled population was reduced; for example, the net 
income per capita per year of the resettled population from Jingyuan County in 
the Ningxia Autonomous Region reached, in 1998, 1,378 yuan (172 US$). 
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Though by international standards this would still be considered a low per 
capita income, it was 1.8 times higher than that of the rural population in 
Jingyuan, the place of origin of the resettlers (Bai Nansheng, 2000:165). 
Furthermore, according to Chen Zhongxiang (1999:92), the total investment in 
resettlement in Ningxia in 1995 was 1,894,500 yuan (about 237,000 US$), and the 
total production value (including grain production, forestry, grass and livestock 
production) was 73,466,100 yuan (9,183,000 US$). Chen calculated that this 
reduced the cost factor by 70 percent and produced an input/output ratio of 1: 
2.79. 
Some positive social impacts were also given attention, thereby showing 
the effectiveness of resettlement for poverty reduction and development. Bai 
Nansheng (2000:165) found that many changes had taken place for women. As 
often observed in resettlement areas, males became involved in off-farm 
activities, so that women had to take more responsibility for farming, which led 
to their greater involvement in training and learning about technologies. 
Women in the resettlement areas also became more out-spoken than women in 
the places of origin. Bai Nansheng also indicates that social contact in the 
resettlement area had improved. Improvement in transportation, electricity and 
other amenities made it possible for resettlers to keep frequent contact with 
relatives and friends, and to have relatively easy communication with the 
outside world. Chen Zhongxiang4 (1999) writes that minority groups have also 
benefited from resettlement for poverty reduction. For example, the majority of 
the resettled population in Ningxia is from minority ethnic groups. Nearly all 
were from southern Ningxia where the minority groups of Hui, Man, 
Dongxiang and others represented 47.76 percent of the total population, with 
those of Hui origin constituting 47.59 percent of these groups.5 And among the 
more than 200,000 resettled people, 62.56 percent were from minority groups 
with the Hui representing 60.58 percent, by far the majority. Chen Zhongxiang 
indicates that the birth rate of the resettled population became lower than that 
in their places of origin in Ningxia. According to a sample study, Chen found 
that the birth rate of the resettled population was 1.6 percent as against 2.5 
percent6 for the population in the place of origin. 
The impact of resettlement on the places of origin has also received 
attention. Zhang Zhiliang (1997) evaluated the economic returns of irrigation 
4
 Chen's article does not mention the time frame of the data and sample size, but it probably 
marks an important continuing trend. 
5
 The total population of Ningxia was 5,615,500 at the end of 2000, among which the Hui, a 
Muslim ethnic group made up 1,902,300, and other ethnic groups made up 36,700. The 
remainder are Han, who constitute the majority of Chinese nationals. 
6
 Again the time frame and sample size is missing. The reasons for this lower birth rate among 
the resettled population are not discussed, but it could be that government birth control 
practices were more strictly adhered to than in the place of origin. 
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resettlement in Central Gansu on the places of origin. In Zhangshan Village of 
Caoxian Township, Jingyuan County, in 1982, the average net income per capita 
per annum was only 58 yuan, and average grain possession was only 72 kg. In 
1983, 62 households (254 people) were resettled (unfortunately, the total 
household population of the village is not given in the study) allowing the 
average land per person for those remaining to double to 0.87 ha.7 According to 
Cheng Zhongxiang (in Chen Zhongxiang & Qin Heguo, 1999:92), 'Statistics in 
1995 showed that the resettlement of 200,000 people from the eight counties of southern 
Ningxia induced the reallocation of resources in the places of origin, which enabled 120,000 
poor people in the places of origin to be lifted out of poverty/ Many statements were made 
indicating that the reduction of population in the places of origin had improved 
the ecological environment in those places (Chen Zhongxiang, 1999, Bai 
Nansheng, 2000). However, no data and cases are provided as hard evidence in 
order to show precisely how the ecological environment had improved. 
Existing literature on voluntary resettlement for poverty reduction in China, 
however, manifests certain fundamental research gaps. There are many 
completed research projects that show in broad terms how resettlers have 
benefited from resettlement, but there is no research that details who exactly 
has benefited. I consider this question central to ask in any such research. 
Furthermore, there is a lack of research that analyses government policy. Policy 
analysis is extremely important because investment in resettlement for poverty 
reduction can be a heavy drain upon government revenue. There is also no 
detailed analysis of the social dynamics at household and community level, 
which I believe to be the main forces shaping which actors benefit from 
resettlement. 
Recently, the international community has raised its concern over 
voluntary resettlement for poverty reduction in China. For example, the Asian 
Development Bank (ADB) made its position clear in a recent conference in 
China (ADB: 2000): 
'[C]arefully defined guidelines should be developed for voluntary resettlement. This should be 
used as a poverty reduction tool only as a last resort. The remaining 20 million rural poor 
live mostly in very remote, resource poor areas. Voluntary resettlement is used in China as 
one option to help them escape poverty. But voluntary resettlement often comes with high 
social and cultural costs. Voluntary resettlement is considered to be quite controversial by 
many NGOs and international organizations. If the Leading Group [Poverty Alleviation 
Leading Group of the State Council of China] hopes to get the support of the international 
community for voluntary resettlement efforts, we must reach broad agreement on appropriate 
policies, procedures, and mechanisms that would satisfy the concerns of all parties. The risks 
and challenges must be carefully analysed when considering voluntary resettlement.' 
7
 No mention is made of when the survey was conducted or the sample size. 
* The article provides no information about the source of information nor does it give the 
baseline for such calculations. 
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Involuntary Resettlement 
There is a rich literature on involuntary resettlement, which suggests that more 
research has been carried out on involuntary than on voluntary resettlement. I 
suspect that this is firstly because investment in projects that result in 
involuntary resettlement has been substantially larger. Secondly, the population 
involved in involuntary resettlement is much larger: 'During the last two decades of 
the previous century, the magnitude of forced population displacements caused by development 
programs was in the order of 10 million people each year, or some 200 million people globally 
during that period.' (Cernea, 2000). Although there are no estimates available on 
populations moving for voluntary resettlement, their numbers must be smaller 
due to fewer voluntary resettlement projects and generally fewer settlers 
involved in each case. This is certainly the case in China.'However, lower 
investment and people involved should not lead to one giving less weight to 
research on voluntary resettlement since there is a significant difference in the 
project objectives of the two kinds of resettlement. The primary concern of 
involuntary resettlement is to 'build infrastructure for new industries, 
irrigation, transportation highways, power generation, or for urban 
developments such as hospitals, schools, and airports' (ibid, 2000), whereas for 
planned voluntary resettlement it maybe regional development, improvement 
of agricultural productivity, and poverty reduction. 
The adverse impacts of involuntary resettlement have been widely 
recognised. This is the reason why, in the mid-1990s, both the World Bank and 
the Asian Development Bank stated clearly that, wherever possible, involuntary 
resettlement should be avoided or minimised. The basic principles for 
involuntary resettlement identified by ADB state that (i) it should be 'avoided 
where feasible', and (ii) where 'population displacement is unavoidable, it 
should be minimised by exploring all viable project options' (ADB, 1995:9). In 
similar vein, the first paragraph of WB resettlement policy states that: 
'Bank experience indicates that involuntary resettlement under development projects, if 
unmitigated, often gives rise to severe economic, social, and environmental risks: production 
systems are dismantled; people face impoverishment when their productive assets or income 
sources are lost; people are relocated to environments where their productive skills may be 
less applicable and the competition for resources greater; community institutions and social 
networks are weakened; kin groups are dispersed; and cultural identity, traditional authority, 
and the potential for mutual help are diminished or lost.' (WB, 2001:1). 
During the 1990s Michael Cernea, who worked for many years within the 
World Bank as the senior rural sociologist, developed his 'Risks, safeguards, 
'For the estimated number of the population involved in involuntary resettlement see 3.1 
Review of Involuntary Resettlement of this thesis. For the estimated number participating in 
voluntary resettlement, see 2.2 Resettlement Project Implementation across China. 
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and reconstruction' model. In this he shows how population displacement 
associated with resettlement schemes generates a wide spectrum of risks: 
landlessness, joblessness, homelessness, marginalization, food insecurity, 
increased morbidity and mortality, loss of access to common property and 
services, and often a considerable amount of social disarticulation (Cernea 2000 
and 1990). Even though practically all of these vulnerabilities are unintended, 
this nevertheless represents a considerable indictment of international policy 
and investment. Yet, to his credit, Cernea's ongoing critical appraisal of various 
types of resettlement scheme has in fact played a key role in the rethinking of 
the approach and practice in the World Bank and other international 
development organisations - at least at the level of policy discourse, if not 
always so clearly in terms of implementation. Cernea (2000:20) argues: 'Most 
important is the internal logic of the model. It suggests that preventing or 
overcoming the pattern of impoverishment would require risk reversal: 
a. From landlessness to land-based resettlement 
b. From joblessness to reemployment 
c. From homelessness to house reconstruction 
d. From marginalization to social inclusion 
e. From increased morbidity to improved health care 
f. From food insecurity to adequate nutrition 
g. From loss of access to restoration of community assets and services 
h. From social disarticulation to networks and community rebuilding' 
In 1995, Cernea (1996) was awarded the Malinowski Award for his outstanding 
contribution to social science. He had accomplished an extraordinary level of 
influence within the bank - more than any other applied social scientist had 
achieved. Working for several decades in the World Bank, he demonstrated that 
social science can make a difference and shape policy. But he also criticized his 
own colleagues: 'social scientists all too often speak to themselves: historically 
they have been much better at recording development's tragedies than 
preventing them.' (1991:188) Cernea believes that 'sociological knowledge can improve 
the formulation of development policies and operational approaches, so as to substantially 
enhance the benefits of induced development.' (1991:189). In his lecture in acceptance of 
the Malinowski Award, he addressed how social science had shaped 
resettlement policy worldwide: 'social science's contribution has resulted in major 
changes in the practice of involuntary resettlement throughout the world - changes in 
resetters' entitlements, in planning, in financing, in turning around insensitive bureaucracies. 
The overarching meaning of all these changes is that the lives and fates of many people 
worldwide are improved through better protection and added opportunities' (Cernea 
1996:29). 
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Systematic research on involuntary resettlement has led to the formulation of 
sounder project and policy frameworks10. This is supported by over one 
hundred thematic review papers commissioned by the World Commission on 
Dams (DAMS, 1998-2001); and by Cernea's strong influence within the circles of 
the World Bank and various other international organisations and bilateral 
donors, and thus more indirectly on national governments. In addition, a broad 
range of social issues has been tackled. Political dimensions were explicitly 
exposed by Scudder (1973) when he suggested that big construction projects 
have a special appeal to planners and politicians, representing a country's or a 
political party's accomplishments. And indigenous issues too have been at the 
centre of debate. Reviewing the literature on Central and South America, 
Montoya Diaz (1996) concludes that most inquiries to date have given 
insufficient attention to the rights of indigenous groups, though, for example, 
cases from Mexico and Brazil highlight the longstanding struggles that 
indigenous peoples have been involved in vis-a-vis land developers and the 
State. Psychological issues are pinpointed by Scudder (1976) who describes the 
kinds of physiological, psychological and socio-cultural stress suffered by 
resettlers; and health matters are discussed by Sutapa Chattopadhyay (2002) 
who conducted a case study of health and living conditions among the 
displaced in India. 
Breaking the Boundaries 
To some extent, these experiences of involuntary resettlement are also found in 
cases of voluntary resettlement where some of the same problems, though 
perhaps on a lesser scale, arise. Though situations may differ considerably, 
some of findings and approaches from involuntary resettlement may also 
provide useful lessons and experiences for the study of processes of voluntary 
resettlement, and vice versa. After all, despite differences in objectives and 
intervention measures, both types of resettlement concern population 
movement from one place to another. The central concerns of current 
involuntary resettlement policies are equity, justice and people's participation, 
or as William Adames (2000:9) argues, 'Equity and distribution are the key issues that 
emerge in any discussion of the social impacts of large dams, Defining equity from the 
point of view of the communities affected by large dams requires an understanding of both 
positive and negative impacts that goes beyond an economic framework' Number five of the 
principles of the Asian Development Bank's (ADB, 1995:8) resettlement policy 
10
 Yet, despite the many studies conducted on involuntary resettlement, William Adames 
stresses that '[the] data on which the analysis is based are poor. Many of the critical categories 
of data have never been collected, even for major dams funded by multilateral donors. Few 
figures are available other than power and irrigation benefits' (Adames, 2000:11). 
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also refers to people 's participation: 'The affected people should be fully informed and 
closely consulted on resettlement and compensation options.' A n d clearly similar concerns 
pertain to those resettled on a voluntary basis. 
At this point it is pertinent to raise Dana Clark's (1999) worries about the 
message carried with the term of 'involuntary': 
'"involuntary" means without the displaced person's informed consent or power of choice, or 
where that consent or choice is being exercised in the absence of reasonable alternative 
options Who determines whether "consent" has been given, who determines whether 
there was truly a "voluntary" decision, whether there is choice from a range of options?' 
The displaced persons' rights of living in their home place are to be deprived if 
involuntary resettlement is to take place. The possible choices left are where to 
go and how to go. The argument then stresses that one should not deprive 
displaced persons' available choices and options under the 'protection' of a 
resettlement process which is fundamentally involuntary in nature but which 
claims to allow some space for settlers. Actually, no matter how intensively one 
conducts a social assessment, or is concerned about equity, justice and people's 
participation, they necessarily remain a secondary thought in involuntary 
resettlement. Many project documents and research papers indicate that 
decisions to move are a kind of 'Hobson's choice', that is when authorities in 
charge of involuntary resettlement finally reach consent, association or 
agreement with displaced persons, then they label such results as 'voluntary'. 
In fact, displaced persons may simply give up resisting because they face no 
other option. Such 'non-existent' choices then should not be named 'voluntary'. 
This tendency to apply the term 'voluntary' in these circumstances is, I assume, 
a strategy that arises because of the desire to make the involuntary nature of 
projects less explicit and therefore more politically acceptable. Such language 
use can easily mislead observers with little experience of the dynamics involved 
in resettlement. 
The extent of voluntariness also differs according to the type of 
resettlement scheme. In 'dam resettlement' programmes, displaced persons 
must move otherwise they will be flooded; in 'reservation resettlement', 
populations living in or near natural reserve or conservation areas must be 
convinced to move in search of other livelihood opportunities and the 
specialised training that may be required; and refugees choose to move away 
from conflict zones because their lives are at risk but often have to be persuaded 
to enter the world of the 'refugee settlement'. Despite the different levels of 
'voluntariness' implied in these examples, in many ways the primary nature of 
resettlement remains 'involuntary' in the sense that the resettlement process is 
fundamentally planned and facilitated or executed by outside authoritative 
bodies. 
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The line between voluntary and involuntary resettlement may therefore 
seem clear when considering broad parameters and yet ambiguous when 
examining the details of social process. For the case of involuntary resettlement, 
an entire population will be displaced without much consultation to make way 
for the construction of a particular infrastructure; whereas for voluntary 
resettlement, the population in the place of origin can choose to move or stay. 
However, as I have suggested above, the line between voluntary and 
involuntary is in practice often ambivalent, and requires careful observation 
and probing to establish the degree of consent, coercion, and negotiated 
agreement involved in particular cases. That is, we should observe and examine 
the complexities involved. Indeed, some populations affected by involuntary 
resettlement may actually in the end benefit from and welcome such 
arrangements; while, on the other hand, much resettlement that is considered 
voluntary may end up being regarded as being involuntary. For example, 
involuntariness arises when resettlers can only move to certain assigned 
resettlement areas, and when residents already living in a resettlement area are 
forced to receive a resettled population, at which point they may themselves 
become displaced. This is graphically illustrated by the resettlement site in 
Yunnan, which I examine later in the thesis, where there were sixteen local 
population groupings already living in the area before resettlement. In order to 
accommodate the resettled population and in accordance with the resettlement 
village plan of having houses in tidy lines and rows, local residents were 
requested to move to the newly-designed resettlement village. Hence, local 
residents had to destroy their previous houses and build new houses according 
to new house construction standards. One local resident commented: "I do not 
want to build an expensive new house because I do not have money, but I was 
told that I could not live in this place anymore if I did not follow the 
instructions. Now, I have a new house, but it is empty inside, because I had to 
sell all my valuable stuff, especially my new colour TV, for meeting the 
construction standards." 
Boundaries emerge and submerge when the level of understanding and 
angle of perception changes; and this is as true for the field of settlement policy 
as it is for other social arenas. Here, it is useful to introduce the concept of 
'policy community' (see Arce 2001:11), which helps us to understand how 
different notions and alternative views over an issue can co-exist - in this case 
'resettlement'. A policy community is a knowledge pool that comprises 
conflicting and shared policy opinions. Applying this to resettlement, Alberto 
Arce writes: 
'[R]ecently an alternative view has started to emerge within the policy community, which 
starts to generate a different notion of what constitutes good resettlement (see Fisher, et al., 
2000). The United Nations agencies addressing issues of forced eviction or internal 
displacement from a tradition of human rights (the United Nations Commission for Human 
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Rights), [while] the World Bank identifies as a main problem the issue of governability 
and government ownership of projects. Instead the UNCHR stresses the issue of breakdown 
of law and order, protection of minorities, and the importance of cultural rights While 
the World Bank orientation is to work with governments to improve their capacity to manage 
and implement policy, [t]he UN agencies mainly work with NGOs, because their skills on 
advocacy and grassroots contacts made them the best institutions to organise local claims on 
active citizenship rights.' 
The concept of policy community, then, is both a conceptual device as well as 
an 'action' concept for promoting collective and alternative policy options and 
strategies. As I show later, the field of resettlement provides a good illustration 
of the importance of policy communities for analysing processes of 
development intervention. But first we need to sketch in the historical 
background to China's contemporary resettlement program. 
1.3 A Brief Review of China's Historical Population Movement" 
China's current demographic characteristics and paths of development are 
closely linked to population resettlement, which can literally be traced back to 
the Qin dynasty, some 2000 years ago. Since then some 1000 cases of large-scale 
resettlement have been recorded. The historical profile of China's resettlement 
can be divided into five periods: 
• The first when multi-directional resettlement took place to the middle and 
down-stream areas of the Yellow River. This spanned the Shang and Zhou 
dynasties and the Chunqiu period. 
• The second when resettlement occurred from the middle and down-stream 
of the Yellow River to middle and down-stream areas of the Yazi River 
during the Qin and Song dynasties. 
• The third when resettlement took place from the east to west within the 
Yazi watershed during Yuan, Ming and Qing dynasties. 
• The fourth when resettlement from in-land to out-reach areas and to the 
overseas took place during the early and middle part of the 20th century. 
• The fifth is marked by the multi-dimensional resettlement of contemporary 
China 
" All the data for this section derive from Cao Shuji (1997), China's Resettlement History, Peoples 
Press of Fujian. 
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Review of China's Resettlement (21" century B.C to 1840) 
Over a very long historical trajectory, China gradually moved from being 
composed of a multitude of separate political units to becoming more 
centralised and integrated politically, although it remained divided on an 
ethnic basis. An old Chinese saying represents China's deeply rooted belief in 
the existence and safety of homeland territories: "It is safe to stay, but be 
cautious when moving around". Like the peoples of many other 'premodern' 
societies, the Chinese have not liked to settle in new areas, and so all large-scale 
resettlement during this period was instigated by major socio-political events, 
such as war and social disorder, or by natural disasters. These can be grouped 
into four types: 
(1) Resettlement caused by wars: China's history is a history of wars and most 
resettlement was the result of wars between competing landlords, rebellions by 
groups of farmers, the invasion of the mainland by 'foreign' ethnic groups 
(nowadays termed 'minority nationalities'), and wars waged by the central 
government against neighbouring countries. People were resettled in different 
ways: soldiers stayed on in conquered territories; people were forced to move to 
the homelands of conquering armies, while the conquerors themselves often 
took possession of land and resources and moved in large numbers of their own 
people to manage them; and many families fled the wars to settle in other 
places. 
(2) Resettlement caused by political decisions: This type can be further 
categorized into four forms: (a) that concerned with political control (e.g. when 
one regime is defeated and its ex-governors and their families, together with 
other officials and supporters are forced to resettle in controlled areas); (b) that 
enforced as a punishment, when criminals were forced to move to remote and 
inhospitable places, and their descendants not allowed to return; (c) that 
connected with the search for a sense of belonging or identity and new 
opportunities (e.g. after the Han peoples succeeded in uniting China, many 
other nationalities (ethnic groups) living on the periphery were attracted by the 
prosperity of the new polity and some were given permission by the Han 
government to settle there); and (d) that due to the construction of large-scale 
infrastructural works, such as the Great Wall which was built by millions of 
forced labourers. 
(3) Resettlement caused by natural disasters: China is geographically located in 
a zone frequently afflicted by natural disasters, such as floods, drought, and 
plagues of locusts. With limited means to defend themselves from such 
disasters, populations regularly suffered from famine and damage to their 
properties, which led many to flee the affected area. 
(4) Resettlement encouraged by government for reasons of 'development'. An 
example of this would be the policy declared by the emperor of the Tang 
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dynasty in 728. He announced that "People who volunteer to resettle in border 
areas will be given good land, and will be exempt from forced labor forever." 
Here - and in many similar cases - government encouraged rather than enforced 
resettlement. In return, resettlers were often given land titles and tax rebates or 
exemption. 
Resettlement in More Recent Times (from 1840 to 1949) 
According to Chinese historians, the modern history of China begins with the 
Opium War of 1840 and leads to the foundation of People's Republic of China 
in 1949. During this period, China saw the end of the Qing dynasty and the 
development of the modern Chinese state. During this 100 year period, we can 
identify five types of resettlement: 
(1) Resettlement of land claimed first by the Qing dynasty government and then 
later by the Republic of China: One of such resettlement took place in northeast 
of China. Northeast China includes three provinces: those of Liaoning, Jilin and 
Heilongjiang. Originally, the population was concentrated in Liaoning 
Province, primarily because of the "closure policy" (i.e. people were not 
allowed to live in a certain 'closed area') implemented by Qing government. As 
a result, there were less than 10 thousand people living in an area of several 
hundred thousand square kilometres in northern Heilongjiang. This made it 
easy for Russia to occupy Chinese territory. In the circumstances, many Chinese 
pressed for government action in opening up the area for settlement which, it 
was argued, was necessary in order to consolidate control over China's 
borderland territory. Hence, in 1860, the Qing government opened the Hulan 
River Grasslands of northern Haerbin, Heilongjiang Province; and in the 
following year, grasslands in the northwest of Jilin Povince were also declared 
open for settlement. 
These decisions provoked large-scale voluntary resettlement. By 1911, the 
total resettled population in Jilin reached 4.22 million and that in Heilongjiang, 
3.22 million. In addition to the resettlement induced by abolishing the policy of 
closure, the opening up of the original royal hunting areas for land occupation 
provoked further massive resettlement. The royal hunting area - "Mu Lan 
Hunting Area"- had been established as early as 1681, but in 1821 it was put 
aside as useless, until 1863 when the Qing government allowed farming inside 
the area. By 1917, the total resettled population amounted to some 890 thousand 
with a total land area of 1 million mu. 
Continuing the efforts of the Qing government, the government of the 
Republic established special agencies responsible for the formulation and 
implementation of policies to attract settlers to the areas. For example, in 1914, 
Heilongjiang Province formulated a "Policy of Calling for Land Claims". 
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However, in the first place, not many people responded because the land 
available was located in very harsh natural conditions and there were no 
specific incentives offered. Thus, in 1921, certain privileges were introduced in 
the form of tax reductions, safety protection and other similar rewards. As a 
result, a total of 706 thousand persons were resettled between 1918 and 1921, 
giving an average 141 thousand per year. This was followed by a population of 
1875 thousand between 1923 and 1930, an average of 270 thousand per year. As 
a consequence, many other provinces, such as Jilin, Liaoning, Ningxia, 
Neimeng, Gansu, Qinghai and Xinjiang, learning from the experience of 
Heilongjiang, set about formulating and implementing their own policies of 
resettlement for development. 
(2) Resettlement caused by the Taiping Heavenly Kingdom war (1851-1864): 
This war constituted the biggest farmers' rebellion in China's recent history. 
The battlefield was concentrated in the middle and down-stream areas of the 
the Yazi River and northern Zhejiang Province, at that time the most populated 
area of China. Heavy causalities resulting from the ten-year war, pestilence and 
famine brought a tremendous loss of population. It is estimated that the total 
loss of population in the provinces of Jiangsuthe, Zhejiang and Anhui was 48.55 
million, some 4.3% of the total population of these provinces before the war. 
After the war, many people migrated into the area. By 1889, there was a total 5.6 
million people living in the three provinces. Although the number of new 
settlers was not enough to replace the loss of population, resettlement played a 
very important role in the post-war development of these provinces. 
(3) Resettlement caused by unequal treaties with other countries: It has been 
said that China's recent history is a history of humiliation. This comment refers 
to the more than one hundred unequal treaties between the Qing government 
and mainly western countries that reduced China to a semi-colonized country 
under foreign dominance. Under these treaties some of its territory was 
controlled by foreign powers for specified periods. One response to this was 
that some Chinese migrated from these foreign enclaves to settle in areas still 
under Chinese sovereignty. For example, in 1858, the Aihui Treaty between 
China and Russia was signed, under which China lost a vast land area to the 
north of Heilongjiang; and two years later, a similar Beijing Treaty between 
China and Russia was signed, ceding to Russia an enormous area of land to the 
north of Wusuli River. As a consequence, many Chinese unwilling to live under 
Russian rule left their homes to find work and accommodation in Chinese 
areas. A further consequence of these foreign treaties was the legalization of a 
flow of labour from Chinese areas to work in foreign enterprise. For example, 
agreements were signed in 1863 and 1868 with the Americans and British that 
legalized the trafficking of Chinese labourers to the US and Britain. 
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(4) Resettlement to urban areas with industrial development: The development 
of industry and trade always go side-by-side with processes of urbanization. 
Hence, with increasing urbanization, large numbers of provincially based-
individuals (sometimes with their families) moved to settle in urban areas in 
order to provide the much needed inputs of labour for the development of 
industry and trade. A unique feature of this type of resettlement was that it 
primarily involved the transfer of members of an agricultural population to that 
of a growing urban/industry population. 
(5) Overseas resettlement of Chinese laborers: Various 'push and pull' factors 
stimulated the overseas resettlement of Chinese workers. Most of them came 
from the coastal area of south-east China, especially Guangdong and Fujian 
Provinces where population pressure was becoming a major problem. 
According to a sample survey among Chinese overseas workers, conducted in 
1935 by China's Pacific Academic Association, 69.95% of those interviewed 
indicated that they had chosen to migrate overseas in order to seek better 
income-earning opportunities - the strongest motivation for leaving China. 
China's nineteenth and early twentieth century history corresponds to a major 
period of colonization by European powers. 
The development of the colonies required the recruitment of labor to work 
in various agricultural, mining and industrial enterprises but local labor 
supplies were insufficient and so they set searching out labor around the world. 
So after 1840, Chinese labor became a key source: China had huge population 
and could easily supply whatever cheap labor was needed. The destinations of 
overseas Chinese laborers ranged widely across the countries of Southeast Asia, 
North America and Latin America, and Australia and New Zealand. About half 
of the laborers went to Asia and one-third to America. At that time, many 
centres for labor recruitment were established in Xiameng, Shantou, Macou and 
Jinmen. According to historical records, there were around this time some 
147,729 laborers bonded through Macou. 
Later when this officially recognized trade in labor came to an end, Chinese 
workers explored alternative routes for work. According to statistics - though 
incomplete - some 70,000 laborers were traded to North Africa for mining 
between 1904 and 1919. A further 10,000 were traded to Germany and 550,000 
thousand to Russia. Large-scale contracting of labor only ended after the 
establishment of the Republic of China in 1912, though many Chinese still 
actively sought work opportunities overseas due to the instability of Chinese 
society during that time. Social instability, political disorder, economic 
degradation and crisis, and natural disasters all played a part in 'pushing' 
people to migrate overseas. In addition, the longstanding network of overseas 
relationships, especially stemming from the coastal areas, facilitated this 
movement overseas. It is estimated that some three million people migrated 
overseas between 1801 and 1925. 
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Review of China's Contemporary Resettlement Experience (1949 up to now) 
As discussed at the beginning of the last section, China's contemporary 
resettlement can be categorised into four types: (1) Government-
organized/sponsored voluntary resettlement; (2) Involuntary resettlement; (3) 
Spontaneous resettlement; and (4) Refugee resettlement. In the previous two 
sections, dealing with the longer term history of resettlement in China, I 
concentrated on events rather than categories, though many similar elements 
and differences were highlighted. In the present section, I focus on the above 
types, although no information is given on refugee resettlement, and 
spontaneous resettlement is only very briefly dealt with. 
Involuntary resettlement 
There are three main kinds of forced resettlement in China's current history: the 
first one is resettlement for industrialization, the second one is resettlement for 
food security, and the third is reservoir resettlement. The first two types of 
resettlement took place mainly in the 1950s and 1960s, but reservoir 
resettlement has continued up to the present. Resettlement programs under 
different economic orders have different natures and features. Before the 1980s, 
China's economy can be categorized as a state planned economy. During that 
period, large-scale resettlement programs were launched to meet government 
interests. There were principally two movements of people, one to the 
industrial zones or cities to support China's industrial development, the other 
to agricultural zones to meet China's food security needs. 
China began to concentrate its resources on so-called "socialist economic 
construction" from 1953 onwards, when the Chinese government initiated its 
huge plan to industrialize by establishing many new industrial cities and 
industrial zones: For example, steel at Baotaou City in Inner-Mongolia, Taiyuan 
City in Shanxi, and at Wuhan City in Hubei; automobile production at 
Changchun in Jilin (or "The First Automobile Factory of Changchun"); and 
other industrial bases in Northeast China, Sichuan, Guizhou and other 
provinces. In order to provide sufficient human resources, several 100,000 
scientists, technicians and technical workers were required to resettle. The 
principal method used to move people at that time was subtle political coercion, 
which in the end led people to believe that they actually made their own 
choices. The directions of movement were from rural to urban areas, and from 
small towns and cities to bigger industrial cities and complexes, which led to a 
decline in the development of many small towns and cities in some areas. So 
that, although these resettlement programs generated many new industrial 
cities and bases and thus contributed to the economic development of the 
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country as a whole, this was at the cost of the decline or stagnation of rural 
areas and some less important areas under the central planning program. In 
order to meet China's food security needs, the new government launched (in 
1949) its programme of agricultural resettlement. Agricultural bases were built 
in remote areas in the northwest and northeast where there were vast areas of 
agricultural and waste land. Many small and large-scale state-owned farms 
were established; and many hundreds of thousands of people participated in 
this opening up the wastelands. They included people from the eastern cities, 
other rural areas, as well as many war veterans. 
From the foundation of the People's Republic, the Chinese government 
made large-scale investments in water conservation, and in water and 
hydroelectric projects, including large, medium and small schemes, and two 
very enormous projects known as the Three Gorges and Xiaolangdi projects on 
the Yellow River. China built a total of 84,000 reservoirs from 1949 to 1999. This 
led to the resettlement of around 12.5 million people, ranking China as first in 
the world in terms of the number of people resettled due to the construction of 
reservoirs. According to estimates from the ADB (1995:5), since 1980, 
development projects (especially infrastructural schemes) in the People's 
Republic of China (PRO) have led to the displacement of perhaps the largest 
number of people in the world (about 30 million). 
Constructing hydropower dams or irrigation shares the largest population 
displacement as compared with other types of programs, such as highway 
construction, and the organising of forest reserves or national parks. Hence, this 
section focuses on information concerning reservoir resettlement. In the past 50 
years, China's reservoir resettlement has passed through three stages, which are 
defined by changes in China's political environment. Mechanisms of resource 
allocation and the movement of people in China are mainly determined by 
political priorities. 
Stage I: Pre-cultural revolution stage (1950-1957) 
The following features can be identified for this stage: (1) the Chinese 
government took more cautious consideration of people's coping capacity 
because China had just been founded, after years of war; (2) land reform had 
been implemented so there were large areas of state-owned land, which could 
be distributed to resettlers; (3) farmers possessed arable land, which could be 
re-adjusted for resettlers; (4) China was a very poor country, and the rural 
economy was especially underdeveloped so that it was much easier for 
resettlers to catch up if they received subsidies. During this period, more than 
20 reservoirs were constructed, and more than 300,000 thousand people were 
resettled. 
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Stage II: Cultural Revolution stage (1958-1979) 
Socio-economic and political features of this stage were: (1) all resettlement 
projects were imposed using various political and administrative means; (2) 
political consideration took precedence over social and economic feasibilities; 
(3) no proper design and planning was conducted; (4) there was no 
consideration given to environmental carrying capacities; (5) very low subsidies 
were provided to re-settlers; and (6) there were no principal policies or 
regulations to guide actions and no legal framework to protect the rights of re-
settlers. During this stage, more than 280 water conservation and water and 
electricity projects, with more then 12 thousand kilowatt capacity, were 
constructed. And more than 2.53 million people were resettled. 
Stage III: Reform and Opening up stage (1979-1999) 
Changes in policies and political dynamics always take time, though this does 
not exclude quick and dramatic change when things are ripe for something 
new. In the Chinese case, the country experienced - over a span of two decades 
(from 1979 until 1999) - huge social, economic and political changes, but much 
of this came gradually, as a step-by-step process. Thus many of the features of 
current reservoir resettlement are an outcome of the past two decades of 
progressive change. We can identify the following important dimensions. 
In the first place, resettlement for development became the key planning 
principle. This was aimed at combining resettlement with considerations of 
economic development. Linked to this was the shift away from the notion of 
passive compensation (i.e. subsidies to new settlers) to more active support for 
the development of new viable livelihood pursuits. That is, the emphasis 
changed from the delivery of relief aid to assistance for productive activities. 
Second, an effort was made to establish and perfect regulations and laws 
relating to water conservation and the utilization of electric power. Central to 
this was the issuing of "Regulations for Land Requisition for Large and 
Medium Size Water Conservation and Electricity Projects and Resettlement", 
thus underlining that China's resettlement projects were now to be founded 
upon a solid legal framework. At the same time, program and project planning 
were given much attention and supported by the injection of external expertise 
into national programs through the setting up of so-called international projects 
such as the World Bank resettlement projects in China. 
At this stage, more than 70 large and medium size water conservation and 
electricity projects were constructed, and two enormous and long-term projects, 
namely the Xiao Lang Di Project of the Yellow River, and Three Gorges Project 
of the Yazi River were initiated. The latter was to be the biggest water 
conservation and electricity project in Chinese history. According to the 
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Ministry of Water Conservation, the construction of the Three Gorges Project 
would submerge many cities, much land and other properties. These included 2 
cities, 10 county towns, 116 market places, 1599 factories and mining sites, 655 
docks, houses totally 34,731,500 square meters, arable land of 252,600 mu 
(168,400 ha), orchards of 108,300 mu (72,200 ha), and roads consisting of 815,500 
meters. Total population living in the entire area to be submerged numbered 
some 847,500 people, among whom 426,400 were urban residents and 348,700 
rural. The estimated total investment required for the Three Gorges Project was 
40 billion yuan at 1993 price value. According to the plan, the construction of 
the project would last for 17 years. Considering natural population growth and 
other related factors, the total resettlement population was calculated at about 
1.2 million, so the project was named the "1 million population resettlement 
project". In fact, the parties involved in the project had all more or less realized 
that the achievement of the project would not only rely on the success of the 
engineering and construction work, but principally on the level of satisfaction 
of the resettled population. In order to make a success of the whole project, 
many types of surveys and investigations were conducted dealing with the 
assessment of environmental carrying capacity, baseline living standards, and 
people's willingness and feelings about resettlement, etc. At the same time, it 
was said by government agencies that a series of monitoring and evaluation 
systems would be established and utilized to monitor people's life 
circumstances throughout the process of resettlement. 
At the time of writing, the Three Gorges Project is now in its final phase of 
construction and a fierce debate has raged throughout its implementation as to 
the balance of costs and benefits it will bring to the nation and environment as a 
whole, but particularly in regard to all those displaced and resettled 
populations directly affected. 
A Note on Spontaneous Resettlement 
As a socio-economic phenomenon, spontaneous population movement has 
always been an ongoing aspect of life in China. It mainly includes three 
categories: the first is the movement of agricultural people to less populated 
areas; the second is that of wage labor to cities and the more developed areas; 
and the third is overseas out-migration. In many cases, spontaneous 
resettlement has taken place before, alongside of, or after government-
organised voluntary resettlement. 
Review of Government-Organised Voluntary Resettlement 
Large-scale government-organised voluntary resettlement started in 1983. That 
year, the Chinese government made a special budget available to support 
poverty alleviation activities in the so-called "Three Xi Areas' (all have 'xi', 
meaning west, in their names). These included Xiji County, Haiyuan and 
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Guyuan County of Ningxia Hui Autonomous Region, and Dingxi and Hexi 
Prefecture of Gansu Province. The 'Three Xi Areas' are internationally 
recognised as poor areas, characterised by harsh natural conditions and very 
poor populations. The basic strategy for the Three Xi Area Development was: 
'water roads' for places where river irrigation systems could be built, 'dry 
roads' for places where water conservation projects could be constructed, and 
'alternative roads', for resettlement from places where there was neither water 
nor dry road possibilities. 
"Three Xi Development' has always received positive remarks from local 
and central government, which has acted to further legitimise the resettlement 
for poverty reduction and development programs implemented central 
government in its '8-7 Poverty Alleviation Program' of 1994, and by the newly 
issued 'General Guideline for Rural Poverty Alleviation and Development' of 
2001. From the mid-1990s, and supported by central government, these 
provinces and regions started their resettlement projects. The total population 
to be resettled under the overall plan drawn up jointly by central and provincial 
government and aimed principally at poverty reduction was five million 
persons throughout China. By 1999, some 2.58 million had been resettled. 
Concluding Comments 
Having traced the history of Chinese resettlement, we may conclude that 
resettlement has always been linked to strategies of political consolidation and 
enforcement, to economic interests and motivation, and to attempts to reduce 
population pressure on resources or to resolve refugee problems in the 
aftermath of natural disasters or civil disorder. The emphasis on political 
consolidation and enforcement has often led to the imposition of 
involuntary/forced forms of resettlement, while concerns for the improvement 
of economic livelihoods and human welfare have generated forms of 
government-organized voluntary as well as more spontaneous resettlement. 
Examining this history, one cannot but be impressed by how changes in the 
political and socio-economic environment have influenced the emergence and 
transformation of specific types of resettlement and associated changes in social 
policy. 
Reviewing China's contemporary population movements helps to position 
the present research in relation to notions of resettlement. Both involuntary and 
voluntary resettlement are government-organised, but they are different in 
terms of their main project or program goals as well as in respect to the 
willingness of resettlers to move. With increasing recognition of the importance 
of giving people and families more choice about their livelihoods and priorities, 
the Chinese government begun to give greater emphasis to the economic 
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benefits that would accrue to those participating in the involuntary resettlement 
programs. However, whatever changes within the framework of involuntary 
resettlement took place, the fact remained that the central nature of such 
resettlement was that people were to be forcibly moved in the sense that they 
had no choice but to do so, although various incentives were provided to 
smooth their way. In contrast, in government-organised voluntary resettlement, 
the central concern has been whether this more open choice strategy would in 
fact bring better results in terms of poverty alleviation and economic 
improvement. It is in respect to this latter problematic that the two cases of 
resettlement analysed in this thesis pertain. 
Yet, having opted to focus on government-assisted voluntary resettlement, 
it is important to underline, as I have tried to do so throughout this chapter, 
that despite the difference made between involuntary and voluntary 
resettlement, many of the same predicaments and livelihood problems in fact 
arise. That is to say, resettlers of whatever type will encounter and have to face 
up to the same sorts of difficulties. They may also opt for similar coping 
strategies and achieve similar standards of living. 
Organization of the Thesis 
This first chapter has aimed to introduce issues of resettlement by outlining my 
interest in the topic, the contribution of previous research to this theme, and the 
relevance and significance of such studies for China - both historical and 
contemporary. 
Chapter two that follows aims to develop an analytical perspective on 
planned intervention. In it, I offer critiques of the economic growth model and 
the modernization approach, and build an analytical framework based upon 
new approaches to looking at state-society relationships, drawing on actor-
oriented analysis, the participatory approach, and state-society synergy 
thinking. 
Chapter three introduces the research areas. It emphasises community-level 
information and farmers' reflections on their own living places. Chapter four 
analyses the structural outcomes of the resettlement projects, and provides data 
on how resettlers have benefited from resettlement 
Chapter five offers information about achievements in the resettlement 
areas and explores various policy dimensions with a view to pinpointing the 
roles played by specific policies in generating resettlement outcomes. A critique 
is made of the rationale and consequences of these policies. 
Chapter six of the thesis examines the social dynamics at community and 
household levels and their impact on the outcomes of resettlement. 
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Finally, in Chapter seven, I pull together the findings and arguments made 
in the thesis and draw conclusions about how to understand why the goal of 
poverty reduction is seldom effectively achieved. 
Developing an Analytical Perspective on Planned 
Intervention 
The purpose of this chapter is to develop an analytical framework, together 
with appropriate research methods, for understanding planned intervention. 
Despite the recent attention given to the promotion of civil society in China, 
government continues to play a major part in resource management, including 
public finance and public property at both central and local levels. This is 
clearly evident in the government-organised voluntary resettlement schemes. 
Hence, it is useful to provide a critical overview of planned state intervention, 
and to define the kinds of theoretical approaches required for its 
understanding. Here I identify three relevant perspectives: actor-oriented 
analysis, 'participatory' approaches, and state-society synergy thinking. 
2.1 Research Argument and Research Questions 
In China and elsewhere, many resettlement areas have become increasingly 
prosperous as a result of the huge investments made by government and 
international donors, as well as by the resettlers themselves. Despite this there 
are also cases where resettlers did not in the end settle successfully at the new 
locations and adapt to the new surroundings and to the rigors of building new 
viable livelihoods. Both central and local governments in China are convinced 
that resettlement is a very effective instrument for poverty reduction and 
development, so they continue to invest in resettlement projects despite the fact 
that they also recognize the many problems. The primary concern of this 
research is to explore whether or not planned intervention through resettlement 
schemes in China is effective in achieving the primary goal of poverty reduction 
as claimed by government. My central argument is that government-organised 
resettlement projects have mobilized many resources and some of them 
brought potential prosperity to the resettled farmers. However, they have not 
sufficiently benefited the government-defined target groups, namely the poorer 
populations of the places of origin. In fact many beneficiaries cannot be 
considered to be the poorer members of the population but belong instead to 
the more affluent of those places. 
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My research questions in response to this research argument are: 
• What are the policies employed for resettlement for poverty reduction and 
development at central government and local levels? How far have these 
policies achieved what they claim to achieve? 
• What has been the impact on local populations and situations of 
resettlement projects? Who has benefited from these resettlement projects? 
• What are the social dynamics at community level that are attributable to the 
outcome of the resettlement projects? 
2.2 Development of Theoretical Debate 
Tradition of Planned Intervention 
Voluntary and involuntary resettlement projects are typical of planned 
intervention, and in the process of research and its analysis the critique of 
planned intervention becomes the line of argument throughout the thesis. 
Initially the belief in economic growth and modernisation formed the basis of 
theoretical thinking and practical application of planned intervention. Hence 
this section starts with a brief review of economic growth theories and the 
modernisation approach. 
Pursuit of Economic Growth 
Preston writes that 'in the early work on Third World development, intervention was 
legitimated by being based upon economic growth theory' (Preston, 1996:154). He argues 
that there are four elements in the background to growth theory: '(a) the 
intellectual influence of the economist John Maynard Keynes; (b) the political agenda of the 
USA as it moves to a position of dominance in the short twentieth century; (c) the Marshall Aid 
program and the reconstruction of Western Europe; and (d) the demands of nationalist 
developmentalism which was the ideology of the emergent new nations.' Keynes' work 
provided an intellectual basis for planned intervention and the further 
development of economic growth models. 'Overall, the Keynesian analysis makes clear 
that state planning to secure full employment is compatible with the political concerns of 
liberalism for the freedom of the individual' (ibid. 156) 
Lewis further developed economic growth theory, especially in his book 
The Theory of Economic Growth (1955). He identifies three proximate causes of 
growth and development. These are, first, the 'effort to economize', which 
Lewis uses to characterize the developed countries. Included within it or as 
illustrations of it we find listed: experimentation; risk-taking; mobility; and 
specialization. The second proximate cause is increase of knowledge and its 
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application and, finally, we are reminded that growth depends upon increasing 
the amount of capital. These are qualities that underdeveloped economies were 
presumed to lack. 
The pursuit of economic growth has promoted the development of various 
economic growth models based on the underlining assumption that economic 
growth is predictable and linear, and its law is universal. However, sufficient 
evidence and research have shown that such an assumption is wrong. Kenny 
(2001:1) indicates that 'no [economic] model has proven robust to trial by repeated 
regression.' He argued: 'Attempts to divine that cause or causes of long-term economic 
growth, testing a wide range of possible determinants using statistical techniques, have 
produced results that are frequently contradictory to results reported elsewhere.' He used 
two of Sachs (Sachs, 1996,1997) articles to show such contradictions: 
'In June 1996, The Economist magazine published a piece based on results from a global 
statistical study concluding that had African countries followed better policies, such as those 
followed in eight fast-growing economies over the last few decades, the region would have 
grown 4.6% per annum faster than its historical growth rate... A year later, The Economist 
published another piece based on results from a global statistical study that concluded 'for 
much of the world, bad climates, poor soils and physical isolation are likely to hinder growth 
whatever happens to policy.' 
This study concluded that, even had Africa followed better policies, it would 
have grown 2.3% slower per year than the countries of South and South East 
Asia. These two articles, with their markedly different conclusions, provide an 
illustration of the problems facing even the best development economists. 
Kenny further argues: 'The evidence appears to suggest that country growth 
experiences have been extremely heterogeneous, and heterogeneous in a way that is difficult to 
explain using any one model of economic growth.' Kenny's a rgument raises a call not 
only to economists but also to all development practitioners to shift from 
developing models to working on actual complex realities. Such a call drawn 
from an economist corresponds the thinking of many scholars with an 
anthropological or sociological bent. This will be discussed later in this chapter. 
However, the level of recognition and acceptance of the limitations of economic 
models is very low, especially among economists. This is because, firstly, most 
economists would not challenge the fundamental methodology of economics; 
secondly, they are mostly occupied with modifying economic models (Klenow, 
1997:597:1) rather than questioning whether there are universal models. 
Questioning economic growth models does not, however, mean the denial 
of contributions of certain economic growth theories. The classical example is 
the contribution of Keynes' intellectual revolution to the economic recovery of 
industrial countries after the Second World War. 
'It is now universally recognised by governments, at least throughout the industrialised free-
enterprise world, that it is one of their primary duties to control the level of total effective 
demand for goods and services. If demand is insufficient to provide full employment, it is the 
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government's duty to raise it by stimulating the injections (investment, government 
expenditure, and/or exports) and/or by discouraging the leakages (by reducing the 
proportions of income saved, paid in taxes, or spent on imports). If demand is excessive, then 
it is the government's duty to restrain the injections and to encourage the leakages.' 
(Keynes, Milo 1975:87-88) 
Shifting of emphasis from political movement to economic development, 
China is now experiencing an overwhelming belief in economic growth. 
Industrialisation, urbanisation and public infrastructure investment are 
regarded as the routes towards economic development. The evidence shows 
how these approaches plus other elements contribute to China's rapid economic 
development. The construction of infrastructure and induced involuntary 
resettlement are typically driven by the pursuit of economic growth. However, 
many researchers now elucidate the other side of the story showing how 
China's economic growth has witnessed a big income divide between regions 
(Cai, 2002; Gustafsson 2002; Ka, 2001; Jian, 1996), between urban and rural areas 
and also among farmers. The other consequence that I demonstrate in this 
research is how other development objectives, such as poverty reduction, are 
replaced by the pursuit of economic growth. 
Industrialisation of agriculture and the modernisation of the Chinese 
countryside have been the goals of the Chinese central government for several 
decades. However, how much agricultural machinery can be used on the tiny 
farming plots and hillside areas that many Chinese farmers currently cultivate? 
Also how far can resettlement advance the industrialisation of agricultural 
production? In the resettlement areas of Ningxia (one of the sites for the present 
research) agricultural industrialisation is set as an important development 
objective, but it is hard to see how this can be achieved when each resettlement 
household possesses only 0.53 hectares of farming land. The ironic fact is that, 
development objectives without the slogan of industrialisation do not 'sound 
good' even though local officials already know that in fact this is hardly 
achievable. Yet they still work with an ideal model that associates 
industrialisation with economic growth and development. 
Hence, my first concern with economic growth theory is to reveal its 
underlying assumption of positive and authoritative intervention. A second 
critical concern is its theoretical defect of ignoring micro-level social processes. 
The latter in fact constitute the fundamental forces generating the particular 
intervention outcomes and day-to-day livelihoods. Under economic growth 
theory, formulas or models are often developed which assume what should 
have happened rather than being based on sound evidence of what actually 
happened. In this way failures are often attributed to the lack of specific 
conditioning elements rather than to the design of the intervention itself. 
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Modernisation Theory 
From the mid-1950s, economic growth theory was gradually absorbed into 
modernisation theory. Preston (1996:172) summarises the background of 
modernisation theory as: 
'(a) the process whereby the less developed countries would shift from traditional patterns of 
life to become developed; (b) industrial society was the goal, where society was driven by the 
demanding logic of industrialism; (c) the logic of industrialism would lead to the convergence 
of political economic systems (in particular those of East and West); and (d) the achievement 
of prosperity as in the USA of the 1960s would mean that ideological debate occasioned by 
conflict in respect of scarce resources would wither away.' 
The ideological foundation of modernisation theory can be traced to the notion 
of modernity. Arce and Long (2000:2) distinguish between 'modernity' and 
'modernisation': 
'[W]e try, wherever possible, to differentiate clearly between 'modernity' as a metaphor for 
new or emerging 'here-and-now' materialities, meanings and cultural styles seen in relation 
to the notion of some past state of things (cf Comaroff & Comaroff 1993:xiii) and 
'modernisation' as a comprehensive package of technical and institutional measures aimed at 
widespread societal transformation and underpinned by neo-evolutionary theoretical 
narratives.' 
The 'modernisation approach' emerged in 1940s and 1950s 'when Western experts 
became concerned with the modernisation of the colonial territories and newly emerging 
independent countries.' (ibid.:5). 
'Of the various attempts at formulating a model to depict this [modernization] process, Neil 
Smelser's (1963) based on the idea of structural differentiation is perhaps the most elegant." 
For him, "[elconomic development takes place through (a) the modernization of technology, 
leading to a change from simple traditionalised techniques to the application of scientific 
knowledge; (b) the commercialisation of agriculture, which is characterized by the move from 
subsistence to commercial farming, leading to a specialization in cash-crop production and 
the development of wage labor; (c) the industrialization process, which depicts the transition 
from the use of human and animal power to machine power; and lastly, (d) urbanization, 
which consists of changes in the ecological dimension and is the movement from farm and 
village towards the growth of large urban centres.' (Long, 1977:10) 
'The central claim of Modernization theory is that industrialisation is linked with specific 
processes of sociopolitical change that apply widely: though preindustrial societies vary 
immensely, one can meaningfully speak of a model of "modern" or "industrial" society 
toward which all societies tend to move if they commit themselves to industrialisation.' 
(Inglehart, 1997:8) 
Indeed a large proportion of the Chinese population, like other contemporary 
societies continue to believe in such a claim. Hence, Inglehart (1997:7) for 
example argues: '[T]his claim is largely correct: though we cannot predict 
exactly what will happen in a given society at a given time, some major trends 
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are predictable in broad outline. When given processes of change are set in 
motion, certain characteristics are likely to emerge in the long run.' 
Furthermore, the institutionalisation of the modernisation approach through 
the educational system, academic disciplines, research institutions, research 
agendas, government organisations and their styles of work has consolidated 
such belief, and left little room for alternative ways of thinking. 
A critical assessment of the modernisation approach is, then, essential for 
understanding the outcomes of development processes and planned 
intervention. Long criticises modernisation theory (along with other structural 
theories) for being externalist. He (2001:10-11) writes: 
'Despite obvious differences in ideology and theoretical trappings, two structural models have 
until relatively recently occupied centre stage in the sociology of development -
modernization theory and political economy. And both evince certain paradigmatic 
similarities and common analytical weaknesses. Modernization theory visualizes 
development in terms of a progressive movement towards technologically and institutionally 
more complex and integrated forms of "modern" society. ...On the other hand, Marxist and 
neo-Marxist theories of political economy stress the exploitative nature of these processes, 
attributing them to the inherent expansionist tendency of world capitalism and to its 
constant need to open up new markets, increase the level of surplus extraction and 
accumulate capital. ... the two models are similar in that both see development and social 
change emanating primarily from external centres of power via interventions by the state or 
international bodies, and following some broadly determined developmental path, sign posted 
by "stages of development"' or the succession of different regimes of capitalism. ... Both 
models therefore are tainted by determinist, linear and externalist views of social change'. 
There is nothing wrong in pursuing the advancement and progress of society. 
The critique lies in what we mean by "advancement" and "progress" and how 
to attain them. Societies with differing social, economic and political histories 
and institutions may have their unique means for the pursuit of advancement. 
However, today, the majority of societies around the world have, since World 
War II, been following the modernisation approach. That is, in one way or 
another, their development paths display common characteristics: large-scale 
capital investment for infrastructure construction, capital loan schemes of 
various kinds, transfers of technology aimed at increasing agricultural 
productivity, promoting industrialisation, urbanisation and centralised, top-
down management structures. These modernisation characteristics are typical 
of many resettlement programmes. 
In pioneer research on agricultural settlement schemes, Robert Chambers 
(1969) reviews the settlement schemes in anglophone Africa from the colonial 
period to the stage of independence in thel960s: 
'Agricultural schemes started in British colonies before independence, and since 
independence in nations formerly under British rule, have included a wide range of 
approaches: land consolidation, farm planning, crop rotation, credit schemes, marketing co-
operatives, cash crop introduction, mechanization and state farming, among others. Some of 
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the most conspicuous of these projects have been what are described as settlement or 
resettlement schemes The resources devoted to these projects have been large. They have, 
of course, included land, labour, and technical and administrative expertise; but an indication 
of the magnitude of investment is most readily given in terms of capital.' (1969:3) 'In social 
and economic terms, however, the record of past schemes has been discouraging. Not only 
have they given rise to many problems, but outright failures and collapse have been common. 
Indeed in almost all countries settlement schemes have been criticized by sociologist, 
agriculturalists and economists for failure to achieve their social, agricultural and economic 
objectives, and for their absorption of scarce resources which might have been put to better 
use.'(1969:7) 
Despite the failure of many resettlement schemes in the past and present, many 
such schemes still exist. Resettlement is often a consequence of other 
development projects such as dam construction, and reflects the development 
vision and desires informed by the economic growth and modernisation 
models. Such a vision of development expresses belief in a linear 
transformation of society and people. It also seems that many resettlement 
programs reflect the desires of decision-makers to have some object to work on, 
that is to have an idea to present and resources to control. 
The major problem with the modernisation approach is its determinist view 
of the macro-level and of outside intervention. Underpinning such a view are 
ideologies of "centre—periphery" and "superior-inferior" power structures, 
coupled with a belief in the transfer of knowledge and institutions. Thus 
modernisation views knowledge as an objective product that has clear 
boundaries, and can be identified and transferred. The power structure 
underpinning modernisation notions classifies knowledge in such a way that it 
denies the knowledge of the perceived "lower"1 status groups. 
Planned Intervention 
The economic growth model, and later, modernization theories have dominated 
worldwide academic discussion for more than four decades since the 1940s. 
This represents the dominance of structural analyses in theoretical debate and 
policy analysis. They are still the fundamental rationale of government policies 
in many countries, even though strong criticisms have been made of them since 
the 1970s, and especially after the 1980s, in academic circles. Planned 
intervention has been regarded as a basic instrument for promoting the 
development of developing counties by international societies and by national 
governments. As Preston (1996:159) comments: 
11 draw the term 'lower' or 'lowers' from Chambers (1993). In general it refers to those who are 
poor, especially poor farmers, or those who have less or no formal education. It combines both 
social and economic status 
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'Intervention in a social system might be understood as deliberate action whose objective is to 
bring about a particular change in some set of circumstance and thereby achieve a preferred 
state of affairs. There are three basic aspects of this approach: (a) the supposition that there is 
something to be acted upon, an object; (b) the expectation that it will respond and do so in a 
predictable fashion; and (c) the idea that the intervention is accomplished by an actor in a 
precise manner according to a clear set of expectations, that is, authoritatively and not 
randomly or accidentally.' 
Planned development basically refers to two broad categories: intervention by 
national government, in the form of national planning or specific 
programs/projects, and intervention by bilateral and multilateral organizations, 
in the form of development aid programs/projects or policy dialogue. Different 
terms are used to elucidate the planned development approach with different 
emphases, such as 'planned intervention', 'planned development', 'state 
intervention', 'directive change' and so forth. One way or other, the following 
three concepts are referred to: development, planning and the central role of the 
State. Intended development2 represents how positive development or change 
is interpreted, which is further translated into development objectives through 
the planning process. Planning is an instrument for reaching development 
objectives. The State is assumed to play an essential role in development, and 
the dynamics between State-society relations are the core for development. 
'In the 1940s and 1950s the idea of national planning became firmly established in most 
countries in the world. Planning and development committees, councils and ministries were set 
up all around the world.' (Frerks, 1991:10) Robertson (1984:86) lay out wha t is 
planning: '[Planning is an attempt to reach forward and gain some kind of control over a 
future which must always remain inherently uncertain secondly, planning is concerned 
with the translation of ideas and ideals into reality. As such it is both a normative and a 
technical process, a search for the means by which desired future goals may actively be pursued. 
Thirdly, it is also a political process, a pattern of relationships between (most significantly) 
states and subject populations.' Conyers (1984:3) defined planning as a 'continuous 
process which involves decisions, or choices, about alternative ways of using available resources, 
which aim of achieving particular goals at some time in the future'. 
The state's role in the planning process concerns policy definition, resource and 
staff allocation, infrastructure investment etc. A conception of the State is 
essential for understanding the ideological underpinning of interventionist 
thinking. Long (2001:41-43) distinguishes two models of agrarian development 
and the state: 
'The first is what is called the logic of capital' model based upon Marxist theories of 
development that interpret the actions of the capitalist state in terms of the imperatives and 
intrinsic 'logic' of capitalist development (de Janvry 1981).The state may also institute 
2
 The understanding of development is briefly discussed in the Part II of Chapter Five. 
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policies that have negative consequences for certain segments of the dominant class or class 
alliance, and that offer concessions to subordinate groups such as peasant producers or 
workers A second analytical approach focuses on the process of institutional 
incorporation whereby farmers/peasants or other local groups become integrated into the 
wider technico-administrative environment consisting of various state and non-state 
organisations (Benvenuti 1975; Benvenuti & Mommaas 1985)'. Long (2001:43) offers 
critical comments on these two models: 'since both these theoretical interpretations assign 
little importance to the role of local forms of organisation and knowledge in development, they 
tend to reinforce the image and efficacy of conventional top-down planning and intervention 
policies.' 
'The scale and uniformity of planning is intimately related to the expansion of state 
bureaucracies during the course of this century. Us association with the exercise of state 
power has given the organisation of planning strong centripetal tendencies: in terms of the 
allocation of responsibilities, the deployment and promotion of qualified staff, and even the 
siting and equipping of offices, planning is strongest at the centre and usually very much 
weaker in substantive ministries, regions and districts (IBRD 1975:391-2). The gap between 
centre and periphery is only one of many contradictions which afflict planning everywhere. 
At the heart of the matter is the persistent discrepancy between intention and achievement, 
the repeated failure of costly efforts to bear fruit. There is also the dilemma of pursuing 
economic growth and maintaining state control. In policy there is the persistent tension 
between efficiency and equity, between gradual and more urgent approaches. These dialectics 
are not peculiar to a particular state or regime, they are, it seems, characteristic of national 
planning everywhere, whether it is advised by socialist or by liberal ideals.' (Robertson, 
1984:62) '[T]he world of planned development is full of painful contradictions: the virtues 
and vices of state intervention, the costs and benefits of primitive ways of life, the moral and 
political dilemmas of active commitment or passive disengagement' (Robertson, 1984:293). 
Despite the dilemmas of planning, most countries have adopted national 
planning mechanisms. This represents, firstly, the belief in 'governing' and the 
planning approach towards governing; secondly, it reflects the fact of having 
limited alternatives. Interestingly, it is the case of the USA that provides a 
strong contrast to the planning tradition. '[I]t is an historical oddity that the USA - by 
any account a strong state with centralised political capacity, and the wealth to invest in 
planning - is one of the very small number of countries which have never had a national plan' 
(Robertson, 1984:63) 
Belief in the efficacy of planned intervention has changed since the first phase, 
when in the 1960s and 1970s the state, backed by international funding, 
believed that it could effectively intervene through projects and programmes, 
and thus control and guide development to the goals initially set. This persisted 
into the 1980s and is still a feature of certain types of intervention programs, 
though they differ somewhat from country to country, from political system to 
political system. But, by the mid 1980s, states throughout the world were really 
facing major problems of not being able to steer change effectively and simply 
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did not have the necessary financial and other resources to support all these 
types of intervention projects. And of course there was also the growing 
indebtedness of the poorer countries, and an increasing lack of funds (in the 
richer countries as well) to staff government agencies and the bureaucracy. 
Preston (1996:296) summarises the critiques of structural analysis that 
gradually emerged and came to the fore in the early 1980s within development 
theory. He makes three broad points that reflect the general critique of planned 
intervention in development studies: 
'(a) that development theory must pay attention to the micro-scale detail of the social 
processes of the construction of patterns of life; (b) that development theory must deconstruct 
notions of intervention and shift away from untenable rational models of plan making 
followed by plan execution, and grant that intervention itself is a drawn-out and complex 
social process involving many agents; and (c) that the further theoretical elucidation of these 
matters requires the suppression of the distinction between structure and agency.' 
Some researchers propose adopting the improvement approach in order to 
make best of planned intervention. Thus Van Dusseldorp (1990:350) argues: 
'Planning will never be a perfect instrument, making it possible for mankind to control 
completely its destination, because the essential prerequisites, at least when it comes to 
people-oriented projects, can never be fully realized. Society should therefore lower its 
expectations of what can be expected from planned development and politicians, planners and 
implementers should realize their limitations when it comes to the making of society 
Projectized planned development will remain forever an imperfect instrument... We can only 
make the best of it.' 
Other researchers question the fundamental relevance and nature of planned 
intervention towards development. Long (2001:31) has argued: 'the concept of 
intervention needs deconstructing so that we recognize it for what it fundamentally is, namely, 
an ongoing, socially constructed and negotiated process, not simply the execution of an already-
specified plan of action with expected outcomes.' 
In the international arena, structural adjustment policies appeared and cleared 
the way for the emergence of a thoroughly neo-liberal era where the market 
was seen as the major solution to all this. It was posited as the way to create 
dynamic entrepreneurship in different sectors of the economy, including 
vibrant small-scale enterprise (backed by funds for micro-credit projects etc). 
The outcome of all this has been somewhat different for different countries but, 
generally speaking, it is the state that is dictated to by outside multilateral 
organisations. The latter require the state to demonstrate its capacity to achieve 
good economic and institutional governance, and of course the ability pay back 
at least a proportion of its debts. It must also show its commitment to a crude 
market model where the latter (through competition and comparative 
advantage) becomes the driving force and salvation of both the richer and 
poorer countries. The global system, then, provides the backdrop of macro 
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institutional and economic frameworks that can create an enabling environment 
within which the role of the state and its relationship to the private and civil 
sectors can be defined and function. It is often therefore claimed that it is 
macro-policy and macro-institutional frames that shape outcomes, not a series 
of locally targeted development projects. 
After the ending of Mao's rule, China has been transformed from a 
totalitarian to an authoritarian county (Shambaugh, 2002). The Communist 
Revolution in 1949 put Mao Zedong in power. He created a strong central 
government, ended China's foreign domination, and began a process of 
determined Soviet-style industrialization. The success of the Communist Party 
in 1949 was due to the support of the massive poor population, especially 
peasant-farmers, who saw the hope of improving their individual social rights, 
especially in respect to land ownership. However, very quickly, such 
aspirations became incorporated into the commune system in which collective 
rather than individual rights prevailed. Thus China became a country with a 
centralised economic system and tight state control of ideology. Much later in 
1978, after the death of Mao, when Deng Xiaoping came to power, the push for 
the reform of Mao's socialist economy took shape. Deng created an Open Door 
Policy, and China began to open itself to the outside world. 
'Tourism was allowed, students began to go overseas, special economic zones were 
established, and joint ventures with foreign firms were encouraged to bring in foreign 
technology, investment, managerial know-how, and market access. Deng encouraged the 
elimination of rural communes, and land was turned over to the rural household (for 
production and income, but not for real ownership). Agricultural productivity jumped 
dramatically, and free markets were created to sell food.' (Parker, 2001) 
Jiang Zemin continued with this Open Door Policy after becoming president in 
1992. Later China's entry into WTO in 2002 marked a milestone in China's 
economy, and undoubtedly will have a significant impact on China's social and 
political system in the future. 
The focus of China's reform has been both economic and administrative. 
The central aim of China's reform is to free the country's economy by reducing 
government control over economy. Such efforts have sustained China's high 
economic growth over the past two decades. Thus government policy has been 
geared primarily to reducing state intervention in economic life. Now, 
entrepreneurs and also farmers enjoy economic freedom to a large, if not full, 
extent. However, central government control over public resources and goods 
remains strong. Public monetary resources, such as revenue and its allocation 
and usage, foreign government and United Nations development aid, and 
funds from other international organizations, all remain firmly under 
government jurisdiction. 
For government administrat ive reform, 'the state finance, planning, credit, and 
investment reforms of the 1980s' turned out that '[c]adres working in town and county 
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governments, and those in small, medium, and large city offices, have gained even more in 
discretionary authority and independent freedom to manoeuvre than have bureaucrats higher 
up in district and provincial departments. Whereas before the reforms county, city, and regional 
officials did administrative work primarily of the 'transmission belt' variety, they have recently 
been acquiring new roles as key gate-keepers and rulemakers, and as underwriters and power 
brokers in command of considerable resources.' (Shue, 1994:74) 
The Poverty Alleviation Office of the State Council of China and its line agency 
are in charge of the poverty alleviation fund allocated by the Ministry of 
Finance and special poverty alleviation funds from central government. Poverty 
programs and projects in China must follow the centralised planning tradition 
in terms of the allocation of resources to the different regions and further down 
to the local level. 
Hence, Chinese society presents a mixed picture. That is, one that is 
relatively free in terms of economic life but centralised in terms of the control of 
public resources, while at the same time shifting its balance towards increased 
decentralised administration at regional and local levels. 
The resettlement projects aimed at poverty reduction and economic 
development - the main focus of the present study - are rather typical of 
government-planned interventions. As I argued above, the ideological and 
theoretical origins of planned intervention can be traced to the economic 
growth model of development and modernization theory. But now we observe 
a new trend: namely that the state and international development agencies 
frame their actions in terms of the need to get macro-policies right in order to 
create enabling environments; rather than concentrating on promoting change 
through large-scale development projects and programmes geared to 
motivating but also controlling the processes of development in a detailed way. 
At the same time, there is a discovery or rather rediscovery of 'participatory' 
approaches and the strengthening of community/civil society organisation. 
These trends anticipate significant changes in state-society relationships. 
New Approaches to the Study of State and Society 
This raises the question of alternatives to development now that the tradition of 
planned intervention is challenged. New concepts and approaches always 
emerge along with alternative thinking. In the following discussion, then, I 
identify three distinctive analytical orientations that I believe provide useful 
and complementary insights. 
Actor-oriented Approach 
My research adopts key concepts from the actor-oriented approach, which 
offers new ways of interpreting and examining planned intervention. The 
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central argument of the actor-oriented approach is that 'Although it is undoubtedly 
true that much important structural change has resulted from the impact of outside forces ... 
[A] all forms of external intervention necessarily enter the existing life-worlds of the individuals 
and groups affected. In this way, external factors are both mediated and transformed by internal 
structures.' (Long, 1992:20) Such an approach provides a new perspective by 
shifting the focus from structural and macro-level analysis to agent-centred 
analysis. This change of focus makes it possible to unpack and understand 
planned intervention at ground level, and especially helps us to understand the 
dichotomy and deviation of planned objectives and actual outcomes. As Long 
argues (2001:31): 
'A tendency in many studies (which still lingers on in certain policy discourses) was to 
conceptualise the process as essentially linear in nature, implying some kind of step-by-step 
progression from policy formulation to implementation to outcomes, after which one could 
make an ex post facto evaluation to establish how far the original objectives had been 
achieved. Yet, as any experienced planner or development worker will readily appreciate, this 
separation of 'policy', 'implementation' and 'outcome' is a gross over-simplification of a much 
more complicated set of processes which involves the reinterpretation or transformation of 
policy during the implementation process itself, such that there is in fact no straight line from 
policy to outcomes' 
Long (1992:37) further explains why planned intervention is transformed in the 
process of implementation. 
'As a typical external force, the planned intervention embraced both formally organised state 
agency intervention as well as that of the companies and enterprises that attempted to 
organise and control production and commercialization of the key products.... Intervention is 
an ongoing transformational process that is constantly reshaped by its own internal 
organizational and political dynamic and by the specific conditions it encounters or itself 
creates, including the responses and strategies of local and regional groups who may struggle 
to define and defend their own social spaces, cultural boundaries and positions within the 
wider power field'. 
To understand these processes, he develops an actor-oriented analysis. He 
maintains that 'such an approach will take more serious account of the dynamic processes by 
which ordinary people - peasants, workers, entrepreneurs, bureaucrats, and others - actively 
engage in shaping the outcomes of processes of development' (1984:2). H e concludes by 
stressing that 'the concept of intervention needs deconstructing so that we recognize it for 
what it fundamentally is, namely, an ongoing, socially constructed and negotiated process, not 
simply the execution of an already-specified plan of action with expected outcomes' (2001:31). 
In a parallel argument, Arce (1994:169) argues that we have to challenge the 
notion of the state itself if we are to understand rural development outcomes. 
He underlines that we should question 'the notion that the state is the main or 
only institution contributing significantly to rural development outcomes, 
emphasizing the importance of contradictions and negotiations between state 
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agencies and between state representatives and rural producers. A critical 
overview of recent work on rural development administration indicates the 
need for a revised conceptual and empirical agenda. The basis for such an 
agenda is to be found in two main directions that explore issues of interface and 
room-for maneuver. Both raise important questions about discourses, practices 
and power.' 
Actor-oriented interface analysis provides an analytical perspective, which 
'can make a useful contribution to an understanding of how processes of planned 
intervention enter the lifeworlds of the individuals and groups affected and come to form part 
of the resources and constraints of the social strategies they develop. Interface analysis, which 
concentrates upon analyzing critical junctures or arenas involving differences of normative 
value and social interest, entails not only understanding the struggles and power differentials 
taking place between the parties involved, but also an attempt to reveal the dynamics of 
cultural accommodation that make it possible for the various worldviews to interact. This is a 
difficult research topic but one which is central to understanding the intended and 
unintended results of planned intervention carried out by public authorities or development 
agencies, or initiated from below by diverse local interests.' (Long, 2001:72) 
The adoption of an actor-oriented approach thus allows researchers to interpret 
the state in society by illustrating, for example, how development policies work 
out quite differently in different regional or local settings, or how policy 
objectives are renegotiated at local or regional levels. Using a case from Winder 
(1979), Long (1988:122) illustrates how policy objectives are renegotiated at local 
and regional level: 
'The Mexican government had originally planned to establish a collective ejido system for 
cultivation but, under pressure from farmers, allowed them to subdivide into sectors and 
small working groups. Government officials also turned a blind eye to internal arrangements 
for distribution of profits on the basis of plot yields instead of labour input, which had been 
the original intention. They likewise abandoned having professional managers heading each 
production co-operative when this was opposed, and instead permitted the establishment of a 
system of locally-elected peasant representatives. Yet despite these major modifications, when 
central government or party officials visited the scheme, the farmers would turn out in 
numbers to demonstrate the wonders of collective production!' 
Some critiques (see: e.g. Roling and Leeuwis, 2001, and) of the actor-oriented 
approach have been made from within Wageningen University, where the 
approach was first elaborated by Long and his colleagues. One criticism made 
is that it focuses on micro-level analysis and so loses ground in providing 
practical advice to macro-level policy formulation. A second critique is that the 
approach gives principal emphasis to the individual actor and misses out 
important group-oriented social organisation. 
As a rejoinder to these points, we should stress that, in fact, the actor-
oriented approach has always paid central attention to policies and policy 
processes. However, the departure point is actor-defined issues or critical 
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events, not abstracted policy statements or planning models (see: Hebinck, 
2001, who underlines this). Moreover, policies that neglect micro-level 
complexities often fail to reach their goals. A related methodological point is 
that, from an actor perspective, policy analysis requires the detailed study of 
multiple actor and institutional interfaces where struggles over resources and 
meanings take place. Thus the approach necessarily pays close attention to the 
forming and reconfiguring of social networks of various kinds. Understanding 
these processes is, of course, the key to the dynamics of group-oriented social 
organization. Furthermore, Long has always argued that the concept of social 
actor embraces not just individuals but also networks, groups and 
organisations. Also recognising individuals from an actor perspective requires 
acknowledging that their personhood is socially and culturally constructed 
(Long, 2001). 
The adoption of an actor-oriented approach does not mean, therefore, the 
denial or neglect of structural phenomena and factors, but a rethinking of 
structural modes of analysis. For an actor-oriented analysis, central notions 
such as 'the market', 'commodity exchange', 'the state' and so forth have to be 
treated in a more open way than structuralists usually do. Actor-oriented 
analysis does not recognise fixed normative frameworks, assumed to be 
homogenous and consistent, that impose themselves on situations and people; 
but rather an emergent set of relationships and situationally defined sets of 
agreements or negotiated positions. Hence, it promotes a change of 
epistemological view. That is, it is designed to bring the researcher closer to the 
realities of everyday life. The reduced reality that structural analysis offers often 
turns out to be a distorted or contrived one. 
Later in the thesis I adopt some key concepts (i.e. agency, social network, 
knowledge and power configuration) from the actor-oriented approach in my 
analysis of the processes of resettlement and outcomes. Of course, these 
sociological terms are not new, but they are given a new interpretation in the 
language of actor analysis, thus adding valuable insights to current 
development debates and theory. Language is inherently political because 
language use comprises meanings and standpoints. For example, one hardly 
finds such terms as 'agency', 'networks' and 'knowledge/power configurations' 
in the debates surrounding economic growth theory and modernisation. The 
adoption of these actor concepts for looking at resettlement processes provides 
an alternative angle for looking at the everyday social dynamics of resettlement 
that cuts across micro and macro levels. It offers an epistemological view of 
government policies and their implementation, as well as an appreciation of the 
social policy process, which focuses squarely on 'organising and ordering processes 
(rather than 'order' per se) that are relevant to the different arenas and institutional domains' 
(Long, 2001:240). This contrasts with the dominant positivism and linear 
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analysis of planned intervention, and thus contributes to a better and more 
comprehensive understanding of resettlement programs. 
Participatory approach 
In order to counter traditional top-down approaches and to take more account 
of local knowledge and organisation, participatory approaches have been used 
in many international projects as a practical tool for bringing about local 
participation. The development of such approaches is based on recognising the 
importance of power relations in development discourse and practice and on 
critiques of professionalism and top-down expert-designed strategies. Such 
thinking provides useful insights into how to perceive the relation between 
professional and local knowledge. Chambers argues that 'In development, the 
reductionist scientific method has been powerful with simple, uniform interventions', 
but he (Chambers, 1997:42) goes on to say that, 
'[I]n diverse, dynamic and uncontrollable conditions with continuous variance and multiple 
linkages, reductionist methods can be both costly and misleading. ... As professionals have 
become more aware of errors and myths, and of the misfit between the reality they construct 
and the reality others experience, some have sought and developed new approaches and 
methods in their work.... PRA3 is a growing family of approaches and methods to enable local 
people to share, enhance and analyse their knowledge of life and conditions, and to plan, act, 
monitor and evaluate.' 
The fact is that it is the professionals who generate data and information and 
who provide analysis to be referenced in policy formulations. It is then the role 
of government officials and politicians to make decisions on policy orientation 
and to determine the guidelines for the use of resources. Hence, Chambers 
(1997:56) argues that 'the uppers experience and construct their realities and seek to transfer 
these to the lowers. ... In normal bureaucracy, central authorities simplify, control and 
standardize. In normal top-down, centre-outwards development, new technology is developed in 
central places by uppers and transferred to peripheral lowers.' 
However, the value of the participatory approach is not simply confined to 
the stage of recognising these problems of professionalism and 'reductionism'. 
It has created a methodology and a set of practical tools designed to challenge 
professionalism, seek for better utilization of available local and external 
resources, and to given proper credit to the value of 'local participation'. Yet, 
although this concept of 'local participation' carries with it positive meanings 
linked to an appreciation of local skills and knowledge, it is often assumed that 
local people need to be mobilized by enlightened professionals to participate in 
projects designed and manipulated by outsiders. 
3
 PRA is Participatory Rural Appraisal. For more detailed information, please look at chapter 
two. 
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The concepts of 'uppers' and 'lowers' drawn from Chambers are used to 
acknowledge existing power structures embedded in the social system. 
Chambers calls for effort to change such structures: 'What can and should we, as 
uppers, do to make our realities count less, and the realities of lowers - the poor, weak and 
vulnerable - count more?' (1997:101). The positive element in adopting these 
categories, then, is that they explicitly acknowledge the hierarchy of different 
actors involved. Such a hierarchy of status creates a 'knowledge hierarchy', 
whereby farmers' knowledge is downgraded in relation to so-called 'expert' 
knowledge. But, on the other hand, the problematic side of this 
conceptualisation concerns how exactly we propose to define who are the 
'uppers' and Towers', and who does the defining. That is, the use of these 
concepts is in itself confirming of such structures. It is difficult in Chamber's 
work to find any precise conception of what these categories precisely mean. 
But I understand the uppers in general to refer to officials and researchers, who 
are often from outside and have a formal education background; while the 
lowers refers to farmers or poor populations in general. 
Exploring issues of participation more fully, Pretty (1995:1251) points out 
that, '[t]wo overlapping schools of thought and practice have evolved. One views participation 
as a means to increase efficiency, the central notion being that if people are involved, then they 
are more likely to agree with and support the new development or service. The other sees 
participation as a fundamental right, in which the main aim is to initiate mobilization for 
collective action, empowerment and institution building.' In similar fashion, Uphoff 
(1985,1991:504) emphasises the need to reverse top-down thinking, which often 
results in nothing more than 'fitting people to projects'. He identifies the 
multiple objectives of participatory development as 'efficiency, equity, and 
empowerment.' 
Thus, when the participatory approach is regarded as a remedy for the lack 
of fit of planned intervention projects with the social dynamics of everyday life, 
it can only serve as functional participation"1 (Pretty, 1995:1252). Empowerment can 
hardly take root, since it can only grow from within supportive social 
institutions. Development projects with their basic belief in the effectiveness of 
4
 Pretty defines 'functional participation' as: 'Participation seen by external agencies as a mans 
to achieve project goals, especially reduced costs. People may participate by forming groups to 
meet predetermined objectives related to the project. Such involvement may be interactive and 
involve shared decision making, but tends to arise only after major decisions have already been 
made by external agents. At worst, local people may still only be coopted to serve external 
goals.' (Pretty, 1995:1252). Pretty defined the concept of 'functional participation' in contrast to 
other 6 types of participation: manipulative participation, passive participation, participation by 
consultation, participation for material incentives, interactive participation, self-mobilization. 
Pretty's typology of participation shows the different degree of participation and even 
fundamental difference in the interpretation of participation. 
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external intervention can hardly serve much to develop local empowerment, 
even if many of them passionately claim to do so. 
The following points need further consideration when discussing the 
adoption of a participatory approach in planned intervention: (1) Who can 
ensure that farmers' realities are seriously taken into account? (2) It is rare for 
anyone, including professionals who are committed to self-examination and 
self-correcting, to be able to go beyond their boundaries as a social group 
located within a specific power structure. The question is then: can the uppers 
draw back to allow farmers' realities to be taken fully into account? (3) Under 
the circumstances of a planned intervention or research project, it would appear 
that the application of participatory approaches is often only feasible with the 
presence of enlightened experts. These experts have the advantage of possibly 
being able to break through temporarily the existing power structure, thus 
generating a bit more space for local participation, though it remains doubtful 
as to what extent temporary and superficial local participation can empower the 
lowers. Of course we should not use this type of argument to deny local people 
their own ways of organising and communicating in their day-to-day life. 
Many international organizations have adopted the participatory approach 
as a key method for their programs and projects. Some national governments 
have also made the approach central to their activities. For example, in 2001, the 
Poverty Alleviation Office of the State Council of China initiated a series of 
participatory training exercises for its different levels of staff. Such move shows 
how alternative thinking about development can alter traditional methods of 
intervention. However, it appears that this has not yet shaken up the deeply 
rooted and institutionalized top-down approach. Its adoption has remained at 
the level of an additional total for research or project implementation. 
Nevertheless, as I hope to demonstrate in later chapters, my use of some 
participatory methods has greatly enriched my understanding of farmers' 
perceptions of and involvement in the resettlement process. 
State-Society Synergy 
Over the past decade, an important trend in development research has been the 
search for a more adequate understanding of state-society relations, especially 
in the context of the kinds of neoliberal global changes we have been 
witnessing. As Perry points out: 'Questions of state-building, civil society, and the 
relationship between market development and democratisation now assumed centre state. The 
causes, character and consequences of political change were interpreted as a product of 
interactions between the state apparatus and society at large' (Perry, 1994:704-705) 
Evans (1996:1119) has proposed the 'state-society synergy' approach. He 
argues that instead of assuming a zero-sum relationship between government 
involvement and private cooperative efforts, we must explore the possibilities 
of 'state-society synergy' by which active government and mobilized 
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communities can enhance each others' developmental efforts. He goes on to 
suggest that synergy usually combines complementarity with embeddedness 
and is most easily fostered in societies characterized by egalitarian social 
structures and robust, coherent state bureaucracies. Synergy, however, is 
constructable, even in the more adverse circumstances typical of Third World 
countries. By complementarity, Evans (1996:1120) means 'the conventional way 
of conceptualising mutually supportive relations between public and private 
actors' This is built upon a clear division of labour based on the contrasting 
properties of public and private institutions. That is, governments are suited to 
delivering certain kinds of collective goods that complement inputs more 
efficiently delivered by private actors. 'Putting the two kinds of inputs together 
results in greater output than either public or private sectors could deliver on 
their own. The idea that synergy may be based on 'embeddedness/ that is, on 
ties that connect citizens and public officials across the public-private divide, is 
more novel' (Evans 1996:1120)7. Such approach offers a positive view of 
development that attempts to create a middle ground between state and society 
relations. Such attempts may only be viable on the assumption that 
governments are interested in achieving the developmental aims that they 
claim. 
Very often, there are gaps between governments' claimed objectives and 
their hidden agendas. The reasons for such gaps are many and different with 
the context or settings. Some are driven by political reasons that cannot be 
made public, and some are for avoiding taking political responsibility. 'For 
example, the Peruvian land reform of 1969 modernised the export-oriented estates leading to the 
consolidation of middle-size commercial farms on the coast and the formation of worker co-
operatives, whilst in the highlands the reform destroyed the semi-feudal estates and accelerated 
the processes of socio-economic differentiation and proletarianisation. The principal rhetoric of 
this reform was 'cooperativism', 'peasant participation' and 'equity', but its implicit 
aims were to increase central control over the rural population and to dynamise 
production.' (Long, 1988:112) Many policy researchers are not only busy with 
policy impact analysis, but also with investigating what is behind the claimed 
objectives. 'A major difficulty in identifying the precise economic and socio-political 
objectives of policies is that governments seldom spell out clearly, without ambiguities, what 
they intend; nor do they indicate the exact priorities for the goals they set. A primary reason for 
this, of course, is that they need to retain a degree of flexibility so that they may modify or scrap 
their plans if these appear to be creating more problems than they actually solve.' (Long, 1977: 
182) 
7
 Evans' formulation bears some resemblance to the concept of 'interface' as elaborated by Long 
(1989; 2001). 
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Evans' formulation bears some resemblance to the concept of 'interface' as 
elaborated by Long (1989;2001). As an analytical tool the notion of interface is 
valuable in the analysis of state-society relations but it does not privilege co-operative 
over conflictive state-society relations. It agrees with state-society synergy in 
terms of how it 'connects citizens and public officials across the public-private 
divide' and how it does not respect the artificial boundaries of the state-civil 
society divide. However, social interface is not only interested in the alliances 
but also in the conflicts that emerge between actors with apparently conflicting 
or diverging interests and values (Long, 2001:50,240). 
The state-society synergy approach sends off messages and provides 
evidence that the state is not the enemy. Arce (1994:170) has argued: 'We believe 
state intervention has a limited but potentially positive part to play in contemporary rural 
change [T]he capacity of the state actually to determine the outcome of the changes it 
helps to initiate may be quite limited. But so far as rural polices can be put in place that permit 
diversity and maintain the discretion of rural people, rather than forcing 'good intention' down 
on them, state intervention may provide some of the necessary conditions for rural development 
to take place.' 
Shue (1994:66) also advocates a possible picture of how state-society 'go 
together ' : 'Students of state building sometimes speak as if the consolidation of strong and 
centralized state power necessarily entails the displacement or at least the weakening of 
alternative loci of authority and control already existing in society. State power and social 
power are presented as confronting each other in a generally very protracted yet ultimately 
zero-sum competition for both the right and the capacity to command obedience. Yet...we might 
propose that a prima facie case could as well be made for thinking that, under certain conditions 
at least, strong and robust civil associations can 'go together' with powerful and resilient 
states.' 
The question is what can be done to promote healthy state-society relations 
so that state-society synergy can be generated. Decentralization is seen as one of 
the many steps towards a democratic state, which can generate strong civil 
society. Decentralization has now become a common phenomenon in many 
countries with former strong central national governments. 'Decentralisation 
reforms are administrative dispositions by which central state concedes autonomy to territorial 
units, up to a level defined by a government act or law taken in parliament' (Mongbo, 2001: 
1). 'Decentralisation reforms bear three main assumptions: Firstly, that the establishment of a 
local framework for legal order will make local government and administrators more 
accountable and therefore enable a less arbitrary approach in the field of civilian rights. 
Secondly, as political representatives get closer to citizens, a better mobilisation and more 
efficient allocation of resources at local level will be enabled. Thirdly, that since the political 
careers of the local elite will be dependent on their capacity or success to induce social and 
economic welfare for their people, these elite will be under scrutiny to install principles of good 
governance, equity and transparency (CAD, 1997, in Blunda and Mongbo, 1998:3)' 
(Mongbo, 2001:4) 
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The discussion of the reforms taking place in former and persistent communist 
countries is instrumental in understanding the future of state and society 
relations. Burawoy (1996:1105) compared the Russian and Chinese cases: 
'Reformers in Russia and China were equally enamored of markets but their attitudes toward 
the state were diametrically opposed. For the Russian "reformers" the party-state was so 
morally and politically repugnant and its incumbents so corrupt and venal that the 
destruction of the state apparatus was worth any price. The Chinese "reformers," on the other 
hand, were prepared to go to any lengths to preserve the party-state but realized that if it 
were to be sustained the system of rules and incentives that connected the central state to the 
regions and thence to localities had to be drastically changed to allow the reconstruction of 
state-society ties at the local level. The jury is, of course, still out in both cases - but at the 
present time the Chinese strategists can look back on a period of continuous growth, while 
Russian's reformers seem to have destroyed the economic capacity of their society in the 
process of saving it from the state.' 
The conclusion drawn by Burawoy from such a comparison is that: 'In looking at 
the Russian through a Chinese lens we awarded central importance to the role of the state in the 
organization of the economy, in establishing budget constraints and property relations. That is, 
the state mediates between the market and its effects - accumulation in China and involution in 
Russia. '(1994:1114,) 'The lesson is an old one that Karl Polanyi taught us long ago: there is no 
market road to a market economy, a "hard" state (linger and Cui, 1994) is essential player in 
the transition.' (1994:1115) 
It is difficult to define what healthy state and society relations are, and it is even 
more difficult to identify how to promote such a condition is, especially for 
countries in transition. 'In recent years, and especially since the end of the Cold War in 
1989, bilateral and multilateral donor agencies have pursued a "New Policy Agenda" which 
gives renewed prominence to the roles of nongovernment organizations (NGOs) and grassroots 
organizations (GROs) in poverty alleviation, social welfare, and the development of "civil 
society"(Robinson, 1993)' (Edwards, 1996:961) The assumption of such agenda is 
that NGOs and GROs can perform roles representing different interest groups, 
especially local populations to counter the dominant and central power of the 
state. Many NGOs and GROs in developing countries are partly and even 
largely financed by bilateral and multilateral donor agencies. Edwards (1996: 
961) reviewed the impact of official aid on nongovernmental organizations by 
concluding: 'much of the case for emphasizing the role of NGOs/GROs rests on ideological 
grounds rather than empirical verification. In addition, though the evidence is inconclusive, 
there are signs that greater dependence on official funding many compromise NGO/GRO 
performance in key areas, distort accountability, and weaken legitimacy.' 
It is not easy to predict how state-society relations will evolve in a rapidly 
changing society such as China. So many variables have to be taken into 
account. How will the role of government evolve in the economic and political 
life of Chinese society? How will civil society grow especially in an emerging 
process of social stratification in China? Are the social and political conditions 
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there for generating sound state-society synergy? Changes are ongoing and will 
continue. As Shue (1994:82) states: 
'The bureaucratic and market reforms of the post-Mao era have touched off many complex 
and intertwined social processes. A renegotiation of both state-state and state-society 
relations is now well under way in China but is likely to be protracted. The very arenas in 
which state and society have been accustomed to interact are being redrawn. And most of the 
rules of competition and accommodation are being rewritten. The ongoing decentralization of 
state power and the simultaneous demilitarisation of social organization have created some of 
the conditions required for both the empowerment of newly rising social forces and the 
enhancement of the state's capacity to govern. Whether both state and society will ultimately 
emerge in some sense strengthened by the wrenching processes of renegotiation now so 
precariously under way cannot, however, be predicted.' 
The introduction of state-society synergy thinking provides a perspective on 
positive social development. Such thinking assumes that 'the state is therefor the 
sake of societal development' (Kleden, 2003). Such thinking also assumes that the 
state encourages the development of civil society, which may not be true for 
every country, for '[f]rom a merely academic notion civil society has become a political 
program involving a wide range of social forces' (Kleden, 2003). There are m a n y open 
questions to be answered regarding the possibilities for state-society synergy. 
The autonomy of the state is important to ensure that the state is not 
manipulated by a few interest groups that have big influence in government 
decisions. The representation of vulnerable groups in the state decision-making 
framework is essential to protect the rights of those who have little voice in 
public power configurations. While high expectations were once attributed to 
the NGO movement, and both positive8 critical remarks are given to the role of 
NGOs (Ho, 2001b:897). Hence, the state-society synergy remains a hope. The 
construction and generation of such synergy depends on a healthy 
development of the state and civil society. 
In general, all the three above mentioned approaches or thinking challenge 
the theories and practices of planned intervention tradition by elucidating 
alternative theories and thoughts. However, each of them provides us a unique 
angle for tackling development issues. The actor-oriented approach is both 
epistemological and analytical. It tells us how to get to a near understanding of 
the complexities of the world. It gives us analytical perspectives rather than any 
fixed framework. The understanding and appreciation of this approach will 
8
 Peter Ho (2001b: 897) elucidates the development of environmentalist NGOs in China and 
their contribution to Chinese civil society: 'Over the past few years, the People's Republic has 
seen the emergence of a broad range of green organizations, varying from hierarchic, top-down 
public lobbies working from within the bureaucratic system, to participatory, grassroots 
organizations that employ tactics of mass mobilization. In this sense, the burgeoning 
environmentalism also implies a significant strengthening of civil society.' 
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generate disagreement with planned intervention approaches, which simplify 
to such an extent that they often distort the reality. Leaving aside Chambers 
'lower' and 'upper' stereotypic divide between farmers and professional, the 
participatory approach advocates an appreciation of farmer's knowledge and 
develops a series of tools for accessing this knowledge. These tools are 
nowadays often used in project implementation. However, being essentially a 
set of techniques, it becomes more easily manipulated by dominant interests. 
That is why many development projects while claiming to be participatory are 
in fact implemented in a top down manner. The actor-oriented approach is 
much more epistemological and methodological than a set of methods and 
techniques. For example, an actor-oriented analysis cannot serve the needs of 
pure economic analysis nor can it accept orthodox intervention thinking. Social 
interface studies form part of the analytical framework of an actor approach 
showing how planned interventions are transformed and unanticipated 'social 
projects' are constructed. State-society synergy thinking gives a positive 
perspective of how state and society can work out the best way to develop if the 
boundaries between state and society can be reconstructed redrawn in a 
constructive way. It seems at first sight to provide an answer to the problem of 
state society divide, but actually it only outlines a set of possibilities, because 
there are as yet too may unanswered questions and uncertainties in achieving 
viable synergy. 
The Analytical Framing of the Thesis 
This research then adopts an actor-oriented approach as the central framework. 
The perspective demythologising planned intervention provides the basic 
thread of debate, and interface analysis a useful research methodology. The key 
concepts relevant to the thesis and used in analysing the outcomes of 
resettlement are those of agency, kinship, social network, and knowledge and 
power configurations. This helped me to understand the social dynamics 
involved in the outcome of resettlement projects rather than seeing this as 
simply the execution of given government policies. The research uses a 
participatory approach in collecting the field data and for grounding my 
theoretical argument. The adoption of the participatory approach gave me a set 
of practical methods and tools for viewing resettlement projects from the 
viewpoints of the farmers themselves. 
The central argument of my thesis focuses on three dimensions: 
(1) The socio-economic dimension (the focus of chapter four). Socio-economic 
factors will be evaluated to illustrate the outcome of resettlement projects. 
The socio-economic analysis will provide evidence about who has 
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benefited and in what ways. The data used for the socio-economic analysis 
are drawn from both the questionnaire survey and participatory research. 
(2) The policy dimension (the focus of chapter five). Government policy is seen 
as an important pre-condition for large-scale resettlement. The argument 
concerning the policy dimension is that when modernization theory and 
the economic growth model dominate the rationale of policy formulation 
and implementation, a poverty reduction policy will not serve its aims. 
This chapter firstly presents in detail the official version of the resettlement 
policy. Then, later in the discussion, the research will indicate the gaps 
between the defined policy intentions and the actual outcomes of the 
resettlement process. At this point policy analysis shows the importance of 
'demythologising planned intervention'. 
(3) The development sociological dimension (the focus of chapter six). Sociological 
debates about development will be explored to interpret the processes that 
have brought about the outcomes. My argument in regard to development 
sociology is that given the dynamics of resettlement, better-off farmers will 
take economic advantage, utilize their knowledge and their well-
established social networks to benefit directly from the resettlement, and 
that the poorer farmers, who are supposed to the primary beneficiaries, get 
left out. Using an interface perspective and drawing on the key concepts of 
the actor-oriented approach enabled me to interpret what has precisely 
happened in the resettlement process and why a development project is not 
simply about executing government policy. 
2.3 Identification of Research Sites 
With regard to the site selection, the first step was which province to chose for 
the conduct of the research. Up to 1999, there were 16 provincial/regional 
governments in China that had launched government-organised resettlement 
projects for poverty reduction and development (see Table 5-1 in chapter five). 
One indicator for selecting a province was the date of launching their 
resettlement projects. In this way, these 16 provinces/regions could be 
categorized into two groups: the pioneer province/regions and the follow-up 
province/regions. There are two pioneers - Ningxia Hui Autonomous Region, 
and Gansu Province. They started resettlement projects in 1983 supported by 
the central government's "Three Xi Development Fund ' 9 . The other 
provinces /regions started their resettlement projects in the 1990s, especially 
after 1994, when central government's '8-7 Poverty Alleviation Program' was 
The detailed information about the "Three Xi Development Fund" can be found in chapter six. 
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issued. The 8-7 Program recommended resettlement as an option for effective 
poverty reduction. Although several provinces/regions started their 
resettlement project respectively in 1986, in 1991 and in 1993, they can be 
generally categorized into the follow-up group. 
The second indicator used in selecting a province was whether or not there 
was local population in the resettlement areas before the resettlement projects. 
One category is where there were no people living in the resettlement areas - in 
which case the resettlement areas were originally wasteland without irrigation. 
With investment in building irrigation systems, the wasteland was turned into 
irrigated land, so that people could be resettled on the newly developed 
irrigated farming land. The other category is where there was already a local 
population resident in the resettlement areas. In such cases, the resettlement 
areas either had better access to water resources by nature or had enjoyed 
previous water conservation projects, or on which investment had been made 
in turning original dryland into irrigated land. 
Two provinces/regions were chosen as research areas, and each of the two 
represents a combination of two indicators. Ningxia Hui Autonomous region 
was one of the research areas. It is a pioneer region in terms of starting 
resettlement projects with central government support. The resettlement area 
was previously wasteland, which implies that there was no local population in 
the area. Yunnan Province is a follow-up Province, which started its 
resettlement projects in 1997 and the resettlement area had already had a 
resident local population before resettlement. 
After having identified Ningxia as one of the research areas, a precise 
research site needed to be identified. To do this, an effort was made to 
understand how local officials in Ningxia categorized different types of 
resettlement. It was found that they used two indicators, one was when the 
resettlement had taken place and the second was the development models of 
the resettlement sites. Officials from Ningxia categorize development models of 
resettlement sites into three: the first is the 'suburb/industrial development 
model', the second, the 'east-west assistance development model10' and the 
third, the 'agricultural development model'. I made the site selection together 
with local officials. In the end, a resettlement site called Moon Village of 
Minning Resettlement Area was chosen. This was for the following reasons: (1) 
Resettlers moved to Moon Village in the 1990s. Many households interviewed 
moved around 1996. In this case, it would be easier for resettlers to compare life 
"' East-west assistance is identified as a way of helping the less developed regions by Chinese 
government. In China, the eastern part is more developed than the western part. Central 
government requests and encourages provinces in the eastern part to invest and support those 
in the western part. 
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between the place of origin and resettlement area, because their memories 
about what took place five years ago would still be fresh. Also five years living 
in the resettlement area is long enough to evaluate what has changed; (2) 
Resettlers in Moon Village are all originally from Xiapu Township of Xiji 
County, so that it would be easier to identify the corresponding place of origin 
in order to research the population that remained; (3) In terms of development 
models of resettlement, Moon Village fits in the 'agricultural development 
model', which is more representative than the other two models because the 
production structure in most resettlement areas in Ningxia and in other 
provinces/regions is still farming-based. 
We had similar discussions with officials in Yunnan about the 
categorization of their resettlement projects. Local officials had never 
categorized their resettlement projects, but they pointed out a very important 
strategy shift in the recent government policy. In the No.67 Provincial 
Document, issued in March 1999, it was stated that the focus of resettlement 
should be shifted from across prefecture resettlement to intra-county 
resettlement, which indicates that administrative boundaries crossed in 
resettlement is an important issue and one that id highlighted in the chapter on 
policy. Using the administrative boundaries crossed during resettlement as an 
indicator, we can categorize the resettlement projects in Yunnan into 4 types. (1) 
Across prefecture resettlement: people moved from one prefecture to another. 
(2) Intra-county resettlement: people moved from one location to another 
within the same county, but across township boundaries. (3) Intra-township 
resettlement: people moved from one village to another within the same 
township. (4) Intra-village resettlement, people moved from one place to 
another within the same administrative village - normally, people moved from 
mountainous areas to plains areas within the same administrative village. 
In discussions with local officials as to what had changed in terms of 
production structures for resettlers in different resettlement sites, it transpired 
that there were production structure changes in nearly all resettlements, even 
though resettlers continued agricultural production as their main income 
sources. This is because resettlers might now grow different crops or the share 
of cropping production in their total income might have changed. However, 
one outstanding difference among farmers was that some got involved in 
commercially oriented plantations, such as tea, coffee and rubber tree 
production, while other farmers continued grain production. So the type of 
production differentiated by commerce-oriented and grain-oriented is another 
important indicator. In the end, we choose Ma Ka Ba Resettlement Site as our 
research site in Yunnan. This was because firstly it is an intra-township 
resettlement, which fits the future focus of provincial government resettlement 
investment, and secondly, resettlers continued their grain production-oriented 
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agriculture, which is the main production type for resettlers in Cangyuan 
County. 
In the process of site selection, much attention was paid to how local 
officials' categorized types of resettlement, since they are the decision-makers 
and their categorizations can indicate their policy orientations. Local officials 
have command of more macro-level information than farmers and outsider 
researchers. One may notice in my previous text that categorization of 
resettlement in Yunnan was drawn up during the discussions between 
researchers and local officials. This was because local officials had never 
systematically reviewed their resettlement projects. Hence, the process of 
categorization and site selection resulted in reality from an interactive process 
between researchers and local officials. 
2.4 Research Design and Research Methods 
The proposed subject matter necessitates the use of two kinds of research: 
descriptive and interpretative research. Descriptive research aims to provide 
detailed information and description of the various indicators around certain 
issues. Interpretative research aims to provide some understanding of the 
causal explanation of the selected research issues. In this research, a detailed 
description of the resettlement outcome is acquired through a questionnaire 
survey. Logical inference is acquired through case studies of social and policy 
dimensions, which allow for more interpretative research. The descriptive 
research serves also for the interpretative research. 
This research is basically qualitative research, though it uses a quantitative 
method, a questionnaire, to conduct the sample survey. I understand that case 
study" is a general summary of all qualitative research methods. In this sense, 
my research is a case study. Case studies have always faced the criticism that 
their findings are invalid because they are based on only one or a few cases. I 
understand that quantitative research relies on representative samples and 
identifiable indicators. My doubt about quantitative research is, firstly, to what 
extent the sample is representative of the parent population; secondly, to what 
extent the identifiable indicators are essential. I will not go in-depth here into 
the battle between qualitative and quantitative research, even though it seems 
as if the one always tends to justify its validity by arguing against the other. I 
justify the use of the case study by Mitchell's argument. He states that: 
11
 A case study is 'a detailed examination of an event (or series of related events) which the 
analyst believes exhibits the operation of some identified general theoretical principle.' 
(Mitchell, 1983:192) 
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'the process of inference from case studies is only logical or causal and cannot be statistical 
and that extrapolability from any one case study to like situations in general is based only on 
logical inference. We infer that the features present in the case study will be related in a wider 
population not because the case is representative but because our analysis is unassailable.' 
(Mitchell, 1983:200) 
Some data are collected by using a questionnaire survey. The results basically 
serve the purpose of fact finding. 
The research uses different units of analysis in the different research 
dimensions. In the policy dimension, the object studied is government policy. In 
the socio-economic dimension, the unit of analysis is the different groups of 
farmers, who are categorized in relation to resettlement. There are three 
categories of farmers in the analysis: (1) resettlers, i.e. those who moved from 
their places of origin to the resettlement area; (2) those who did not move but 
remain in the places of origin; (3) the local population already resident in the 
resettlement area before the resettlement projects. A detailed comparison is 
made of the different socio-economic factors among these three groups of 
farmers. In the development dimension, the individual farmer is used as the 
primary unit of analysis. 
The research does not aim for a controlled comparative study between the 
two sites. Comparison will be made of general trends rather than in relation to 
each of the variables. Hence, the research findings derived from specifically 
selected research sites may not be representative of many other resettlement 
projects across China, no matter how carefully and scientifically the research 
sites have been selected so as to meet sample requirements. The reason for this 
is that there are too many social, economic, political, and physical variables that 
can influence the resettlement process. Hence the primary aim is not to be 
representative in a statistical sense but to provide an analytical framework of 
the processes and outcomes. It is believed that a general comparison of the 
overall outcome of resettlement of the two research areas is variable because the 
two research areas are both under government resettlement projects for poverty 
reduction. 
The main methods applied in this research are a questionnaire survey and 
selected techniques drawn from participatory rural appraisal (PRA). An 
interface perspective and gender concerns run through the analysis and 
discussion of field data. An interface analysis has methodological implications 
in that it guides researchers as to where and how to draw insights from social 
events and social processes. Long (2001:69-72) illustrates the key elements of an 
interface perspective: 
• 'Interface as an organised entity of interlocking relationships and intentionalities. 
Continued interaction encourages the development of boundaries and shared expectations 
that shape the interaction of the participants so that over time the interface itself becomes 
an organised entity of interlocking relationships and intentionalities.' Certain modes of 
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relationship between officials and farmers will always be developed in the 
process of their interaction. The relationships between officials and farmers 
tend to be recognised through rules, sanctions, and procedures. In reality, 
boundaries are always broken and new boundaries and informal "rules" 
are formed, and such boundaries and "rules" are site-specific. 
• 'Interface as a site for conflict, incompatibility and negotiation. Although interface 
interactions presuppose some degree of common interest, they also have a propensity to 
generate conflict due to contradictory interests and objectives or to unequal power 
relations.' The apparent superior-inferior relationships between officials and 
farmers do not mean that superiors always give the orders and inferiors 
always follow them. I suspect that the more hierarchical a relationship is, 
the more tension it involves. Researchers informed by interface analysis are 
sensitive to interface interactions. Those without the this knowledge and 
sensitivity may be blind to an ongoing scene of conflict, incompatibility and 
negotiation. 
• 'An interface approach depicts knowledge as arising from 'an encounter of horizjons'. "The 
incorporation of new information and new discursive or cultural frames can only take place 
on the basis of already-existing knowledge frames and evaluative modes, which are 
themselves re-shaped through the communicative process. Hence knowledge emerges as a 
product of interaction, dialogue, reflexivity and contests of meaning, and involves aspects 
of control, authority and power.' 
• 'Power as the outcome of struggles over meanings and strategic relationships. Like 
knowledge, power is not simply possessed, accumulated and unproblematically exercised 
(Foucault, in Gordon, 1980:78-108). 'Power implies much more than how hierarchies 
and hegemonic control demarcate social positions and opportunities, and restrict access to 
resources. It is the outcome of complex struggles and negotiations over authority, status, 
reputation and resources, and necessitates the enrolment of networks of actors and 
constituencies' (Long, 2001) 'Creating room for manoeuvre implies a degree of consent, a 
degree of negotiation and thus a degree of power, as manifested in the possibility of exerting 
some control, prerogative, authority and capacity for action, be it frontstage or backstage, 
for flickering moments or for more sustained periods' (Villarreal, 1992:256). 
The questionnaire is the classical method for quantitative research. Justified 
research sampling and right sample size is important for obtaining qualified 
questionnaire survey data. The questionnaire is designed on the basis of the 
researchers' research assumptions, and its framework leaves little space for 
interviewees to reflect their life in a flexible manner. In the process of filling out 
questionnaires, interviewees just passively answer the questions. Considering 
the limits that the questionnaire has in its nature, it has only been used for 
finding out some basic descriptive socio-economic facts rather than for seeking 
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in-depth interpretation of causes of the outcome of resettlement process. SPSS12 
was used as the data analysis tool. 
The design and implementation of questionnaire survey and case studies 
are organized as follows: firstly, a preliminary questionnaire was designed 
based on literature review, and key issues are made notes as reference for 
future case studies; secondly, a test field research was conducted to test the 
design of the questionnaire and for the selection of research site; thirdly, a field 
research was conducted to obtain a certain number of household survey, at the 
same time case studies were conducted. In each research sites, farmers meeting 
were organized. Individual household interview and individual farmer 
interview were selected in the process of questionnaire survey and farmers 
meeting. The researcher did not approach individual interview as a separate 
activity, it was always a continuation of questionnaire survey and farmer 
meeting. The final section of the indicators used in chapter four is based on the 
questionnaire and the quality of the survey results. 
Table 2-1: Sample Size for Questionnaire Survey 
Resettlers 
Farmers 
remaining 
in the 
places of 
origin 
Local 
population 
in the 
Resettle-
ment Areas 
Total 
Ningxia 
Total No. of 
Households 
Interviewed 
38 
47 
0 
85 
No. of 
Households 
Interviewed 
With Female 
Interviewees 
16 
19 
0 
35 
Yunnan 
Total No. of 
Households 
Interviewed 
30 
31 
14 
75 
No. of 
Households 
Interviewed 
With Female 
Interviewees 
7 
10 
1 
18 
Total 
Total No. of 
Households 
Interviewed 
68 
78 
14 
170 
Number of 
Households 
Interviewed 
with Female 
Interviewees 
23 
29 
1 
53 
Note: I designed to interview half women and half men, but I failed to do so, because some 
women withdrew by telling us that they were not involved in the process of resettlement 
decision-making and they were not as clear as their husband for the many questions we asked. 
12
 SPSS is computer software. It can be used to do quantitative analysis of sample data, such as: 
mean, summary, linear/mixed model, ratio statistics, hierarchical Cluster Analysis, etc. 
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In fact, the current number of women interviewee were reached by special effort made by the 
researcher and the local officers who were in the field with the researcher. 
It cannot be said that a feminist critique has been used as a basic methodology 
in the research. However, gender issues are taken into consideration in the 
study, such as in the design of research methods and the household 
questionnaire. The following gender-sensitive considerations were used in the 
research methods: (1) to have both male and female interviewees fill out the 
questionnaires, though a separate analysis of the answers by males and females 
was not done. This might have added insights gained from the case material. (2) 
Information about gender division of labor is investigated in the questionnaire. 
(3) In the application of PRA tools, discussions with women and women's 
groups were conducted. 
Some PRA tools were applied in the field survey. The following text briefly 
introduces the tools used and the outputs obtained from their use. It should be 
kept in mind that the ideologies of ethnographic methodology can be often 
traced in PRA tools and in the practical application of PRA tools in the field. In 
fact ethnography has contributed to the development of participatory 
approaches. I argue that the use of PRA tools is a pragmatic way of applying 
ethnographic methods, even though they can never contribute the same 
richness as a full ethnographic study. 
Semi-structured interviewing (SSI) 
Introduction to the method: SSI is one of the main tools used in PRA. It is a 
form of guided interviewing where only some of the questions are 
predetermined. PRA interviews do not use a formal survey questionnaire. 
Many questions are formulated during the interview. If it becomes apparent 
during the interview that some questions are irrelevant, they can be skipped. 
Questions usually emerge from the interviewee's responses, the use of ranking 
methods, observation of things around and the PRA team's own background 
and experience. There are three types of SSI: individual interview, key 
informant interview, the group interview and the focus group interview. 
Individual interviews can be used to obtain representative information. 
They are more personal than group interviews and are more likely to reveal 
conflicts within the community since respondents may feel they can speak more 
freely without their neighbors present. 
Key informant interviews can be used to obtain special knowledge. A key 
informant is anyone who has special knowledge on a particular topic (e.g. a 
merchant on transportation and credit, a midwife on birth control practices, a 
farmer on cropping practices). Key informants are expected to be able to answer 
questions about the knowledge and behavior of others and especially about the 
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operations of the broader systems. While there are well-known risks of being 
misled by key informants' answers and cross-checking is necessary, key 
informants are a major source of information for PRA. The key informants are 
expected to have a more objective or at least different perspective on affairs in 
the community than the community members themselves. 
Group interviews obtain community-level information. Group interviews 
have several advantages. They provide access to a larger body of knowledge 
and an immediate cross-check on information as it is received from others in the 
group. Group interviews are not useful for discussion of sensitive information. 
They can also be seriously misleading when the questioner is believed to have 
the power to control benefits or sanctions. Group interviews may reveal 
people's ideals rather than what actually exists, but triangulation of methods 
and cross-checking of information can reveal more of the whole picture. The 
interviewers should encourage alternative views and opinions and probe to 
avoid group pressure. Informal conversations after the meeting can be useful to 
get information from those who were not able to express their opinions during 
the group interview. Group interviews require more advance planning and 
preparation than individual interviews. 
Focus-group discussion is to discuss specific topics in detail. A small group 
of people (six to twelve) who are knowledgeable or who are interested in the 
topic(s) are invited to participate in the focus group discussion. A facilitator is 
chosen to ensure that the discussion does not diverge too far from the original 
topic and that no participant dominates the discussion. 
Application of SSI in the research: the semi-structured interview is the most 
frequently used method in this research and many other methods and tools 
used are very often linked with the SSI. For example, the use of household 
sorting is often applied in a group discussion. More than 30 individual 
interviews were conducted. The interviewees were either selected by certain 
criteria or at random. In each community visited better-off and poor farmers 
were chosen for interviews and often after the interviewees had finished the 
formal questionnaire forms. A better selection of who to interview in detail 
could be made after receiving the information from the questionnaire. 
Sometimes, a talk was simply had with someone who passed by. Most stories 
told in chapter six were from individual interviews. Most interviewees were 
males, because they were the decision-makers in the resettlement process at 
household levels. Several individual interviews with women were also 
conducted. For two of the stories, presented in detail in chapter six, twelve key 
informant interviews were conducted. These are listed in the following table: 
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Table 2-2: Key Informant Interviews Conducted 
/-«_ i_ » * i- T i • Number of Interviews
 T . Output of the Interviews „ , . , Interviewees T
_ Conducted 
„ , . . , , .
 t . , . . Provincial and Policy guidelines at various levels 4 . ,,. . . 
' ° county officials 
Implementation process of the . ..... , r
„ , . f . 4 Villages cadres 
resettlement projects 
Village profile and project implementation Township and 
process village cadres 
Several group interviews and focus group interviews were conducted in each 
community. Topics discussed covered: household sorting, community problem 
analysis and problem ranking, discussion on household decision-making, 
SWOT (Strength-Weakness-Opportunity-Stress) analysis, for example about the 
'returning land to forestry and grass' policy and about life in the resettlement 
area, etc. Not all the group discussion results are presented in the thesis. 
Selection was made based on the relevance and the quality of product. 
Seasonal Calendar 
Introduction to the method: This is a calendar showing the main activities, 
problems, and opportunities throughout the annual cycle in diagrammatic form 
(it really is a series of different diagrams shown on a single sheet). It helps 
identify the months of greatest difficulty and vulnerability, or other significant 
variances that which have an impact on people's lives. A seasonal calendar can 
be used to summarize, among other things: 
Indigenous seasons 
Climate (rainfall and temperatures) 
Crop sequences (from planting to harvesting) 
Crop pests and diseases 
Collection of wild fruits and herbs 
Livestock (births, weaning, sales, migration, fodder) 
Livestock diseases 
Income generating activities 
Labor demand for men, women, children 
Prices 
Marketing 
Human diseases 
Social events 
Types and quantity of cooking/heating fuel 
Migration 
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• Income and expenditures 
• Debt 
• Quantity or type of food consumed (diet) 
• Annual holidays 
Application of seasonal calendar in the research: The use of seasonal calendar is 
a very good way to get to know the background of a community, so was often 
used as the first topic to discuss with a group of farmers. The outputs of this 
tool are tables dealing with seasonal crop calendar and gender division of labor 
(see table 4-36 and 4-37). Beside the concrete output of the application of the 
tool, we should also acknowledge how the use of this tool helped the 
researchers to explore further research questions in the process. 
Time Trends 
Introduction to the method: Time trends show quantitative changes over time 
and can be used for many variables, including: yields, area under cultivation, 
livestock population, prices, interest rates, migration, time and distance to 
collect fuel wood and fodder, population size and number of households, birth 
and death rates, malnutrition rates, project expenses, rainfall etc. 
Application of the method: Time trends were often used in group 
interviews, individual interviews and key informant interviews. Information 
gathered from time trends is mainly presented in chapter three when 
introducing the research areas. 
Household Sorting 
Introduction to the method: There are inequalities and differences in wealth in 
every community. These differences influence or determine people's behaviors, 
coping strategies, and views. Household sorting or ranking allows the team to 
'investigate perceptions of wealth differences and inequalities in a community; discover local 
indicators and criteria of wealth and well-being; and establish the relative position of households 
in a community.' (Theis, 1991) 
Steps for using household sorting: 
• Selection of sorting categories, can be wealth, type of land, major 
activities involved or any relevant categories 
• Write down names of all households in a selected communities 
• Organise a small group meeting inviting 5-6 local farmers (Pay attention 
to their socio-economic backgrounds. Farmers with different background 
should be invited and women should be invited) 
• Identification of indicators to use for the household sorting 
• Pick up name cards one by one for discussion of categorizing them into 
different categories 
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• Discussion of the socio-economic characteristics of each category of 
households 
Application of the method in the research: Household sorting has played an 
essential role in this project. The research has used the outputs from sorting to 
show who has benefited from resettlement. The outputs from sorting support 
the central argument of the thesis. The outputs of the tool deal with households 
sorting of sub-villages in the places of origin in both Ningxia and Yunnan (see 
Table 4-1,4-2,4-3 and 4-4, chapter four). 
Story Telling 
Introduction to the method: Story telling is a method to give interviewees full 
space to tell what happened about something. Things to be told can be a process 
(for example the resettlement process), an event (for example a local wedding 
ceremony), an activity (return of steep land to forest), a personal story, a family 
story, etc. Different people see the same thing differently due to their 
experiences, background, viewpoints, knowledge etc. Researchers and farmers 
see the same things differently. Researchers who conduct their research only 
with their structured questionnaires begin with an ignorance of farmers' 
perceptions. Interaction will cause both parties to change their views. We 
understand other people largely by what they tell us since we have different 
experiences by which to judge their views. 
Steps in the story telling are for researchers to first have some background 
knowledge about the community, and have rough ideas about the research 
interests. Researchers will then identify the interviewees, or they may simply 
stop and talk with anyone passing by in the community. They will then give 
full space to the interviewee; letting them talk without interruption unless they 
stop. The researcher then makes full notes of what the interviewees said 
without changing any terms used. 
Ranking 
Introduction to the method: Ranking or scoring means placing something in 
order. Analytical tools, such as ranking, complement semi-structured 
interviewing by generating basic information that leads to more direct 
questioning. They may be used either as part of an interview or separately. 
(Theis, 1991) 
Application of the method in the research: Rankings were used several 
times in the field research, such as in the ranking of community problems and 
ranking of what matters to who between husband and wife during household 
decision-making. The outputs utilized in the thesis can be found in community 
problem ranking results in chapter three and the Tables dealing with household 
decision-making (see Tables 6-5, 6-6 and 6-7, of chapter six). 
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Diagram 3-1: The Research Areas in Ningxia and Yunnan 
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Hence, the precise research sites of the research were: No.3 and No.4 sub-
villages (in the resettlement area) in Moon Village, Minning Development Area, 
Yongning County of Ningxia; Xiapu Natural Village (in the place of origin) in 
Xiapu Village, Xiapu Township, Xiji County of Ningxia; Mangkaba 
Resettlement Sub-village (in the resettlement area) in Manggang Village, Nanla 
Township, Cangyuan County, Lincang Prefecture of Yunnan; Xiawantang 
natural village, Shangwantang natural village and Huoshaozhai natural village 
(in the place of origin) in Manggang Village, Nanla Township, Cangyuan 
County, Lincang Prefecture of Yunnan. 
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3.1 Introduction to the Research Areas in Ningxia 
The resettlement project of my research in Ningxia is a case of inter-county 
resettlement. This means that the resettlers have moved from one village in 
their place of origin located in a specific county to another village in the 
resettlement area that belongs to a different county, thus crossing county 
borders, though still within the administrative borders of Ningxia Hui 
Autonomous Region. 
Ningxia Hui Autonomous Region 
The key characteristic of Ningxia in relation to resettlement is its north-south 
division in terms of accessibility to Yellow River landscape and irrigation. The 
other key characteristic is its large percentage of people belonging to the Hui 
ethnic group, which implies a complex social and political structure. Although 
in the thesis I make reference to the religious implications of membership of this 
ethnic group, I do not intend to concentrate discussion on, what is called the 
'minority issue'.2 
Ningxia is located in the northwest of China, in the up-stream area of the 
Yellow River. Its total area is 66.4 thousand square km. The total area of arable 
land is 19,320 thousand mu (i.e.1,288 thousand ha), of which irrigated land 
accounts for 5000 thousand mu (333 thousand ha). The area of wasteland that 
has agricultural potential consists of more than 10,000 thousand mu (666.7 
thousand ha). The population of the region totals 5,615.5 thousand, of which 
3,676.5 thousand or 65.47% are of Han ethnicity. Hui ethnicity accounts for 
1,902.3 thousand people or 33.88%. Of the total population, 1,821.3 thousand 
(32.43%) live in urban areas, while the rural population is 3,794.2 thousand 
(67.57%). All villages in Ningxia have had access to electricity since 1997. 
The regional development of Ningxia is uneven. The northern part is made up 
of an irrigated plain, where both urban and rural populations have relatively 
higher living standards and better living conditions. However, the southern 
part is a dry mountainous area, where the level of economic development is 
very low. Poverty alleviation is one of the most important tasks of the regional 
government, and resettlement is considered a key instrument for poverty 
reduction. 
2
 Power configurations that link with religious issues, are discussed in chapter six. 
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The Place of Origin in Ningxia 
Xiji County 
Xiji County is located in Southern Ningxia. Altitude ranges from 1,688 to 2,633 
meters above sea level. The total area is 3,144 square km. It covers 26 townships 
and 305 administrative villages. The total population reaches 445.8 thousand, of 
which 52 percent are Hui. Annual average temperature is 5.3 degree centigrade. 
Annual rainfall is about 400 mm, 60 percent of which is concentrated in July, 
August and September. Farmers' average net income per capita per year is 
1,103 yuan. (1 yuan=8US$) 
Xiji County is one of the poorest counties in China. It suffers from drought, 
soil erosion and natural resource degradation. Resettlement has been identified 
as an important approach to alleviate poverty in Xiji County. The following 
table shows the population/households moved under central/provincial 
government support from 1985 until 2000. 
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Table 3-1: Overview of Government-Organized Voluntary Resettlement 
projects in Xiji County of Ningxia 
Period 
1985-1987 
1991-1999 
1998-2000 
Total 
Type of Projects 
'Three Xi' 
Projects3 
Various projects 
under central/ 
Provincial 
government 
support 
'1236' project4 
Number of 
Resettlers 
6000 
18500 
12900 
37400 
Number of 
Resettled 
Households 
1200 
3400 
1345 
5945 
Places of 
Origin 
Hongyao 
Township, 
Tianping 
Township, 
Majian 
Township 
Baiya 
Township, 
Shagou 
Township, 
Huoshizhai 
Township, 
Xiapu 
Township 
All 
townships 
from the 
county 
Resettlement 
Areas 
Nanshantaizi 
Resettlement 
Area in 
Zhongwei 
County of 
Ningxia 
Yuquanying 
Resettlement 
Area in 
Yongning 
County of 
Ningxia 
Hongsipu 
Resettlement 
Area of 
Ningxia 
Source: Poverty Alleviation Office of Xiji County Government 
Xiapu Township 
There are 26 townships in Xiji County, and Xiapu Township is one of the 
poorest. The average farmers' net annual income per capita in Xiapu Township 
was about 850 yuan (about 106 US$) in 2000, while in the better-off townships 
the average farmers' net annual income per capita was above 1000 yuan (125 
US$). 
Xiapu Township is located in the eastern part of Xiji County with an annual 
rainfall of 440-460mm concentrated in July, August and September. The highest 
temperature in a year is 30 degrees Celsius and the lowest minus 20 degrees. 
Average altitude is 2,600 meters above sea level. It is windy in spring and in 
3
 For detailed information about "Three Xi" projects, please look at chapter five. 
4
 "1236" is an abbreviation of a "Yellow River Irrigation Project for Poverty Reduction of 
Ningxia". " 1 " represents that the project aims at alleviating poverty population of 1 million, of 
which 800 thousand are supposed to be resettlers. "2" represents that 2 million mu (133 
thousand ha) can be irrigated after project completion. "3" represents that the whole project 
needs 3 billion yuan (375 million US$) input. "6" represents that the project aims to finish 
within 6 years since 1998. 
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winter sandstorms often occur in February and March. Total arable land is 2,679 
ha, which is all rain fed land with very low productivity. Major crops are wheat, 
flax (planted for cooking oil), potatoes, mizi (a drought resistant local variety of 
grain), peas, barley, oats etc. The crop yields are extremely low due to poor 
natural conditions, for example, the average yield of wheat is 675 kg/ha, and of 
potatoes 1,950 kg/ha. 
The total population of the township is 11,171, of which 5,620 are women 
and 5,551 men. The population is almost exclusively agricultural (11,047 people 
or 98.9% of the total population). The Hui ethnic group or 'nationality' 
(Muslim) predominates, 10,854 persons or 97.2% of the total population. The 
major income source for local farmers is livestock production. The number of 
large animals, including cattle, horses, donkeys, sheep/goats and etc. is 2,232. 
There were only 36 pigs, not for eating since the population is Muslim, but for 
religious purposes. The number of poultry is 9,400. 
The land household contract system was implemented in the township, as 
elsewhere in China, in the early 1980s, and no big land adjustment has been 
carried out since, so many farmers started reclaiming mountain land for arable 
land when their available land did not yield enough to feed their family. This 
reclaiming of mountain land has caused big environmental problems, such as 
soil erosion. 
Xiapu Village 
The research team traveled from Yinchuan City to Xiji County by jeep for doing the 
field trip in the place of origin. We started in the early morning and arrived in the late 
afternoon and stayed the night in a hotel in Xiji County before continuing early the 
next day to go to Xiapu Village. It only took us about 40 minutes to reach the village. 
The road condition is relatively good and is an asphalt road. The village is on the road. I 
was expecting a very poor village with little access to transportation, but it turned to be 
a village with good access. The other striking was that many households had tractors 
parked in front of their houses. The Village Party Secretary, Mr. Ma Zhengxuan, was 
expecting us at his home when we arrived and we had discussions about what we 
wanted to do. The next day I asked Mr. Ma to show me around the village. After we 
climbed to the top of the village, I saw a small reservoir, which had no water. Grass was 
growing inside, and two horses were eating the grass growing there. Mr. Ma told me 
that the reservoir had been constructed in the 1960s, and had been used from the 1960s 
to the early-1980s. It had not been used for more than 20 years since there had been no 
water source to fill it. We passed by maize fields where the maize was too short and 
weak to become ripe before the winter, since it was already mid-August. Mr. Ma told 
me that they would have no maize harvest again this year. When we went down to the 
lower part of the village, I saw a deep ditch passing through the village. It is about two 
meters wide and three to five meters deep. The ditch was made by floods and rushed 
deeper and wider each year when floods occurred. When we approached a half broken 
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small simple wooden bridge crossing the ditch (it could hardly be seen as a bridge, it 
was just a thing for crossing, with supports of a mixture of wood and mud), a couple 
reached the bridge, trying to push a cart full ofmizi across the bridge. The broken bridge 
had become so narrow that the two wheels could not both stand on the bridge. The 
couple and their harvest were about to fall into the ditch. Mr. Ma went forward, quickly 
found a big tree branch, and then placed it on the bridge to make it a bit wider. Finally, 
they managed to pull and push the cart over the ditch. 
Xiapu village is located in the eastern part of Xiji County. Total arable land of 
the village is 4,800 mu (320 ha). Total forest is 2,400 mu (160 ha). Total 
wasteland/ mountain area is 2,600 mu (173 ha). There are 240 households and 
1,371 people in the village. The male population numbers 710, the female 
population is 650. All residents are Muslim. 
The village is not far from the township center, so that there is no village 
clinic or school because the villagers have easy access to the hospitals and 
schools in the township center. 
Off-farm labor is one of the most important sources of cash income. It was 
estimated that in the year 2000 about 130 people worked as off-farm laborers 
outside the area, working in activities such as construction, mining and tertiary 
sector services. About 20 worked nearby as agricultural laborers. The 
importance of off-farm activities can further be seen in the results of a 
household ranking exercise done in Shangpu Sub-village of Xiapu Village 
(Table 4-1, chapter four). This shows that farmers identified the most important 
characteristic of the better-off households in the community to be that they had 
enough able labor for off-farm activities. 
The natural environment of Xiapu Village is harsh. It is a hilly area. The 
predominant soil type is loess. The climate belongs to a cold, semi-humid type 
of weather. Annual rainfall is 400 mm and concentrates in July, August and 
September. There is a frost-free period of 180 days. The highest temperature is 
30 degrees Celsius, and lowest temperature is minus 20. The average altitude is 
2,600 meters above sea level. It is windy with of 5-6 degree wind force in winter 
due to the cold air stream from the Siberian Area and sandstorms are frequent 
in February and March during spring. 
The biggest climatic constraint the villagers face is drought, and looking at 
the evolution of rainfall over time in the local area it would seem that this 
situation is getting worse. 
Table 3-2: Timeline of Rainfall of Xiapu Village of Ningxia 
Year 1961-1965 1966-1972 1973-1989 1990-1993 
Rainfall Sufficient Drought Sufficient Less rainfall 
rainfall rainfall 
1993 to 2001 
Drought 
Source: Farmers' group discussion in Xiapu Village 
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The harsh conditions restrict crop and livestock production. Major crops in the 
village are wheat, mizi, potatoes, bulrush millet, peas, buckwheat, oats etc. Yield 
of all the crops except potatoes are lower than 100 kg per mu (1,500 kg/ha). In 
terms of livestock production, spread among the 240 households, there were 
240 head of cattle, 300 sheep/goats, 80 donkeys, 30 mules, 1,100 chickens, 800 
ducks, and 200 geese. 
The lack of water also means that farmers have difficulties in supplying 
their daily needs for drinking water, water for feeding the animals and for 
keeping a minimum of hygiene. The following table shows the labor input 
needed for fetching water. 
Table 3-3: Timeline of Time Spent Fetching Water in Xiapu Village of 
Ningxia 
Year Before 1995 1995-19995 2000 to now 
Time spent per About 2 hours About half hour About 2 hours 
household 
Source: Interview with Village Party Secretary, Ma Zhengxuan 
Even though Xiapu Township is one of the poorest townships in Xiji County, 
the average income level of Xiapu Village, according to the township 
government statistics, was at the level of the better-off townships in Xijin 
County, i.e. above 1000 yuan (125 US$)6. There are seven administrative villages 
in the township. They are Yaozhuang, Yumugou, Chelugou, Yaozichuan, 
Beizhuang, Shangma and Xiapu. Xiapu and Chelugou are the two relatively 
better-off villages in the township, the average farmers' net income per capita 
per year in 2000 being above 1,000 yuan (125 US$). Beizhuang and Yumugou 
ranked at the middle level in township records, with an average farmers' net 
income per capita per year of about 700 yuan (87.5 US$). And Yaozhuang, 
Yaozichuan and Shangmaquan were the poorest, the average farmers' net 
income per capita per year was below 580 yuan (72.5 US$). However, according 
to the Party Secretary of Xiapu Village, the average farmers' net income per 
capita per year in 2000 was 250 yuan (about 31 US$). The information provided 
by the two different sources differed greatly, and it is difficult for an outside 
researcher to judge which is correct. 
5
 A drinking water system was established so that the villagers could have easy access to water. 
However, the water source dried up after 1999 due to the severe drought. For detailed 
information about the water project, see Access to Water in chapter four. 
6
 The data at township level were provided by the township government. Information on the 
income level of Xiapu Village from township government and from Village Party Secretary is 
different. According to the information from township government, the average farmers' net 
income per capita per year in 2000 was above 1000 yuan (125 US$) in Xiapu Village. However, 
according to the information from the Party Secretary of Xiapu Village it was only 250 yuan 
(about 31 US$). 
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The economic position of Xiapu Village in the township is important for the 
research. We were told that more farmers moved to resettlement areas from 
Xiapu Village than from other villages. If Xiapu Village is indeed one of the 
better-off villages in the township, then we may conclude that better-off villages 
have benefited more than the poorer villages. In view of the unreliability of the 
secondary data, the researchers conducted short visits to two other 
administrative villages in the township. Direct observation confirmed that 
Xiapu Village was clearly one of the better-off villages in the township. The 
transportation and housing conditions in other villages are much worse than in 
Xiapu Village. Despite the relatively better off position of Xiapu Village in the 
township, in absolute terms, farmers in Xiapu Village are still living in 
hardship. However, such facts only urge us to pay more attention in poverty 
reduction projects to those who are poorer in poor areas because they are those 
who are to be first assisted. 
The following table shows the population growth in Xiapu Village. Despite 
the moving out of about 20% of the village population in 1994, the population 
has still doubled over the past 30 years. 
Table 3-4: Timeline of Village Population of Xiapu 
Year 1972 1978 1980 1986 1993 
Number of 118 140 146 155 204 
Households 
Population 580 741 826 984 1112 
Village 
1994* 
169 
912 
of Ningxia 
95-2000 
(data gap) 
(data gap) 
2001 
240 
1371 
Source: Interview with Village Party Secretary, Ma Zhengxuan 
Note: In 1994,35 households moved out under the resettlement project. 
A strong argument to support resettlement is that the reduction of the 
population in the place of origin will reduce pressure on the ecological 
environment, and that the decreased demand for grain due to the reduced 
population will support the implementation of the "Return Land to Forestry" 
policy. However, the research findings do not support the above assumption. 
The following table shows the timeline of forested areas. The increase of 
forested areas only took place when afforestation projects provided grain 
subsidies. We can see two peak points in terms of the forest area in the village, 
one during 1982-1986, the other during 2000-2001. There was a World Food 
Program of United Nations (WFP) afforestation project from 1982 to 1986. 
However, immediately after completion of the project, which brought an end 
also to the grain subsidies, farmers cut down most of the trees planted under 
project support to have more land to produce grain. In 2000, the government-
supported project of "Return Land to Forestry and Grass" started, so that 2,150 
mu were planted with trees, and 630 mu with grass. In 2001, the project was still 
continuing. 
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Table 3-5: Timeline of Forested Area in Xiapu Village of Ningxia 
Year 
Area (mu) 
1950s 
200 
1960s 
300 
1970s 
600 
1982-1986* 
2304 
1995 
230 
2000* 
2150 
2001 
3100 
Source: Interview with Village Party Secretary, Ma Zhengxuan 
Grain subsidy is a great incentive for farmers to grow trees, as was proved by 
both the WFP project in 1982 and the government project in 2000. In Xiapu 
Village, the change of forested area has nothing to do with resettlement or the 
reduction of population due to resettlement. Hence one cannot simply assume 
that resettlement will help improve the ecological environment. 
It is often said that farmers need to be educated to know that tree 
plantation can improve the ecological environment and that the ecological 
environment is essential to a sustainable livelihood. In fact, according to the 
field survey conducted in Xiapu Village (see Table 3-6), farmers have a clear 
view about the impact of forestry on their ecological environment (see 
'strengths' in the table). However, planting trees is seen as reducing the area 
available for grain production (see 'weaknesses' in the table), and this is what 
prohibits farmers from planting trees. In a discussion with the village secretary 
about what might happen when later government subsidies stop, he said: "Fruit 
trees and grassland may have greater opportunities to survive, but ecological 
trees may be cut down again because they bring no grain and cash to the 
household livelihood". So far, about two thirds of the trees are 'ecological' trees, 
only one third are fruit trees. 
Table 3-6: SWOT Analysis of 'Return Land to Forestry and Grass' by Fanners 
in Xiapu Village 
Strengths 
Forest can preserve water 
and soil, adjust weather, 
prevent floods, provide 
fuel, and develop 
livestock production. 
Government provides 
grain subsidy. 
Weaknesses 
Reduced grain 
production 
Opportunities 
Support for 
Government's "Three 
Western Areas 
Development", 
especially policy of 
"Return Land to 
Forestry" 
Threats 
Drought, wild 
rabbits eat trees, 
rats damage trees. 
Source: Farmers' interviews conducted in Xiapu Village in February 2002 
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Diagram 3-2: Transect Diagram of Xiapu Village of Ningxia 
t r e e 
f 3-t 
Vegetation/ 
crops 
Ningtiao, Populus Tremula, Heici, 
apricot, willow, flax, maize, 
sorghum, potato, oats, mizi, 
alfalfa, etc. 
Mizi , maize, sorghum, potato, oats, 
flax, alfalfa, etc. 
Activities 'Return land to forestry and 
grass', cropping 
Residential area, cropping, animal 
husbandry, terracing 
Problems 
identified by 
farmers 
Most trees planted are ecological 
trees rather than economic trees, 
so that they might be cut down 
again once grain subsidy stops in 
10 years time. 
Very often no crop harvest 
Maize grows very slow due to 
drought, some have no yield at all. 
Flax very short plant so can only be 
harvested by pulling up entire plant 
rather than with hook to cut 
Potato only grows leaves but gives no 
harvest 
Lack of drinking water, and water 
quality is very poor 
The ditch becomes deeper and deeper, 
so that much land has been destroyed 
The bridge over the ditch is almost 
broken down 
Potentials 
identified by 
farmers 
The area where grass was planted 
under 'return land to forest and 
grass' project may survive as 
grass after grain subsidy stopped, 
to support livestock production. 
Source: Village walk with the Village Party Secretary, Mr. Ma Zhengxuan 
The following problems were identified by the farmers of Xiapu Village when 
the research team conducted group discussion in the village: 
• Lack of economic income 
• Grain productivity too low 
• No money to buy seeds and fertilizer 
• No money to send children to school 
• No money to see a doctor 
• Lack of rain water and no water sources for drinking and irrigation 
• Lack of access to credit 
7
 A kind of shrub, which can grow in poor soil and is drought resistant 
Same as above 
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• Illiteracy rate is very high 
• Poor access to transportation 
The following chronological list of events mark the brief Village Historical 
Profile described by the Party Secretary of Xiapu Village. We can see that the 
pace of development of the village is very slow and the investments made in 
the village are rather insignificant compared to the investment made in the 
resettlement area. 
• 1972: A blacktop road was constructed from Lanzhou city to Yichuan city, 
which just come across the village. 
1980: The village was electrified 
1982-1986: WFP afforestation project was implemented 
1990: Nearly all the trees planted in WFP project were cut 
1995: Village roads to the natural villages were constructed 
1995: A drinking water project was implemented 
2000: Government project of "Returning land to forest and grass" was 
implemented 
• 2001: Upgrade of electric transportation system was implemented 
The Resettlement Area 
The Mining Resettlement Area 
In 1990, the government of Ningxia Hui Autonomous Region officially zoned 
some areas for the resettlement of people from Xiji, Haiyuan and Guyuan 
Counties. This was an outcome of a farmers' self-organized resettlement 
initiative9. Minning Resettlement Area was allocated to Xiji County for 
resettlement. It is located in the western part of Yongning County10, 50 km from 
Yinchuan City, the capital of Ningxia. The total area is 66,000 mu (4,400 ha), of 
which 34,000 mu (2,267 ha) and is arable land. 3,300 households and 18,500 
people have been resettled. 
' The detailed process of the farmers' self-organized resettlement initiative can be found in chapter six 
No information is provided about Yongning County, even though the resettlement area is located there. 
This is basically because administratively the resettlement area had been always under Xiji County. 
Twenty three resettlement areas had been established in Ningixa after 16 years of effort from 1983 to 1999. 
Out of the 23 resettlement areas, 11 are intra-county resettlement, and 12 are inter-county resettlement. 
Inter-county resettlement means that resettlers move from place of origin in one county to the resettlement 
area in the other county, they resettle across county border. Provincial government set a policy that 
resettlers and resettlement areas should be under administration of county government of the places of 
origin, which was for eliminating the fear and insecure feelings of the resettlers. So, even though the 
resettlement area is within a geographical county boundary outside, and even far away from the place of 
origin, it is administratively managed by the county that governs the place of origin. This policy was 
deliminated in September 2000 (see 'Policy Movement in Ningixa in September 2000' in chapter five). 
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The development of crop and livestock production in the new area is 
promising. In 2001, the land under summer crops reached 10,290 mu, land 
under autumn crops reached 9,466 mu and land planted with economic trees 
reached 802 mu. In terms of livestock production, there were 717 head of cattle, 
2,267 sheep, and 622 pigs. Mushroom production was promoted in the area 
with technical and financial support (loans). In the year 2000,1,000 households 
grew mushrooms, and the average income per household reached 2,800 yuan 
from it. The highest income of one single household reached 8,000 yuan from 
mushroom production. In 2001, 450 more households started growing 
mushrooms. 
The social infrastructure is developing rapidly. Recently, Yu Quan Ying 
Resettlement Office" formally submitted an application to establish a township-
level government to manage the overall resettlement area in 2001. When 
approved, the resettlement area will be formally recognized as Ming Ning 
Township. There are 9 administrative villages and 50 sub-villages in the 
resettlement area. 1.1 km of concrete paved road and 15 km of village roads 
have been constructed. There are 3 primary schools and 1 middle school with a 
total of 158 teachers. There are 396 students in middle school and 2,074 students 
in primary school. A gas station has been constructed, a construction company 
has been established as well as a factory for building materials. Some 
restaurants, shops and market places have been built. The total built-up area of 
these service places has reached 13,840 square meters and the number of people 
employed totals 270. 
There are no data to show how the ecological environment has changed in 
the resettlement areas since resettlement. It is believed that irrigation and grain 
production have improved the vegetation coverage. However, the indicator 
system of the ecological environment consists of many elements, so that 
comprehensive measurement is required to draw any conclusion. 
Moon Village 
We traveled by jeep from Yinchuan City (capital of Ningxia) to Moon Village. It took 
about two hours because the road was still under construction. It may only take half an 
hour or so to reach the village from Yinchuan after the completion of the road since the 
distance is only 50 km. The road under construction is wide. As we approached the 
resettlement area, we started to drive on the very good road that has just been 
completed. This good road led us to a wide market street with newly built 3-storey shops 
and apartment buildings on either side. The future township government will be located 
on this wide street. The road changed to a dirt road on entering the village, so that dust 
" After the provincial resolution of 1990 concerning resettlement to the Yu Quan Ying area, the Yu Quan 
Ying Resettlement Office of Xiji County was established for implementing the resettlement plan. All the 
staff of the office are from Xiji County, even though the resettlement area is located within the boundaries 
of Yongning County. 
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poured onto the window of our car. All the farm houses are in rows and lines, they are 
mostly new and of brick and wood structure. 
The area is still under development, and resettlers are still moving in (see Table 
3-7). To date, 315 households and 1,418 people have resettled in Moon village. 
The male and female population number 777 and 641 respectively. The total 
labour force is 628. Male laborers account for 388 and female laborers 240. All 
the villagers are Muslim. The total arable land has reached 2,205 mu (147 ha). 
Table 3-7: Timeline of the Population in Moon Village in the Resettlement 
area in Ningxia 
Year 
Number of 
Households 
Population 
1995 1996 
More than 90 
60 
More than 270 
100 
1997 
175 
About 
900 
1998 
210 
About 
1000 
1999 
240 
About 
1100 
2000 
270 
(data 
Rap) 
2001 
310 
1340 
Source: Interview with Village Party Secretary, Ma Shaolin 
The major pull force of the resettlement area is its access to irrigation. Crop 
production can be profitable as long as there is irrigation water. The major 
crops are maize and wheat. And with the improvement of the soil with fertilizer 
and irrigation, the crop yield shows an increase over recent years, which can be 
seen in the following table. 
Table 3-8: Timeline of Grain Production in Moon Village in the Resettlement 
Area in Ningxia 
Year 
Maize Production (kg/mu) 
Wheat Production (kg/mu) 
1995 
200 
50 
1998 
400 
250 
1999 
10012 
No data 
2001 
400 
300 
Source: Interview with Village Party Secretary, Ma Shaolin 
The development of livestock production is also promising, which can be seen 
in the Table 3-9. Although there is no mountain or grassland, farmers still can 
raise animals by feeding them straw (fodder). In total, there are 174 head of 
cattle, and more than 500 sheep. Farmers in Moon Village told us the reasons 
for the quick development of sheep production were threefold. First, farmers 
were able to get access to credit. Some farmers, for example, took a loan of 
10,000 yuan for sheep production. Second, many farmers had the know-how to 
raise sheep because they had raised sheep before and third, farmers now have 
enough straw as feed. 
1
 The drop of production was caused by plague of pests and diseases 
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Table 3-9: Timeline of Number of Sheep in Moon Village in the Resettlement 
Area in Ningxia 
Year 
Number of sheep 
1996 
0 
1997 
15 
1998 
35 
1999 
200 
2000 
About400 
2001 
About 500 
Source: Interview with Village Party Secretary, Ma Shaolin 
Cash income from wage labor is important for villagers for paying the high 
irrigation fees. Many villagers work as wage laborers in nearby cities or nearby 
state-owned farms. It was estimated that there were about 400 farmers working 
as wage laborers in 2001 in construction work. And most villagers in Moon 
Village often worked as agricultural wage laborers in the nearby state owned 
farms. According to the official statistics, the average farmers' net income per 
capita per year was 450 yuan in 1999 and 500 yuan in 2000. 
The Yu Quan Ying and the Huang Yang Tan State owned farms are playing 
a very important role for resettlers, because seasonal agricultural work is a 
major cash income source. Yuan Quan Ying farm is 7 km away from Moon 
Village and Huang Yang Tan farm is 9 km distant. The land of the farms has 
been contracted out to individual farm workers for a contract fee of 15 yuan per 
mu (about 28 US$/ha). The major crops that the farms grow are maize, wheat 
and grapes. In busy seasons, resettlers work 8 hours a day and are paid 15 yuan 
per day. The resettlers provide human resources to the development of the 
farms, hence enabling the farmers to further develop the land both in terms of 
area cultivated and in terms of intensity of cultivation. On the other hand, the 
easy access to the farms in terms of distance enables the resettlers to benefit 
from a cash income opportunity that helps them to buy production inputs, pay 
for their living expenses, and especially to pay irrigation fees. 
The development of social infrastructure around Moon Village is relatively 
good. Villagers have easy access to medical services in the township center 
because they are only 2 km away. There is one primary school in the village 
with 12 teachers and 130 students. There are 4 privately owned small shops in 
the village. 
Most of the villagers moved from Xiji County. There were 315 households 
out of which 298 came from Xiji, accounting for 94.6% of the total households. 
There are 6 sub-villages in Moon Village. Two of these, No. 3 and No. 4 
were selected for conducting the questionnaire survey. The reason for this was 
that most of the resettlers there came from Xiapu Village, where the research on 
information about place of origin was conducted. Table 3-10 provides some 
information about these two sub-villages where the research was conducted. 
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Table 3-10: Some basic data on Sub-Villages No. 3 and No. 4 in the 
Resettlement Area in Ningxia 
Name of 
the sub-
village 
No.3 
No.4 
Number of 
households 
40 
32 
Population 
198 
155 
Number 
of labour 
force 
101 
72 
Area of 
arable 
land 
280 
264 
Villagers 
involved 
in off-
farm 
activities 
85 
64 
Villagers 
involved 
in long-
term off-
farm 
activities 
4 
2 
The following problems were identified by local farmers in a group discussion: 
• Charges for electricity were too high. Farmers had to pay on average 120 
yuan per mu (219 US$/ha) for irrigation each year. 
• The field design was so badly laid out that no proper access to the fields was 
possible.. The canals were also built in an incorrect way (see the following 
diagram). The consequences were several. (1) field paths were so narrow 
that tractors could not get through on them so farmers had to carry their 
harvest out on their shoulders; (2) the paths were constructed in such a way 
that some farmers could only access their plot of land by passing over other 
farmers' land, which caused a lot of conflict; (3) four households shared one 
field canal, which caused some conflict. 
• Lack of diversified income sources 
• Lack of contact to the outside 
Diagram 3-3: Problem with irrigation field design in Moon Village in the 
Resettlement Area in Ningxia 
Main Canal 
Agricultural Field 
Branch Canal 
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3.2 Introduction to the Research Areas in Yunnan 
The resettlement project studied in Yunnan is an intra-village resettlement, 
which means that villagers moved from one sub-village in a mountainous area 
(the place of origin) and resettled in another sub-village in the valley area (the 
resettlement area) of the same administrative village. Hence, there is no 
separate introduction for the place of origin and the resettlement area, except 
for some specific information about the sub-village in the place of origin and 
the sub-village in the resettlement area. 
Yunnan Province 
Yunnan Province is located in the southwest of China, bordering Vietnam, Laos 
and Burma. It is a typical high plateau mountainous province, whose average 
altitude is 2000 meters. There is no real plains area in the province, only 
relatively flat areas, which account for only 10% of the total land area. Valley 
areas constitute only 4% of the total land area. The total population in the year 
2000 was 41.438 million, of which 14.864 million, or 35.87% of the total 
population, were of minority ethnic origin. 
Cangyuan County 
Cangyuan is located in the southwest of Yun-Gui plateau. It is on the border 
with Burma. The length of the border is about 150 km, and is a major passage to 
many Southeast Asian countries. The total area of Cangyuan County is 2,445 
square km. Average land holding per person is 1.55 ha, and the population 
density is 65 persons per square km. Mountainous area constitutes 99.8% of the 
total area. The total area of arable land is 32,530 ha, of which 6,617 ha are 
irrigated. There are two rivers that cross the county - the Mengdong and 
Nangun Rivers. The annual rainfall is 1,752.7 mm. 
There are in total 157,600 people in Cangyuan. There are 21 different 
minorities. The minority population accounts for 146,900 or 93.2% of the total 
population. The largest minority population is of Wa origin, accounting for 
133,600 people (85% of the total population), which represents one third of the 
Wa ethnic population in China. There are 11 townships and 93 administrative 
villages. There are 299 middle and primary schools. Primary school education is 
covered in all 93 administrative villages. 
At the end of 2000, the total GNP was 378.18 million yuan, total agricultural 
production value was 298.19 million, and total production value from township 
and village enterprises was 85.99 million yuan. The annual financial revenue of 
the County was 31.22 million yuan with financial expenses of 91.59 million 
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yuan. Total annual grain production was 57,164 tons. The major food crops are 
paddy rice, dry rice and maize, and the major economic crops are sugar cane 
and rapeseed. The major plantations are tea, rubber and coffee. 
There are 11 townships in Cangyuan County. Nanla Township ranks in the 
middle level in terms of farmers' incomes. In 2000, the average farmers' net 
income per capita per year was 503 yuan (62.9 US$), that of the best township 
was 786 yuan (98.3 US$), and that of the poorest township was 349 yuan (43.6 
US$). 
Nanla Township 
Nanla Township is located in the northwest of Cangyuan County. It has a 
border of 42.33 km with Burma. Its total area is 275.268 square km. The altitude 
of the township ranges from 2,302 meters to 460 meters. The average 
temperature is 15.6°C. There is no frost in winter and summer temperatures are 
also modest. The annual rainfall is 2,200 to 2400 mm. 
Nanla Township comprises 9 administrative villages. The total number of 
households is 2,339, with a total population of 12,810, of whom 11,459 are 
registered as rural, accounting for 89.5% of the total population. The population 
of Wa nationality is 9,942, or 77.6% of the total population. The population of 
Han origin is 1,432, or 11.18%. 
The total area of arable land is 37,209 mu (2,480.6 ha), of which for 8,992 mu 
(599.5 ha) is paddy field, representing 24.2% of the total arable land area. The 
rest is rain fed land. The township is rich in forestry and water resources. The 
climate is good for many crops. The major crops are rice, maize, wheat, sesame, 
soybean, rapeseed, many kinds of vegetables and fruits. The climate is also 
good for many plantation crops such as tea, chestnut, papaya, rubber, coffee, 
bananas, sugar cane etc. The average farmers' net income per capita per year in 
the year 2000 was 427 yuan (53.4 US$), and average grain possession was 409 kg 
per person. Rubber, alcohol, and tea production are the major local industries. 
There are seven rubber-processing factories with 504 employees. The total area 
of rubber tree plantation is 13,480 mu (898.7 ha). 
There are nine administrative villages in Nanla Township. Manggang 
Administrative Village is the best village in terms of farmers' income level. In 
2000, farmers' average net income per capita per year was 521 yuan (65 US$) in 
Manggang village, which ranked the first in Nanla Township. Net average 
income per capita per year of the poorest village was 284 yuan (35.5 US$). 
Manggang Village 
During the field study carried out in Manggang Administrative Village, we stayed in a 
small guesthouse in the resettlement area. My previous experiences with small hotels at 
village and township level were that they were often dirty, with toilet and bathing 
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facilities that never worked well. However, the small hotel in the resettlement area of 
Manggang Village was clean and well facilitated with toilet, bath, telephone, TV etc. 
We were told that the hotels in the area were always full of guests. Walking in the main 
street of the resettlement area, we saw many restaurants and shops. We also saw several 
Burmese walking around. 
The Mangka resettlement village of Manggang Administrative Village was only 
several hundred meters away from our guesthouse. On the way to the resettlement 
village is a big open market selling all kinds of local stuff. The houses in the resettlement 
village are in rows and lines and well constructed. The village road has been nicely 
paved with concrete and has drainage on one side. We first conducted our interviews in 
the resettlement village. When later we visited the sub villages in the place of origin we 
needed to go by jeep even though they also belong to Manggang Village and are within 
easy reach. The distance between resettlement area and place of origin is only 28 km. 
However, we were warned by the local official who accompanied and helped us during 
the field study that it is difficult to go to the place of origin when it rains This is because 
the road condition is poor and the terrain is steep. It was the rainy season in mid-July 
when we visited the project, so unluckily, we had to make the trip to the place of origin 
on a rainy day. In the village of origin, we saw some very poor houses of wooden 
structure. Moving from one household to another, necessitated stepping into wet mud 
and animal dung. The biggest difficulty encountered in the village of origin is the 
language barrier. Most farmers in the village of origin only speak the Wa language. So, 
all the interviews and the questionnaire survey had to be conducted through local people 
who could speak both Wa and Mandarin. I recall how very often after I had asked a 
question the farmers would talked a lot among themselves to answer my question, but 
the 'interpreter' only summarized the long talk into a few sentences. When questioned 
about what else the farmers had said, they claimed the farmers were repeating the same 
things. When we conducted the survey in the resettlement village, most farmers we met 
could manage to speak Mandarin. 
The Manggang Administrative Village is located in the mountainous area of 
northwestern part of Cangyuan County at an average altitude of 1,200 meters, 
ranging from 400 meters to 1, 800 meters. The annual rainfall is 1,900 mm, and 
the average temperature is 22 °C, ranging from 37°C to 19 °C. The location of the 
village crosses both mountain and plain areas. The high land area of Manggang 
Village is characterized by its Karst physiognomy so that there is a lack of 
drinking water especially in the dry season. The resettlement area belongs to 
the southern Asian semi-tropical rainforest climate, with a fertile soil and a 
plains landscape. Its total arable land is 6,676 mu (445 ha), of which 1,068 mu is 
paddy field in the lowland area. The remaining area is dry upland. The average 
area of arable land per person is 3.2 mu (0.21 ha). Most arable land is on slope 
land, some of which is terraced and some not. Some 2,237 mu (149 ha) is 
forestland, and 32,000 mu (2,133 ha) is barren mountain wasteland. 
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There are a total of 387 households, 2,063 people. The male population 
accounts for 1,042 of these and the female for 1,026. The total labor force 
numbers 687, of which 334 are males and 333 are females. The entire population 
is of Wa nationality. 
The major crops in the upland are maize, dry rice, soybean, and sweet 
potato and in the lowland they are maize, dry rice, irrigated (paddy) rice, 
soybean, tea and vegetables. Animal production is the major cash income 
source of local farmers, especially for upland villages. There are in total 668 
head of cattle, 3,849 pigs, 25,490 chickens. Every household has some fruit trees 
for home consumption. 
The sub-villages located in the mountainous area have very poor access to 
transportation. They are 8 km away from the road, and 28 km away from 
Mangka resettlement and development area. There is no local clinic or hospital 
so that farmers have to travel 48 km to a nearby township for medical services. 
There is one middle school and three primary schools in the villages. The total 
number of teachers is 40. Most children do not continue with middle school 
education. The quality of the electricity service is very poor. Power cuts happen 
very frequently. The following table provides some basic information about the 
three sub-villages in the place of origin where we conducted our field study. 
Table 3-11: Basic data on the three sub-villages researched in the place of 
origin in Yunnan 
Name of 
village 
visited 
Huo Shao 
Zhai 
Shang 
Wan Tang 
Xia Wan 
Tang 
Total 
131 
151 
87 
Pop. No. of 
households 
26 
27 
17 
Area of 
arable 
land 
617 
568 
447 
Area of 
paddy 
field 
38 
44 
18 
No. of 
cattle 
/buffalo 
75 
65 
18 
No. of 
pigs 
60 
70 
80 
The resettlement area is named as the Mangkaba Resettlement and 
Development Area. As mentioned, it is located on the border with Burma, only 
4.6 km from the important trade zone of Nandeng Special Zone in Burma. It 
was designated as a provincial port in 1997. The distance to the local market is 
only several hundred meters. In the resettlement area, 2 village roads 2.8 km 
long have been constructed. Three drainage channels have been constructed, 1.5 
km long, and 2.1 km of drinking water pipes have been installed. Five water 
tanks have been constructed with a capacity of 60 cubic meters. A two-
kilometer power transportation line of 10 kilowatt has been built, and a 1.1 km 
power transportation line of 0.4 kilowatt. Five public toilets have been built. 
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The resettlement project started in August 1998.141 households comprising 
814 people have moved to the area. 246 households remain in the place of origin 
in the 16 sub-villages in the mountainous area. 250 mu (16.7 ha) of paddy field13 
were newly created, and 1450 mu (96.7 ha) of dryland fields were newly 
claimed in the resettlement area. 
The following overview provides a brief historical profile of Manggang 
Administrative Village. 
• 1982: Land contract system was implemented in the area. The user rights of 
arable land, firewood and other forest land were all allocated to individual 
households. 
1985: A fire destroyed 11 houses 
1986: A fire destroyed 10 households and another 11 households were 
damaged. 
1987: A plague of pests occurred so that grain production was extremely low 
in that year 
1991: A serious flood took place and ruined 50 mu of paddy field 
1992: Education on socialist ideology was implemented and lasted for 3 
months. 
1996: A working team came to the village to strengthen the activities of the 
Communist Party 
1999: Resettlement project started 
2000: Village autonomous management was implemented. Village Office 
was changed into Village Committee. 
The following problems were identified by farmers from Xiawantang Sub-
Village in the Place of Origin: 
• No paddy fields 
• Poor fertility of arable land and very low productivity 
• Drought and lack of water 
• Poor transportation 
• Lack of cash income sources 
• Low educational level 
The following problems were identified by farmers from Huoshaozhai Sub-
Village in the Place of Origin: 
• Poor transportation 
" The allocation of the newly created paddy field and newly claimed dryland field is not clear. 
In the field survey, all farmers interviewed claimed that their possession of land stayed the 
same as before. And we are not able to get answers from local officials. 
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Lack of water 
Lack of information 
Difficulty to reach medical services 
Lack of contact to the outside world 
Lack of income sources 
Poor soil fertility 
Plague of pests and damage by wild rats 
Large distance to paddy field and dry land 
Lack of technology 
Usage of old seed varieties 
Having visited both resettlement areas and places of origin in both regions, my 
direct impression was that the differences between the resettlement areas and 
the places of origin were very big. This is an overall impression on the future 
development potentials. I cannot deny that resettlers in both regions are facing 
all sorts of problems, for example, many resettlers are in debt over constructing 
their houses in the resettlement areas in Yunnan, and the resettlers are 
struggling for sufficient cash income to pay the irrigation fee in Ningxia. But I 
can clearly see the hope and prospects in both resettlement areas, because they 
both have better access to transportation, market places and other social 
infrastructure, and also very importantly, the food security level in the 
resettlement areas are much better than in the places of origin. However, no 
clear perspectives can be seen for future development in the places of origin for 
both regions. The other observation is that the places of origin are located in 
very poor areas in general, but the villages selected for resettlement in the 
places of origin were relatively better-off than other villages in the same 
townships, which is the case for both research regions. 
Outcomes of Resettlement - The Better-off Moved to 
Become Yet Better-off1 
Introduction 
This chapter evaluates and compares the outcomes of the two resettlement 
projects chosen for study, giving specific attention to socio-economic factors. 
My analysis focuses on who has benefited and in what ways. This issue has, by 
and large, been a missing element in the research on voluntary resettlement in 
China. Previous discussions on voluntary resettlement for poverty reduction 
have paid attention to how the resettled population benefited from the 
resettlement, rather than documenting exactly who have been resettled. This 
implies an assumption by policy researchers and practitioners alike that those 
resettled are in fact the defined target group. This, as I show in this chapter, is a 
false assumption. 
Analysing who are beneficiaries helps us to evaluate the justice of using 
poverty alleviation funds for resettlement, and tests whether or not such 
government-organised projects reach their claimed target groups. In order to 
do this, I have analyzed, where possible and when necessary, how resettlers 
have benefited in relation to three reference groups. The first consists of the 
population remaining in the places of origin. Comparing resettlers with those 
who stayed behind can provide information about the livelihood situations of 
the two groups and provide information on the impact of resettlement. The 
second group concerns information about the situation of resettlers before they 
moved from their places of origin. This helps us to understand how resettlers' 
lives have changed with resettlement. The third group is the local population 
already living in the resettlement area, though this applies only to the case of 
Yunnan since there was no local population occupying the resettled area in 
Ningxia. 
These comparisons provide insights into the resettlers' past and present 
livelihoods as well as future developments. They also help to explore how far 
people in the resettlement areas have a better life than those in the places of 
origin and whether resettlers follow similar living patterns to those already 
' Income from different years are compared without taking account of the inflation rate because 
from 1996 to 2000 this was not high enough to make any marked difference. All figures in RMB 
are converted into US dollars by dividing by eight - the rough conversion rate for the years 
concerned. 
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inhabiting the resettlement areas. This multi-comparison thus combines 
perspectives that are vertical (comparison with the past), horizontal 
(comparison with the population remaining) and future-oriented (comparison 
with the population building a new life in the resettlement area). 
The following aspects are compared: demographic features (including: family 
size, age structure, labor force numbers and educational level); economic features 
(including: cash income and expenditure, household estate, income 
sources/production and expenditure structure, input/output analysis of grain 
production); accessibility (including: access to land, food security, drinking 
water, the market, loans, communication, and education); labor input and gender 
division of labor, and lastly socio-economic vulnerability. The socio-economic data 
provided and analysed in this chapter are at household and community levels. 
It is believed that household and community levels represent the end results of 
large-scale government interventions. 
The analysis of the demographic features of the different groups aims to 
provide detailed information about who the resettlers were. This is 
complementary to the other major information about their social positions as 
derived from the results of the household ranking exercise2. These 
demographic data also relate to the whole process of resettlement, just as 
economic variables describe the economic outcomes of resettlement. 
The impact of resettlement on accessibility mainly discusses aspects 
relating to land and food security, drinking water and social infrastructure. 
Food security is always a factor in the analysis of the situation of poor farmers. 
Seeking food security is often the essential motivation for poor farmers to 
move. However, farmers with food insecurity often do not have enough 
economic capacity to take the opportunities to make a better living elsewhere. 
Information about social infrastructure is important in this research in two 
respects. Firstly, the social infrastructure in the resettlement areas is important 
for the sustainable development of those areas. Secondly the social 
infrastructure in the places of origin informs us about the differences between 
the resettlement areas and the places of origin. 
The analysis of labor input and the gender division of labor is to draw 
attention to gender issues in the process of resettlement. Women and men are 
affected differently in various aspects of the process of resettlement. Change in 
the gender division of labor and the workload for respective genders are 
considered as the most import issue to be tackled. Of course, this is not the 
only gender issue discussed. The thesis also pays attention to gender issues in 
other dimensions. For example, the issue of gender and decision-making is 
discussed in the chapter six. 
2
 The results of the 'Household Sorting' exercise is provided in this chapter. The Household 
Sorting method was introduced in chapter three on developing a research methodology. 
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4.1 Who Were Resettled? 
Resettlement is about people moving from one place to another. In most cases, 
only some community members in given communities moved. So who then 
were those resettled? The two sites we visited are both under the government 
project entitled Resettlement for Poverty Reduction and Development. Were the 
right groups targeted? There may have been many reasons why some 
households were able to move and others were not. However, no matter how 
many other objectives are met, no matter whatever variables are of influence, it 
is a failure if the poor have not been targeted in a poverty reduction oriented 
project. 
Who were resettled from given local communities? 
Household sorting was carried out with groups of farmers in the villages of 
origin in order to ascertain who in the communities moved out and who 
remained. Household Sorting is a Participatory Rural Appraisal (PRA) tool3. 
Household sorting is to categorize households in a community according to 
certain indicators for a given purpose. The method allows us to 'investigate 
perceptions of wealth differences and inequalities in a community; discover 
local indicators and criteria of wealth and well being; and establish the relative 
position of households in a community.' (Theis, 1991). The purpose in our 
research was to establish the relative position of households in a community in 
terms of well being. Before conducting the household sorting exercise, we first 
asked farmers to think about how they would like to categorize all the 
households in the sub-village. Then we asked what indicators to use to 
categorize the well being of the households in the village. We then asked 
farmers to list all the names of head of households including both resettled 
households and those remaining and then sort all households into the different 
categories identified. The three broad categories were the joint product of the 
researchers and farmers. For example, after we raised the first question of how 
to categorize the well being of the households, farmers would usually remain 
silent for quite some time, and so we might then give as an example three broad 
categories. In the case of the four sub-villages in which we conducted 
household sorting, farmer participants all agreed with such categorization. I 
had experiences in other research projects where farmers made alternatives 
proposals. In the process of household sorting, the role of the researchers was 
' The detailed description of PRA tools is in chapter two. 
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mainly to facilitate. All the information with regards to the indicators and 
characteristics in the tables is description given by farmers. 
In the following four tables, the names underlined are those who moved 
to the resettlement areas. Table 4-1 shows that, in this sub-village in Ningxia, 53 
percent of the farmers in the good category and 23 percent of farmers in the 
middle category have moved, whereas only 4 percent of farmers in the poor 
category moved. Another way of examining the question is to say that of the 
total number of people from the fourteen households that resettled from this 
sub-village, 57.2 percentage were better-off farmers, 35.7 percentage were 
middle level farmers and 7.1 percentage were poor farmers. Hence, we can 
conclude that the majority of those who moved were not the poorer farmers in 
the community. More than half were the relatively better-off farmers. 
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Table 4-1: Household Sorting 
Administrative Village in Ningxia 
in Shangpu sub-village of Xiapu 
Category No. of 
Househol 
ds moved 
of total in 
each 
category 
Percentage 
of moved 
Households 
Name of the household head Characteristics 
Good 8/15 53% Ma Zhengshan,. Ma Yanshan, 
Ma Shoujie. Ma Pengwan, Ma 
Tianren, 
Ma Oiang, Ma Zhenghe, Ma 
Luping, 
Yang Rongzhong, Ma Shourong, 
Ma Zhengxuan, Ma Shaoyu, Li 
Meiying, 
Ma Chunlu, Ma Yanhu 
Having higher cash income because 
the family members may get salary 
as government employees or earn 
income from off-farm activities; 
They raise livestock; Their house 
structure is brick and wood. 
Middle 5/38 23% Ma Shouping, Ma Xuewu, Ma 
level Cunhui, Ma Shaolin, Ma Shaoqi, 
Ma Zhengze, Ma Zhenglian, Ma 
Curtfu, Ma Cunwen, 
Ma Cunli, Ma Cunlin, Ma 
Shengjun, 
Ma Cunyi, Ma ligang, Ma 
Chunshi, 
Ma Xiaoci, Ma Cunji, Ma Tongji, 
Ma Cunming, Ma Shouzhong 
Having higher cash income because 
the family members earn income 
from off-farm activities. They raise 
livestock. They plant potato with 
more fertilizer so that they get 
higher 
potato production. Their house 
structure is brick, wood and mud. 
Poor 1/26 Ma Shouan, Ma Zhengduo, Ma 
Wenxue 
Ma Wancheng, Ma Xuezhen, 
Ma Xueping, Ma Zhengyuan, 
Ma Zhengzhi, Ma Yanhu, Ma 
Yanzhen, 
Ma Zhiping, Ma Zhibei, Ma 
Fazhong, 
Ma Youshen, Ma Mingzhen, Ma 
Wenxin, 
Ma Yanlu, Ma Yanbang, Wang 
Qin, 
Ma Zhihu, Ma Anrong, Ma 
Fatong, 
Ma Shoujun, Ma Shouxian, Ma 
Shouli, 
Most of them just live 
independently from their parents' 
home. They have less arable land so 
that they could not grow much 
potato; They have more small 
children and fewer labor forces; 
Their house structure is wood and 
mud, and some of them even still 
live in cave. 
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Table 4-2: Household Sorting in Shang Wan Tang sub-village of Mang Gang 
Village of Nan La Township of Cang Yuan County of Yunnan Province 
Category 
Good 
Middle 
level 
Indicators 
Have cash 
savings 
Just have 
enough to 
eat 
and cloth 
No. of 
Households 
moved out 
Of total in 
each 
category 
8/8 
4/12 
Percentag 
e of 
moved 
Househol 
ds 
100% 
33% 
Name of the household 
head 
Yin Xuekun. Ba Guomin, 
Wang Chaolin. Bai Xiaove, 
Peng Xiaove- He Wenhua. 
Bai Xiangdong. 
Yang Laosan 
Peng lianzhong, Bai Zifu, 
Bai Zhigang. 
Ba Xueguang. Yin Ming, 
Yang Yutian, Bai Zhixing, 
Characteristics 
They can acquire market 
information, they are good 
in cropping and animal 
husbandry, people lend 
them money, they have 
enough labor and money to 
build houses. 
They do not know 
technology, lack money, no 
one lends them money, they 
only have dry land 
themselve Ba Guoxing, Ba Yandao, 
Peng Jianwen, Bai Zhiguo, 
BaiZhiming 
Poor Have not 2/8 25% Su Laosi. He Xueguang, 
enough to Yin Laoda, Ba Xinhua, 
eat and Yin Shaohua, Yang Qing 
cloth Su Baoguang, 
themselve Ba Guorong, 
They are in slow thinking, 
they are not good in animal 
husbandry, they do not plan 
well, they do not know 
technology, they are not in 
good health, they only have 
dry land 
Farmers from different communities often identified different indicators to 
define the household well being. For example, in Shang Wan Tang (Table 4-2) 
farmers used savings, food and clothing as indicators. In both Huo Shao Zhai 
and Xia Wan Tang, farmers used paddy field and buffalo as indicators (Tables 
4-3 and 4-4). Such phenomena tell us: (1) the key determinants of well being in 
different communities are seen differently; (2) farmers know their communities 
and their neighbors in the same community well. 
4
 There are two kinds of arable land in this village, one is dry land, and the other one is paddy 
field. The land was allocated in early 1980s. No change has been made since then. 
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Table 4-3: Household Sorting in Huo Shao Zhai sub-village of Mang Gang 
Village, Nan La Township of Cang Yuan County of Yunnan Province 
Category 
Good 
Middle 
level 
Indicators 
Having 
paddy 
field and 
buffalo 
Having 
buffalo 
No. of 
Households 
moved of 
total 
in each 
category 
9/9 
7/20 
Percentage 
shared by 
moved 
households 
100% 
35% 
Name List of Household Head Characteristics 
Peng Laper, Pej 
Shixing 
Ying 
Jiwen, 
Peng Zhongde, Peng Jun, Bai 
Laosi, Peng Zhongming, Wang 
Laosi, He Wenzhong, He 
Guangming, Cheng Laosi, He 
Jinguang, Bai Laoer, Bai 
Laoliu,Bai Laoda, Bai Guanghua, 
They are well 
informed, good in 
cropping and animal 
husbandry, good in 
technology. 
They are 
knowledgeable, 
although they have 
strong labor force, for 
example, they do not 
know how to treat 
pigs and chickens 
when they are ill. 
Poor Having no 4/5 80% He Guangqiang, Cheng Guohua, Low qualification, 
buffalo Peng Guoming, Peng Linhe, He mental retardation 
Laosi 
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Table 4-4: Household Sorting in Xia Wan Tang sub-village of Mang Gang 
Village, Nan La Township of Cang Yuan County of Yunnan Province 
Category Indicator No. of Percentage 
Households shared by 
Moved of moved 
total in each households 
category 
Name List of the 
Household Head 
Characteristics 
Good Having 
paddy 
field and 
buffalo 
7/9 78% Zhao Xiuhua, Peng 
Zhongming, Ba Laoda, 
Ba Zhpnrning, Ba 
Laosan, 
Ba Zhongwei. Zhao 
Tiang, 
Ba Yinhua, Bai Laoda 
Having paddy field, good 
at pig raising, from richer 
family, less burden, 
healthy, involving in off-
farm wage labor 
Middle 
Level 
Having 
buffalo 
3/9 33% He_ Wenxian, Ba 
Yinming, Peng Laoda. He 
Guangqing, Yang Laoda, 
Su Laosan, 
Yang Guanghua, Ba 
Laoer, 
He Guangming, 
Having buffalo, good land, 
income generated from 
animal husbandry, being 
food self-sufficient and 
even with surplus for sell, 
having animal manure for 
arable land 
Poor Having no 
buffalo 
0/5 0% Peng Zhonghua, Wang 
Xiaoer 
Ba Yinzhong, He 
Guanghui, 
Peng Weimin, 
Having no buffalo, some 
family members are not 
healthy, crops are not 
healthy, often borrowing 
food to eat, poor arable 
land 
From the tables, we can see that important factors of well being to farmers are 
the type of land, the quality of land, having or not having buffaloes, health, 
food subsistence, technology and information. The different categories of 
farmers have different characteristics in relation to these factors. This is 
essential to understand the participation of different farmers in the 
resettlement process. The thesis will try to tackle these issues in this chapter 
and in the chapter six. 
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Table 4-5: Share of different categories of households of the total resettled 
households in the sub-villages of the place of origin in Yunnan 
Category 
Name of 
Sub-village 
Good Middle Level Poor 
Number of resettled Number of Resettled Number of Resettled 
Shang Wantang 
Huo Shaozhai 
Xia Wan Tang 
Sub-Totals 
Share of Total 
9 
7 
24 
54.5% 
4 
7 
3 
14 
31.8% 
2 
4 
0 
6 
13.6% 
Although the situation varied in different sub-villages, we can see clearly in the 
above table that the poorer the households, the less likely they were to move. 
The majority of households in the 'good' category moved and about one-third 
of those in the middle category. Of all the resettlers in these three sub-villages, 
the proportion of 'good' households was more then half, whereas the poor 
represented only about 14 percent. 
Those who moved have a better life - Farmers' views on resettlement 
Table 4-6: Resettlers' views on their life in the resettlement sites in Ningxia 
and Yunnan 
Region \ 
Ningxia 
(N=36) 
Yunnan 
(N=31) 
View 
Number 
Households 
Percentage 
Number 
Households 
Percentage 
of 
of 
General feelings 
about resettlement 
Good 
33 
91.7 
25 
80.6 
Just 
so-so 
2 
5.6 
3 
9.7 
Not 
good 
1 
2.8 
3 
9.7 
Comparison 
previous life 
Better Just 
so-so 
29 5 
80.6 13.9 
20 10 
64.5 32.3 
with 
Not 
Better 
2 
5.6 
1 
3.2 
Level 
to the 
Good 
17 
47.2 
No 
data 
of adaptation 
new place 
Just 
so-so 
6 
16.7 
No 
data 
Not 
good 
13 
36.1 
No 
data 
Note: There are some data gasp for Yunnan in terms of farmers' view on their adaptation to the 
new place. 
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Table 4-7/Table 6-3: A returnee's comparison of life between the place of 
origin and the resettlement area in Ningxia 
Workload 
Economic situation 
Water 
Electricity 
Cooking oil 
Expenditure 
gifts 
on 
In the place of origin 
(Xia Pu Village) 
Overloaded 
Lower income, lower 
Expenditure 
It takes an hour to get a bucket of water. 
And it is not convenient because she has 
to collect water from a well that belongs 
to other households 
Not stable 
From own field 
More expenditure on giving gifts. 
(400 yuan - about 50 US$ a year)5 
In the resettlement area 
(Moon Village) 
Not as heavy as in Xia Pu 
Higher income, 
Higher expenditure 
Very convenient 
Stable 
It costs cash money 
Less expenditure on giving gifts. 
(100 yuan-about 11 US$) a year) 
Note: This comparison was made by one of the case study informants, Ma Jianhua, a returnee 
now living in Xia Pu Village, her village of origin) 
Table 4-8: Comparison made by resettlers between the place of origin and the 
resettlement area in Yunnan 
In the Place of origin 
(Mangkaba Village) 
In the Resettlement area 
(Manggang Village) 
Access Inconvenient for transportation 
Lack of water 
Use animal power 
Far to the market place 
Far to schools 
Inconvenient in medical services 
Far to the arable land 
Fetching water from 2-4 km away 
Convenient for transportation 
Easy access to water 
Use motor vehicle 
Near to market place, easy to sell products 
Near to schools 
Convenient in medical services 
Nearby the arable land 
Fetching water from nearby place 
Living 
Condition 
Live in thatched cottage 
Not wearing shoes 
There are no toilets 
Live in brick built house 
Wearing shoes 
There are public toilets 
Entertainment Can only receive one TV channel 
Having nothing to do in the evening 
Can receive several TV channels 
Can play in the street in the evening 
Note: This is the result of a group exercise with farmers in Mangkaba Village 
Table 4-6 shows: (1) Majority of resettlers from both Ningxia and Yunnan had 
generally good feelings about the resettlement. (2) The majority of resettlers 
from Ningxia believed they had a better life in the resettlement area and more 
5
 Many farmers in Ningxia said to us during the interview that they have to spend more money 
on gifts exchange in the place of origin than in the resettlement areas even though their average 
income level is lower. Data on expenditure structure show the same trend (see table 4-24)The 
main reason is that farmers in the places of origin, where many of their generations have been 
living, have much more relatives than in the resettlement areas, where a new life has just 
started. 
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than half (64.5 percent) of the resettlers from Yunnan felt the same. (3) About 
half (47.2 percent) of the resettlers from Ningxia had already adapted to the 
new place. Hence, the general conclusion is that resettlers experienced a better 
life in the resettlement areas. A detailed descriptive comparison was made by 
resettlers in Ningxia and in Yunnan to reflect their general feelings (Tables 4-7 
and 4-8). Both the group exercise results from Yunnan and the case study result 
from Ningxia show obvious advantages in the resettlement areas. The resettlers 
enjoy a better life than those who remained in the places of origin. And this 
conclusion comes not only from the statistical analysis of the questionnaire 
survey, the results of which will be illustrated in the following sections of this 
chapter, but also from farmers' own perspectives, which can be seen clearly 
from Tables 4-6,4-7 and 4-8. 
In the following demographic features of resettlers in comparison with 
other groups, detailed information is given on who the resettlers are. 
4.2 Demographic Features 
Family size6 
The two regions show a similar trend in that no big changes in family size have 
occurred. One important point to note is that there are fewer larger-size families 
in the resettlement area than in the place of origin, in Ningxia. In Ningxia, due 
to the shortage of land resources in the resettlement area, each household was 
allocated only 8 mu (0.53 ha) of arable land on the assumption that there would 
be 4 family members in each household, so it is hard for resettled households to 
feed larger families. While in the case of Yunnan, resettlers moved from a 
mountainous area to lowland within the same administrative village and so 
they kept their original land. Physical resources were thus not a bottleneck for 
the movement of larger families. This is why households with larger family 
sizes in Ningxia decreased from 51 percent to 36.8 percent and households with 
larger family sizes in Yunnan slightly increased (see tables 4-9 and 4-10). 
The current phenomenon in both China's rural and urban areas is that 
people choose to live in nuclear families. The field survey and the data 
highlighted such a common trend. What we found was that the younger 
generation would set up their own households after marriage, and the parents 
tended then to live together with the youngest son. The younger generation 
tended not to have more than 2-3 children. This is confirmed in the following 
two tables, although there is a percentage of families with more than 2-3 
children. 
' I have defined households of smaller family size as households with 5 or less family members, 
and larger family size as households of 6 or more family members. 
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In the field survey, we were told that in some cases part of the family 
moved to the resettlement areas and left other members behind. This might 
explain why there are fewer larger families in the resettlement area than in the 
place of origin in Ningxia. 
Table 4-9: Number of Household Members in Ningxia 
Average no. of Households of smaller family size Households 
household 
members 
of larger 
family size 
3 persons 4 5 persons 6 or more 
or less persons 
Population 5.7 
remaining in 
place of origin 
Resettlers 5.5 
2 (4.3%) 
1 (2.6%) 
9 (19%) 12 (26%) 24 (51%) 
6(15.8) 17(44.7%) 14 (36.8%) 
Table 4-10: Number of Household Members in Yunnan 
Average no. of Households of smaller family size Households 
household of larger 
members family size 
3 persons 4 persons 5 persons 6 or more 
or less 
Population 5.1 
remaining in 
place of origin 
Resettlers 5.3 
4 (13.3%) 
4 (12.9%) 
6 (20%) 9 (30%) 11 (36.6%) 
5 (16.1%) 9 (29.0%) 13 (42.0%) 
Age Structure 
From Tables 4-11 and 4-12, we can conclude that more of the younger people 
resettled in both places. The younger population (in the age range 0-45) shares 
a higher percentage and the older population (in the age range 46-65) shares a 
lower percentage of the total population in the resettlement areas than in the 
places of origin. We might make two assumptions to explain such a trend. (1) 
Families in the older age group did not want to leave the places they had lived 
in all their life, or they gave up their chance to move for their children because 
of the limited land resource in the new area to support a big family. Case 
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studies confirmed this assumption. For example, in the case of Ma Yongzheng 
(see next chapter), what his parents said to his proposal to resettle was: "We 
were born here, and have lived here all our life, you were born here too so that 
you could also stay. Besides 8 mu of land in the resettlement area is too small 
to make a better life, and you cannot make big money on wage labor." So in the 
end, the son moved and his parents stayed, because of their willingness to do 
so and because of the land constraint; (2) Families with young children tended 
to move to seek a better life for their children. Decision-making around 
resettlement can hardly be made by any single factor, but age and 
consideration for the next generation are certainly influencing factors in 
decision-making. It is hard to use statistical data to prove to what extent people 
moved for their children's future, but we can confirm such an assumption by 
providing how different groups of people anticipated their children's future in 
Table 4-13. The table shows clearly how resettlers had many more and much 
higher expectations of their children, which in turn reflects the available 
opportunities in the different places. When I asked farmers remaining in the 
places of origin about their expectations for their children, they mostly 
answered: "What I can say, it is situational, I cannot expect more than what we 
have in reality." That is why I could not categorize most of the answers into 
Table 4-13. But when I asked resettlers about the same question, I received 
more definite answers, categorized in Table 4-13. 
Note should be made that the average age of resettlers in Ningxia is 
younger than that of population in the place of origin, which is in line with the 
fact that more younger people moved. The average age of resettlers in Yunnan 
is older than that of the population in the place of origin, unlike in Ningxia 
because a much higher percentage of older people (above 66) moved. We have 
to look at both age structure and average age for obtaining a whole picture. 
Table 4-11: Age 
Gender ratio (m:f) 
Age structure 
(number and 
percentage) 
Average age 
structure in 
0-18 
19-45 
46-65 
Above 66 
Ningxia 
Age structure of populati 
remaining in the place 
origin 
113:100 
105 (43.4%) 
84 (35.1%) 
41 (17.2%) 
9 (3.8%) 
25.6 
on 
of 
Age structure of 
population in resettled 
areas 
114:100 
97 (48.7%) 
73 (36.7%) 
25 (12.6%) 
4 (2%) 
23.5 
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Table 4-12: Age Structure in 
Gender ratio (m:f) 
Age structure 0-18 
(number and 19-45 
percentage) 46-65 
Above 66 
Average age 
Table 4-13: Parents' expectal 
Yunnan 
Age structure of 
remaining in the 
origin 
149:100 
63 (40.1%) 
59 (37.6%) 
31 (19.7%) 
4 (2.5%) 
27.4 
ions of children 
populati 
place 
on 
of 
in Yunnan 
Age structure of 
population in resettled 
areas 
112:100 
68 (42.2%) 
67 (41.6%) 
13 (8.1%) 
13 (8.1%) 
28.9 
Population 
remaining in 
place of origin 
Resettlers 
Local population 
the 
in 
the resettlement area 
Helping 
farming 
1 
with Not to be 
farmers 
2 
1 
1 
Go out and /or 
find a job 
4 
3 
Being 
higher 
educated 
2 
6 
5 
Note: (1) In the field survey farmers were asked: "What are your expectations for your 
children?" The narrated answers were then put onto paper. In many cases, interviewees found 
it difficult to answer this question, they just replied: "Oh, it is situational, what can I say?" 
This is why so few answers are summarized. (2) Such a survey was not carried out in Ningxia 
due to time limitations. 
Labor Force 
In Ningxia, the labor force available to each household in the resettlement 
areas is about the same as for those in the place of origin (see table 4-14). In 
Yunnan, the average labor force in the resettled household is lower, although 
the family size is similar to that in the places of origin. The average labor force 
in each household went down from 3.2 to 2.7 and the percentage of labor 
participants compared with the total number of household members went 
down from 62.4 percent to 52.1 percent. In Yunnan, the reduction in the labor 
force is due to two reasons. (1) The higher percentage of population between 
age 0-18 in the resettlement area and (2) the higher percentage of population 
above the age of 66 (see table 4-15). 
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Table 4-14: Number of persons and percentage of the labor force in 
households in Ningxia 
Family size Average labor force Percentage of labor 
of each household force of total household 
members 
Population remaining 5.7 
in place of origin 
Resettlers 5.5 
2.6 
2.5 
46% 
45% 
Table 4-15: Number of persons and percentage of labor force in households 
in Yunnan 
Family size Average labor force Percentage of labor 
of each household force of total household 
member 
Population remaining 5.1 
in the place of origin 
Resettlers 5.3 
3.2 
2.7 
62% 
52% 
Educational Level 
Tables 4-16 and 4-17 show that the average educational level of resettlers in 
both Ningxia and Yunnan was higher than that of the population remaining in 
the places of origin. This is especially obvious in Yunnan. There may be several 
reasons to explain such a trend. 
(1) People who are higher educated may be more knowledgeable about the 
new places so that they can better evaluate the benefits of resettlement, which 
led them to move. By assuming this, I do not mean we can equalize education 
with knowledge, but neither can we ignore the benefits of education. For 
example, in Yunnan, only those who had received a school education could 
speak Mandarin, which is often the pre-condition for them to communicate 
with people in other areas and from outside. The statistical evidence in the 
following tables shows that higher educated people moved, but we cannot 
deduce statistically, that higher educated people tend to move. However, our 
case study in the next chapter did show how knowledge and information, 
which is linked with education, can contribute to decision-making in favor of 
resettlement; 
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(2) The previous section (Table 4-11 and Table 4-12) shows that more younger 
people moved, and if the average educational level of younger people is higher 
than that of older people, then it is no surprise that the average educational 
level of the resettler is higher. 
Table 4-16: Educational levels in Ningxia 
Illiterate Primary Middle High School Average 
School School and above no. years 
63 36 16 3.0 
29% 17% 7% 
77 18 13 3.3 
Percentage 34.9% 46.4% 10.8 7.8% 
Population 
remaining in 
Place of 
Origin 
(N=218) 
Resettlers 
(N=166) 
No. of 
People 
Percentage 
No. of 
People 
103 
47% 
58 
Table 4-17: Educational level in Yunnan 
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Illiterate Primary Middle High School Average 
School School and above no. years 
Population 
remaining in 
Place of origin 
(N=141) 
No of 41 89 10 
People 
Percentage 29% 63% 7% 
3.4 
1% 
Resettlers Number of 37 72 
(N=142) People 
Percentage 26% 51% 
26 
18% 
4.6 
5% 
Local 
population in 
resettlement 
Number of 4 
People 
Percentage 8.4% 
37 
76% 
4.2 
15% 
4.3 Economic Features 
Cash income and expenditure 
In the field survey, I chose to use net cash income as the key economic 
indicator rather than use net income. I found lots of difficulties in using net 
income. It is hard to obtain complex information from any single household 
about its gross income if it involves converting value in kind into cash value 
and when it involves deducting non-cash costs from gross income. I define net 
cash income as gross cash income minus gross cash costs. To do this is not to 
deny the importance of non-cash income and non-cash costs. Cash income is an 
easier way to grasp the apparent economic situation of interviewed 
households. To complement the missing dynamic inside household livelihoods 
by my economic simplification, in the following parts of this chapter, I will 
make use of other analyses, such as household food security and household 
estate status. 
The functions of cash and non-cash flows are different. In my view, cash 
flow is a necessary determinant for any outgoing activities while non-cash flow 
is important for livelihood subsistence. The problem with poor households is 
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that their cash flow is only able to meet their basic needs and not enough to 
make productive investments, or to accumulate in order to take up 
opportunities such as resettlement. 
Tables 4-18 and 4-19 show that: 
(1) The resettlers in both regions are in a better economic situation than the 
population remaining in the places of origin because they make higher net cash 
incomes. Household annual net cash income of resettlers in Ningxia was 676 
yuan higher than that of population remaining. That of resettlers in Yunnan 
was 1,500 yuan higher. 
(2) Household annual net cash income of resettlers in Ningxia increased on 
average 128 yuan every year of the 4 years of resettlement. Although in 
Yunnan, household annual net cash income only showed an increase of 14 
yuan, we have to keep in mind that that the resettlers in Yunnan had only been 
resettled for less a year. 
(3) Resettlers borrow much more money in the resettlement area than they did 
before they moved, and they also borrow much more money than the 
population remaining in the place of origin. We can draw some assumptions 
from such phenomena: first resettlers have to take the risk of higher debts if 
they want to move; second the population remaining have lower risk-taking 
capacity so that they cannot move; third, resettlers have a higher capacity to 
mobilize financial support such as formal and informal loans. 
(4) The local population already in the resettlement area in Yunnan shows a 
good economic profile. Table 19 shows that their average household annual net 
cash income was 3,845 yuan, which is 1,055 yuan higher than that of resettlers. 
It is anticipated that resettlers in Yunnan may catch up in their economic 
performance with the local population of the area in the future. 
Outcomes of Resettlement 107 
Table 4-18: Household annual net cash income, expenditure and debt in 
Ningxia 
Loan/Debt Net cash income Cash expenditure 
Population remaining in the place of 2387 2947.2 3199.5 
origin (in 2000) 
Resettlers in the place of origin 1307 3101.3 3050.7 
(around 1996) 
Resettlers in the resettlement area (in 2834.3 3613.3 4516.3 
2000) 
Table 4-19/Table 6-2: Household annual net cash income, expenditure and 
debt in Yunnan 
Loan/Debt Net cash income Cash expenditure 
Population remaining in the place of 905 1290 1136 
origin (in 2000) 
Resettlers in place of origin 3514 2772.8 2147 
(in 1999) 
Resettlers in the resettlement area (in 6287 2790 7666.1 
2000) 
Local population in the 3576 3845 1761 
Resettlement area (in 2000) 
Household Assets 
I define fixed productive assets by the following items: a truck, tractor, pump, 
sprayer, seeder, reaper, irrigation equipment, process machinery, farming 
equipment, and other such items. 
By fixed consumption assets, we refer to the living place (house or thatched 
cottage), TV set, washing machine, radio-recorder, bicycle, refrigerator, 
motorcycle, sewing machine, fan, furniture, telephone, among others. 
Table 4-20 shows that resettlers in the resettlement area in Ningxia now 
have a higher level of productive fixed assets than the population remaining in 
the place of origin have. They have also improved their stock of productive 
fixed assets over the years in the resettlement area. This confirms the conclusion 
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made in section 3.1 that household assets are even more convincing than 
household cash income in showing the change of economic status over a period 
of time. Household cash income and household productive assets represent 
different household dynamics. Cash income of a particular year represents the 
economic performance of a household in that year. The timeline of household 
cash income may give a dynamic view of the household economic performance 
over the years. Fixed assets reflect an overall outcome of household socio-
economic status over a longer period of time. Current fixed assets may be due 
to any of the following reasons: financial management capability, financial 
backup from kin, less burdens because of better health situation or/and because 
of fewer school age children etc. 
Taking the value of household assets into consideration, we may conclude 
that all the surveyed groups of farmers in Yunnan had a much lower economic 
status than those in Ningxia. 
Table 4-20: Value of household assets in Ningxia: 
Value of fixed Value of fixed 
production assets (yuan) consumption assets (yuan) 
Population remaining in the 1390.2 1053.0 
place of origin (in 2000) 
Resettlers in place of origin 864.6 762.9 
(around 1996) 
Resettlers in the resettlement 1698.7 1129.1 
area (in 2000) 
Table 4-21: Value of household assets in Yunnan 
Value of fixed production Value of fixed 
assets (yuan) consumption 
assets (yuan) 
Population remaining in the No data 405.82 
place of origin (in 2000) 
Resettlers in place of origin (in 60.06 885.3 
1999) 
Resettlers in the resettlement 25.94 471.34 
area 
Local population in the 28.57 572.13 
resettlement area (in 2000) 
Income structure 
In this section, two concepts are employed in the discussion, income structure, 
and production structure or pattern. By income structure we mean the 
composition of the overall income from different income sources, whereas 
production structure concerns production activities that farmers engage in for 
income generation, and the labour they put into these different activities. 
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Income and production structures are not in themselves explanatory but they 
provide contextually useful baseline information. 
Resettlers have a different income structure to the population remaining in 
Ningxia, (see table 4-22). For example, for resettlers in the resettlement area, 
income from off-farm labor ranked the largest source of income and 
represented more than one third (41.8 percent) of their total net cash income. 
For the remaining population, income from off-farm labor ranked fifth and 
represented only 11.4 percent of their total net cash income. However, such 
differences of income sources between resettlers and the remaining population 
did not occur after resettlement. When comparing income structures of 
resettlers before resettlement with the population remaining in Ningxia, as 
Table 4-22 shows, resettlers already had a different income structure before 
they moved. For example, income from off-farm labor already ranked the 
largest source and represented more than one third (36.4 percent) of their total 
net cash income. Thus resettlers had not gone through big structural changes in 
their overall pattern of income in the resettlement area, unlike the case for 
production patterns. The cropping pattern in particular fundamentally 
changed after resettlement in Ningxia, since farming went from rain fed to 
irrigated agriculture (see section IV). 
Comparing the income structure of resettlers and the population 
remaining in the place of origin in Yunnan, Table 4-23 shows that income 
structure for both groups was similar. For example, for both groups, net cash 
income from animal husbandry was overwhelmingly important and the largest 
share of income, 55 and 50 percent, respectively. Net cash income from off-
farm labor was the second largest, 17 and 29 percent respectively. Crop 
production was the third largest share, representing 15 percent and 11 percent. 
This is very different from the situation in Ningxia. 
Comparing resettlers in the place of origin and in the resettlement area in 
Yunnan, Table 4-23 shows the following: 
(1) A structural change in resettlers' household income patterns was taking 
place. Although net cash income from animal husbandry and from off-farm 
labor still ranked first and second, there was a decrease of 16.1 percent in 
income from animal husbandry and an increase of 7.7 percent in off-farm labor. 
Furthermore, net cash income from sideline production showed an increase of 
13.7 percent. 
(2) Income from off-farm labor increased by 5.6 percent and still ranked as the 
largest source of income, representing 42.4 percent of total net cash income 
(3) Net cash income from crop production still plays a very important role, 
and represents 33.1 percent of the total. 
(4) Net cash income from animal husbandry decreased by 7.9 percent, playing 
a much less important role than before. But it is too early to make any final 
conclusion of future trends, because resettlement is still in its early stage. 
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Table 4-23 shows that the local population in the resettlement area had a 
different net cash income structure compared with resettlers. They also 
performed better, economically. It is hard to predict whether the resettlers' 
economic situation will track towards the same net cash income structure of 
the local population or not. 
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Resettlement in Ningxia has not much change in terms of income patterns but 
production patterns have altered considerably with the change from rain fed to 
irrigated agriculture, and in the time given to different production activities 
(see section IV). Resettlement in Yunnan has not involved big changes so far in 
production patterns , only in income structures. The data suggest that some of 
the general implications that we can draw are: (1) resettlement will certainly 
involve changes in either production pattern or income structure; (2) to 
evaluate a resettlement project, finding what has changed is only the first step. 
One must then examine how resettlers have benefited from the changes. (3) 
farmers' self-reflection is the key to drawing and orienting general evaluations 
of a project when faced with a complex realities and changes. 
Expenditure Structure 
Most striking for both regions is that the population remaining in the place of 
origin made fewer production inputs than resettlers, both before and after 
resettlement. For instance in Ningxia (see table 4-24), production inputs 
represented only 2.4 percent of total expenditure for those remaining, but 
represented 21.3 percent of total for resettlers before they moved, and 37.5 
percent after. In Yunnan (see table 4-25), let us first compare the data in the 
place of origin. Production inputs represented 6.1 percent of the total 
expenditure for those who remained, and 9.8 percent for resettlers before they 
moved and 13.9 percent after. 
Table 4-24: Household expenditure structure in Ningxia (in yuan) 
Population 
Remaining 
In the place 
of origin 
(in 2000) 
Resettlers 
In place 
of origin 
(around 
1996) 
Resettlers 
in resettled 
area (in 
2000) 
Amount 
% 
Amount 
% 
Amount 
% 
Agri. 
Prod, 
input 
78.2 
2.4% 
651.1 
21.3% 
1630.2 
37.5% 
Electronic 
appliance 
s 
136.0 
4.3% 
143.0 
4.7% 
161.1 
3.7% 
Daily 
Consumption 
1277.6 
39.9% 
1000.4 
32.7% 
1417.1 
32.6% 
Gifts 
451.0 
14.1% 
384.7 
12.6% 
246.3 
5.7% 
Medical 
care 
494. 
15.4% 
324.1 
10.6% 
435.3 
10% 
School 
fees 
710.3 
22.2% 
405.3 
13.2% 
516.8 
11.9% 
Othe 
rs 
52.4 
1.6% 
142.1 
4.6% 
109.6 
2.5% 
Total 
3199.5 
3050.7 
4516.3 
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Table 4-25: Household Expenditure Structure 
Population 
remaining 
In the place 
of origin 
(in 2000) 
Resettlers 
In place of 
Origin 
(average 
in 1999) 
Resettlers 
In the 
resettled 
area (in 
2000) 
Amount 
% 
Amount 
% 
Amount 
% 
Agri. 
Prod, 
input 
69.5 
6.1% 
211 
9.8% 
306.6 
13.9% 
Electronic 
appliance 
s 
11.3 
1% 
121.5 
5.7% 
169.6 
7.7% 
Daily 
consumption 
626.6 
55.2% 
639.2 
29.8% 
732.5 
33.2% 
in Yunnan 
Gifts 
31 
2.7% 
78.5 
3.7% 
120.8 
5.5% 
(in yuan) 
Medical School 
care fees 
118 
10.4% 
178.2 
8.3% 
337 
15.3% 
109.3 
9.6% 
624.2 
29.1% 
533.7 
24.2% 
Othe 
rs 
170.3 
15% 
294.5 
3.4% 
3.4 
0.2% 
Total 
1136 
2147.1 
2203.6 
Local Amount 
Population % 
in 
the resettled 
area (in 
2000) 
383.6 154 
21.8% 8.7% 
516.1 
29.3% 
46.5 343.1 90.1 227.8 1761.2 
12.9 
2.6% 19.5% 5.1% % 
Crop Profitability 
The resettlement area in Ningxia is a typical irrigation area. The water is drawn 
from the Yellow River. The production pattern of is that of modern irrigated 
farming, that is, high input and high output agriculture. In the field survey, 
resettlers said that a very important reason for moving was to seek "sweat for 
sweet". It signified that they were sure they would gain a good harvest if they 
worked hard because irrigation could ensure a good yield. Farmers referred to 
production in their place of origin as "food given by God", since they felt that 
production was not in their own hands but at the mercy of the weather and in 
particular the rains.. We can see from Table 4-26 that unit currency output in 
the resettlement area is one and half times higher that in the place of origin. We 
can see clearly that agricultural profitability is a very important pulling force 
for many farmers to move. 
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Table 4-26: Cost/benefit analysis of maize production in Ningxia 
Input per land unit/1 mu (yuan) Total input Output per Unit 
per land land unit Currency 
Seed Fertili Pesti Irrigat Hired Tax 
unit/ (kg/mu) Output 
zer cide ion labor 
(yuan/mu) (kg/yuan) 
In place of 30 45 6 0 0 6 87 75 0.85 
origin 
In the 15 101 24 118 46 2 306 400 1.3 
resettlement 
area 
4.4 Accessibility 
Access to land and food security 
In poor areas, food security very often relies on land area and its productivity. 
This is certainly true in Ningxia and Yunnan. A strong argument in support of 
resettlement is that the reduction in population will reduce pressures on 
community resources, including water, wood for fuel, and arable land. 
However, this assumption can only be true if resources exist and if these 
resources are re-allocated among the population remaining after the 
resettlement. 
The land situation in Ningxia and in Yunnan is quite different. The one is a 
cross-county resettlement from a dryland mountain area to irrigated land. The 
other takes place within the border of one administrative village with 
movement from dryland, mountainous grazing areas, to a valley with paddy 
fields. There was allocation or purchase of irrigated land in the resettlement 
area in Ningxia. However, there was no change in land possession in Yunnan. 
The land area for resettlers before resettlement in Ningxia was similar to 
that for the remaining population. On average, each resettler household had 
22.6 mu (1.5 ha) of dryland and those remaining had 24.6 mu (1.64 ha) (see 
table 4-27). After resettlement, resettler households were given less land - only 
7.4 mu (0.49 ha) per household - but this was irrigated land and potentially 
more productive (see table 4-27). Arrangements may vary in different areas 
concerning how to deal with the land left behind. In Xiapu Village of Ningxia, 
no clear policy was laid down on how to handle the land. What happened was 
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that resettlers left their arable land to their relatives so that they could keep 
access to the production or other benefits of the land under informal family 
arrangements. Hence, population reduction following resettlement did not 
create more living space to the remaining population in general, only to the 
relatives of the resettlers who were able to use the arable land that the resettlers 
left behind. 
In the research village in Yunnan, there were no official changes taking 
place in land holding. No matter whether farmers stayed or moved, their land 
remained the same. Resettlers in Yunnan already had better land than the 
population remaining before resettlement. Having paddy fields or not is the 
predominant indicator of household well being (see table 4-3 and Table 4-4). 
Each resettler household had on average 2.2 mu (0.15 ha) paddy field before 
resettlement, and they continued to keep the same land after resettlement. The 
population remaining had only 0.35 mu (0.023 ha) paddy field per household 
on average (see table 28), and their situation will continue to be the same. 
Table 4-27: Farmers' access to land in Ningxia (mu/household) 
Dry land Paddy Irrigated Grassland Vegetable Forest 
field land land land 
Population remaining 24.64 
in the place of origin 
Resettlers in the place 22.621 
of origin 
Resettlers in the 0.04 
resettlement area 
Table 4-28: Farmers' access to land in Yunnan (mu/household) 
Dry land Paddy Irrigated Grassland Vegetable Forest 
field land land land 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
7.4 
2.08 
4 
0 
0.148 
0 
0 
11.345 
2.12 
0 
Population remaining 
Resettlers in the 
resettlement area 
Local population in the 
resettlement area 
11.07 
9.742 
7.71 
0.35 
2.177 
1.758 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0.543 
0.823 
0.297 
1.55 
2.429 
1.945 
Table 4-29 shows that the food security situation of resettlers has greatly 
improved in Ningxia. 86.8 percent of the resettlers have reasonable food self-
sufficiency in the resettlement area. The level of food security increased by 47.3 
percent in the 4 year period after resettlement. However, only 28.6 percent of 
the population remaining in the place of origin have food self-sufficiency. 
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Table 4-29: Household food security in Ningxia 
Food self-sufficient 
No. of household Percentage 
Population remaining in the place 12 28.6% 
of origin (in 2000) 
Resettlers in place of origin 15 39.5% 
(around 1996) 
Resettlers in the resettlement area 33 86.8% 
(in 2000) 
Access to drinking water 
Resettlers have access better water sources in the resettlement area in Ningxia. 
They are able to collect water from a water tap located in the central place of 
the village. Water is supplied at particular times of day for several hours a day. 
The problem is that sometimes the water supply stops for several days without 
any forewarning. In the place of origin water came from both wells and tap 
water, but at present tap water is no longer available for most of the time due 
to a lack of water at source during the dry season. There is also a shortage of 
water in the wells during the dry season. 
In Xiapu, the place of origin of Ningxia, access to drinking water has 
always been a problem. In September 1995, a drinking water project was 
implemented with financial support from the Poverty Alleviation Fund. The 
total investment was 250,000 yuan (about 31,000 US$). Two hundred thousand 
yuan (about 25,000 US$) was used for purchase of facilities, and 50,000 yuan 
(about 6,000 US$) was used for 'food for labor'. After completion of the project, 
200 households had access to tapped drinking water from 1995 to 1999. 
However, since that time, there has been no water during the dry season. The 
source of water for the project was an underground spring but the 
deterioration in the natural environment caused a decrease in its volume and 
perhaps even the disappearance of the water source. Under such circumstance, 
no matter how many people move out, those who remain will still have 
insufficient drinking water. 
Resettlers in Yunnan also have better water resources than those in the 
place of origin. A water tank was built in the resettlement area from which 
water is piped to a tap in the center of the village. But the supply of water is 
not guaranteed. No warning or explanation is given before an interruption in 
supply. Resettlers collect water from wells when there is no water which 
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provide a sufficient supply all year round. The place of origin continues to 
suffer from a water shortage. There are two water sources there. One is 
rainwater, the other one is spring water. During the rainy season from May to 
November, farmers collect rainwater as drinking water. During the dry season 
from December to April, farmers go to the mountain to collect spring water. 
Access to markets and labor input in market activity 
Resettlers in Ningxia have much better access to markets in terms of distance 
than those in the place of origin. Resettlers now go to market much more often 
than their compatriots in the place of origin. The distance to the marketplace is 
2 km in the resettlement area instead of 5 kilometers in the place of origin. The 
frequency of going to market has more than doubled (see Table 30). 
Resettlers in Yunnan also have much better access to market in terms of 
distance than in the place of origin, so that they also go to the market place 
much more often than before. The distance to the marketplace is only 200 
meters in the resettlement area in Yunnan, but was 28 km in the place of origin. 
Resettlers go to marketplace about 10 times more than they used to, going once 
every 5 days. The population remaining in the place of origin only goes to the 
marketplace once every 48 days on average (see table 30). 
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Table 4-30: Access to market and farmers' frequency of going to market place 
in Ningxia and Yunnan 
Population 
remaining in 
place of origin 
Resettlers in the 
resettlement area 
Distance 
5 km 
2 km 
Ningxia 
Frequency 
Once every 
days 
Once every 
days 
45 
20 
Distance 
28 km 
200 meters 
Yuanan 
Frequency 
Once every 48 
days 
Once every 5 days 
The Change of different gender's involvement in market activity in Yunnan 
With the increased frequency of going to the marketplace in the resettlement 
areas, women in the resettlement areas get involved in market activities more 
often than those in the place of origin. In the place of origin, women only share 
27 percent of the market activities, but in the resettlement area, women share 
more than half (51.5 percent) of the market activities (see table 31). 
Table 4-31: Different gender's involvement in market activity in Yunnan 
Population remaining in the 
place of origin (in 2000) 
Resettlers in the place of 
origin (in 1999) 
Resettlers in the 
resettlement area (in 2000) 
Frequency to the 
marketplace (times 
year per household) 
per 
11 
8 
30 
Women's frequency to 
marketplace 
Frequency Share 
2 17.8% 
2 27% 
16 51.1% 
Access to loans 
The loan status presented in Table 4-32 and 4-33 includes both formal loan and 
informal loan. Table 4-32 shows: (1) People in both places of origin and in the 
resettlement area in Ningxia have access to loan because almost 90 percent of 
interviewees in both places borrowed loans; (2) Resettlers in the resettlement 
area have higher demand for cash flow so that their loan size is bigger than 
population remaining in the place of origin. Table 4-33 shows: (1) People in the 
resettlement area in Yunnan have much better access to loans because more 
than 90 percent of the interviewees from resettlement area had borrowed 
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money. Only one third of the interviewees from place of origin borrowed 
loans. 
According to the field interview, both commercial loans and informal 
loans played very important role in Ningxia in terms of loan size and number 
of people who borrowed loans from each channel. About half of the 
households both in the resettlement area and in place of origin borrowed 
money from either of the two channels. However, in Yunnan, informal loans 
played a much more important role than commercial loans for farmers in both 
the place of origin and in the resettlement area. In the place of origin in 
Yunnan, none of the interviewees borrowed money from the formal system, 
but one third of the interviewees borrowed money from informal sources. The 
average loan size was 905 yuan. In the resettlement areas in Yunnan, about two 
thirds of the resettlers borrowed money from informal sources and the average 
loan size was 4442 yuan. About one third of the resettlers borrowed money 
using commercial loans and the average loan size was 10167 yuan. 
Table 4-32: Loan status in Ningxia 
Population remaining in the place of 
origin in 2000 ( N=42 ) 
Resettlers in place of origin around 
1996 (N=38) 
Resettlers in the resettlement area in 
2000 (N=38) 
Households with loan 
Number 
37 
30 
34 
% 
88.1% 
78.9% 
89.5% 
Average 
(yuan) 
2279* 
1273 
2760 
loan size 
The number is the average of 36 households. The loan that one household borrowed was not 
included in the average because the loan size is 80000 yuan. 
Table 4-33: Loan status in Yunnan 
Population remaining in the place of 
origin in 2000 (N=30) 
Resettlers in place of origin in 1999 
(N=31) 
Resettlers in the resettlement area in 
2000 (N=31) 
Local population in the resettlement 
area in 2000 (N=14) 
Households with loan 
Number 
10 
14 
28 
12 
% 
33.3 
45.2 
90.3 
85.7 
Average 
(yuan) 
905 
3514 
6282 
3576 
loan size 
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Access to communication 
Telephone communication is a quick and reliable way of communication in 
modern society. Communication through face-to-face contact is the most 
backward way for long-distance communication mostly because it takes too 
long for the message to arrive. In this research, face-to-face contact includes 
personal contact and passing messages through a third person. The question 
that we asked about methods of communication in the questionnaire is that 
which is the most frequently method that you use for your long distance 
communication. 
Resettlers in Ningxia (see table 4-34) now have better methods of 
communication than the population remaining in the places of origin. Both the 
population remaining and resettlers, before their resettlement, relied on face-
to-face communication as a major way to contact the outside world. Eighty-two 
point nine percent of the population remaining in the place of origin mainly 
uses face-to-face contact for their communications. Sixty-nine point two 
percent of resettlers, before resettlement, used the same method for most 
communication. However, now 52.6 percent of resettlers use the telephone for 
most of their communication. Forty-four point seven percent of resettlers still 
mainly rely on face-to-face contact. 
The same trend is evident in Yunnan. Resettlers in Yunnan have now 
improved their methods of communication (see table 4-35). No farmers 
remaining in the place of origin in Yunnan have access to telephone. But, 35.5 
percent of resettlers in the resettlement area use telephone as their major 
communication method to the outside. 
Table 4-34: Ways to reach the outside in Ningxia 
Population remaining 
in the place of origin 
(N= 41) 
Resettlers in place of 
origin (N= 37) 
Resettlers in 
Resettlement site 
(N= 38) 
By telephone 
No. of % 
househol 
ds 
7 17.1% 
5 13.5% 
20 52.6% 
By mail 
No. of % 
househol 
ds 
0 0 
6 16.2% 
1 2.6% 
Face to Face Contact 
No. of % 
househol 
ds 
34 82.9% 
26 70.2% 
17 44.7% 
122 Voluntary Resettlement in China 
Table 4-35: Ways to reach the outside in Yunnan 
Population remaining 
in the place of origin 
(N= 41) 
Resettlers in place of 
origin (N= 37) 
Resettlers in 
Resettlement site 
(N= 38) 
By telephone 
No. of 
househol 
ds 
0 
1 
11 
% 
0 
3.2% 
35.5% 
By mail 
No. of 
househol 
ds 
2 
4 
3 
% 
6.7% 
12.9% 
9.7% 
Face to Face Contact 
No. of 
househol 
ds 
28 
26 
17 
% 
93.3% 
83.9% 
54.8% 
Access to education 
Resettlers have better access to education than the population remaining in the 
places of origin in Ningxia. In the place of origin in Ningxia, the primary school 
is located 1 km away from the interviewed village. Middle school is located 7 
km away. In the resettlement area, in Ningxia, primary school is located 500 
meters away, and middle school is located in 1 km away. 
The same as in Ningxia, Resettlers in Yunnan have also better access to 
education. In the place of origin in Yunnan, primary school is located in 1 km 
away, and middle school is located in about 28 km away. In the resettlement 
area in Yunnan, both primary school and middle school are located in 1 km 
away. 
4.5 Changes in the Gender Division of Labor 
Resettlement usually involves changes in production activities due to 
differences in production structure in the different areas. These differences 
may include differences in cropping patterns and the share of labor allocated to 
different production activities within the overall distribution of labor. Changes 
in production activities not only bring about changes in household livelihoods 
and in patterns of income and expenditure structures, as already described in 
previous sections, but also changes in the everyday lives of women and men. 
Resettlers have undergone different kinds of changes in production 
structure in Ningxia and Yunnan, the former being affected fundamentally 
because of the shift from rainfed to irrigated agriculture (Tables 4-36, 4-37 and 
4-38), and the latter retaining the same land type and cropping system, though 
their income and production structure underwent some change (Table 4-23). 
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In this section, I examine changes in production structure and labor input 
in Ningxia but not in Yunnan. The reason for this is that resettlers in Yunnan 
are recent-comers and have only one year in the resettlement area. It is 
therefore too early to identify any significant trend. 
All policies and official discourse relating to resettlement projects ignore 
the distinction between men and women, treating them instead as members of 
an indivisible household unit. In reality, however, women and men are often 
affected differently by the same projects. Thus, in this section, I not only 
consider general differences in production structure between places of origin 
and resettlement areas but I also highlight the changed involvement of women 
and men in the various production activities. 
Tables 4-37 and 4-38 show clearly the differences in crop production and 
their impact on the labor requirements for the different crops in Ningxia. Table 
4-36 summarizes the total labor requirement and women's labor obligations. In 
the place of origin, women are responsible for 60 percent of total cropping 
activities or about 203 days which makes up about two-thirds of their entire 
labor time; whereas, in comparison, men provide 40 percent or about 137 days 
which constitutes about one third of their entire labor time. In contrast, in the 
resettlement area the total labor requirement for crops is reduced, due to the 
small size of the household plot and to a less diversified cropping system. This 
also means that farmers are not able to obtain access to additional land even 
though they may have surplus agricultural labor. Thus in the resettlement area, 
women share 66 percent of total cropping activities or about 39 days, for which 
they contribute only about one tenth of their total labor time; whereas men 
provide only 34 percent of total cropping activities or a total of 20 days, which 
adds up to 5 percent of their entire labor time. Although, overall, women 
continue to supply by far the larger input into agricultural activities, both male 
and female labor requirements are considerably reduced. 
Table 4-36: Gender division of labor in crop production in Ningxia 
Crop Production 
Labor Required Women's Share Women's Labor 
input 
In Place of origin 339 days 60% About 203 days 
In the resettlement 59 days 66% 39 days 
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There are also big differences in livestock production between the place of 
origin and the resettlement area, since the purpose of animal raising is 
different. In the place of origin, animal raising is primarily for animal power, 
while in the resettlement area it generates income and provides meat for 
consumption. Women's labor input in animal production is double that of the 
place of origin. In the place of origin, livestock husbandry is not developed due 
to the low production of grain. Low production of grain results in lack of food 
and straw for feeding animals so that the number of animals is relatively small 
in the places of origin. But many households do raise animals for animal power 
because they need it for carrying goods up and down the mountain roads and 
paths. 
In the resettlement area, most households have a surplus of food to feed 
the animals. Many households raise chickens and ducks, but they are not able 
to raise cattle or other large animals because there is no space in the home yard. 
In the place of origin, it takes women about an hour every day to take care of 
animals and sometimes men also share the task when at home. In contrast, in 
the resettlement area it takes about three hours every day for women to take 
care of the animals and men hardly ever look after them, even if they are 
available. 
In both places of origin and resettlement areas, off-farm activity or wage 
labor is a major household source of cash income, and mostly men who engage 
in such activities. In the places of origin, male laborers spend between 5 to 7 
months working off the farm. The types of activity range from one person to 
another and from time to time, but they include construction work and mining 
mainly in and around Yinchuan (the capital city of Ningxia), Xinjiang and 
Inner Mongolia. The distance traveled to obtain off-farm work is considerable 
so workers do not return home very often. They prefer to save on 
transportation costs and travel time. In the resettlement area, male laborers 
engage in wage labor throughout the year on two large state-owned farms 
located close to their homes, where there is a regular demand for agricultural 
labor. 
4.6 Socio-economic Vulnerability in the Resettlement Area 
The results of a farmer group discussion in the resettlement area of Ningxia are 
recorded in table 4-39. The purpose of the exercise was to obtain a general idea 
of how farmers understood their own situation and what major problems they 
faced. Such knowledge is important in order to understand the complexity of 
the current livelihoods of resettled farmers and their households. It is 
important to point out that not all resettlers moved at the same time: some 
came earlier and much later. Many arrived to observe the resettlement area 
several times before they finally made their move. Hence latecomers where 
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able to get to know some of the strengths, weaknesses and risks before they 
decided to move. And in the end, all resettlers, it seems, made their decision 
based on some kind of 'trade-off model, that is, in every single case they came 
to the conclusion that they believed that they would gain more in moving than 
they might lose in staying put. 
Having irrigation water available is the most attractive element to 
resettlers when deciding to move. Having irrigation water means food and 
income. However, from the 'strength, weakness and risk' analysis, we can see 
that this most attractive element also involves high risk, since crops can be 
damaged when the water supply is insufficient. Water supply problems may 
be caused by many different reasons; for example, unstable electricity supply, 
blocked irrigation ditches, slow water flow, a small volume of water, burnt out 
water pump, etc. In the field survey, a farmer called Ma Yongzhen told us that 
he had lost in crop production due to irrigation problems. He explained: 
"In Spring of 1997, the water supply suddenly stopped because the transformer was damaged 
due to overloading. This was caused by a seized-up water pump. The water pump was 
jammed by mud because of the small quantity of available water. We normally apply chemical 
fertilizer before we irrigate our crops. But crops get burned to death if no water is applied. 
Such sudden interruption of the supply of water for irrigation caused tremendous crop losses 
that year. Normally the yields in my field can reach 350 kg/mu, but the harvest was only 50 
kg/mu that year." 
Table 4-39 provides an estimate of the loss of Mr. Ma's crop production in 1997 
due to this irrigation problem. 
Table 4-39: The loss of Ma Yongzheng' crop production due to irrigation 
problem 
Unit input 
192 yuan 
Unit output 
Expected 
output 
350 yuan 
Actual output 
50 yuan 
Per unit loss 
164 yuan + 
300ke grain 
No. of units 
4 
Total loss 
656 yuan 
+1200kg grain 
Irrigation problems are not the only risks. Pests and diseases are also a great 
risk in mono-production systems. For example, in 1999, pests and diseases 
spread throughout the whole village. Average maize production decreased to 
100 kg/mu., even though production had been increasing since 1995 after the 
irrigation system begun functioning (see table 3-8 in chapter three). 
The following table summarises the strength, weakness and risks that 
resettlers experienced in their lives in the resettlement area. 
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Table 4-40: Strength, weakness and risk analysis by resettled farmers in 
Ningxia 
Aspects 
Irrigation 
agriculture 
Mushroom 
production 
Wage labor 
Drinking 
water 
Education 
Strength 
Much higher 
output than dry 
land, output is 
assured as long as 
input is made, food 
security is assured. 
Very high 
economic return, 
increased income 
Many available 
Opportunities, 
widened income 
Sources 
Water tank and 
collection point is 
very close, good 
water quality 
Quality is higher 
than in place of 
origin, better 
equipment and 
better management 
Weakness 
Input is too high, especially 
irrigation water fees, 
requires intensive labor 
input, especially irrigation 
management for every half 
month during busy season 
Price is unstable, requires 
intensive labor input, 
quality of seeds are not 
guaranteed, low technical 
level of farmers, plague of 
insect pest 
Wage labor supply is more 
than demand 
Collection points are not 
enough, water is only 
Supplied twice every day 
Higher school fees 
Risk 
Water supply cannot 
meet water 
requirement, 
sometimes, the 
insufficient water 
supply caused reduced 
harvest. 
Lack of technical service 
and other related 
services 
Money is not paid on 
time 
Sometimes water is not 
supplied, which 
happened 2 to 3 times 
every month when 
there was no water for 3 
to 4 days every time. 
For example, in August 
2001, water supply 
stopped 6 times, water 
was not supplied for 7 
days on one of those 
occasions. 
Drop-off due to higher 
School fee 
4.7 Summary 
Certain clear messages can be drawn from this summary of findings about the 
outcomes of resettlement. It was predominately those who already had some 
economic advantage that resettled; and it was those who resettled that 
benefited from the opportunities to achieve better incomes, food security, 
access to drinking water and to improved social infrastructure. In addition, the 
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summary stresses the differences experienced by female as against male 
resettlers. 
Who have resettled? 
Those who are resettled in Ningxia have the following characteristics: 
- Those with better economic status moved. The Household Sorting result 
shows that, of the total number of those who resettled in the sub-village in the 
place of origin in Ningxia, 96% were above the middle economic level, of 
whom half fell into the category of the better-off. Only 4% came from the 
poorer farmer category (see table 4-1). 
- The resettlers tended to have smaller size household. As seen in table 4-9, 
the percentage of larger size households (i.e. those with 6 or more members) 
was much smaller in the resettlement area. 
- Younger people (i.e. those up to age 45) moved, although a considerable 
number of older people also did so (see table 4-11). 
- Those who moved, on average, have higher educational levels. As shown in 
table 4-16, about half of the population (47 percent) in the place of origin are 
illiterate, whereas 65 percent of resettlers have primary or secondary schooling. 
Those who are resettled in Yunnan have the following features: 
- Those with better economic status moved. The results of the PRA exercise 
indicate that more than half (55 percent) of the resettlers were better-off 
farmers in their communities of origin. Most fell above the middle level 
economically (87 percent) and far fewer (14 percent) were poor farmers in their 
communities if origin (see table 4-5). 
- Those with better arable land moved. Resettlers had better land holdings 
before their resettlement than the population that remained in Yunnan. 
Possession of paddy fields is the predominant indicator for household well 
being (see tables 4-3 and 4-4). Each resettled household had on average 2.2 mu 
paddy fields before resettlement. They continue to keep the same landholdings 
after the resettlement. The population remaining only had 0.35 mu paddy field 
per household (see table 4-28). 
- Those who moved had, on average, much higher educational levels (see 
table 4-17). 
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How have resettlers benefited? 
Those who resettled in Ningxia have benefited in respect to the following 
criteria: 
(1) Net cash income: Resettlers have improved their economic situation after 
resettlement since they now make higher net cash income than they did in the 
place of origin. Household annual net cash income of resettlers in Ningxia 
increased on average by 128 yuan, every year, after 4 years of resettlement (see 
table 4-18). 
(2) Household Assets: Resettlers in Ningxia have improved the value of their 
productive fixed assets over the years in the resettlement area (see table 4-20). 
(3) Food Security: Resettlers have a much better food security situation than 
those who remained behind. 86.8 percent of the resettlers are food self-
sufficient. In contrast, only 28.6 percent of the population remaining in the 
place of origin have achieved food self-sufficiency. The level of food security 
has increased by 47.3 percent in the 4-year period after resettlement (see table 
4-29). 
(4) Access to Drinking Water: Resettlers have access to better water sources 
than those that remaining behind. Resettlers have access to tap water most of 
the time, whereas the population remaining in the place of origin only has 
access to well water during the rainy season. 
(5) Access to Land: Resettlers have access to irrigated land, while those 
remaining behind only have dry land. The irrigated land is much more 
productive than the dry land: the unit of currency output of maize production 
in the resettlement area is one and half times higher than that in the place of 
origin (see table 4-26). 
(6) Access to the Market: Resettlers in Ningxia have much better access to 
markets in terms of the distance to the marketplace than those remaining in the 
place of origin. Resettlers now go to market much more often than those who 
did not resettle. The distance to the marketplace is 2 km in the resettlement 
area in Ningxia, but is 5 km in the place of origin. Such privileged access allows 
resettlers to visit the marketplace more than twice as before (see table 4-30). 
(7) Access to Communication. Resettlers in Ningxia now have better 
communications than the population remaining in the place of origin. Before 
resettlement, resettlers relied on face-to-face communication as the major way 
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of contacting the outside world. Now more than half (52.6 percent) of the 
resettlers use telephones for most of their communications (see table 4-34). 
(8) Access to Education: Resettlers have better access to education than the 
population remaining in the place of origin in Ningxia. In the place of origin, 
the primary school is located 1 km away from the village and the middle 
school some 7 km away. In the resettlement areas, the primary school is located 
500 meters away and the middle school only 1 km. Furthermore, farmers 
reflected that the quality of education in the resettlement area is so much better 
than that in the place of origin. 
Those who resettled in Yunnan have benefited in respect to the following 
criteria. It is too early to make any assessment of how resettlers have benefited 
at household level in Yunnan because they only moved about a year ago. 
Hence, the following summary points only reflect on changes at community 
level. 
(1) Market: Resettlers in Yunnan have much better access to the market in 
terms of distance to the marketplace than those remaining in their place of 
origin, and they visit it much more frequently than they did before (see table 4-
30). The distance is only 200 meters from the resettlement area in Yunnan, but 
is 28 km from the place of origin. Resettlers frequent the marketplace about 10 
times more often than do the population remaining in the place of origin. On 
average resettlers go every five days as against 48 days for those living in the 
place of origin. 
(2) Communication: Resettlers have improved their methods of 
communication (see table 4-35). No farmers remaining in the place of origin in 
Yunnan have access to telephone; but 35.5 percent of resettlers use the 
telephone as their major means of communication with the outside. 
(3) Education: Resettlers have better access to education. In the place of origin 
in Yunnan, the primary school is located 1 km away, and the middle school 
about 28 km away, whereas in the resettlement area, both schools are located at 
any easy distance of 1 km. 
(4) Farmers generally considered the quality of education in resettlement area 
to be much better than that in the place of origin. 
J 
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Changes in Women's and Men's Lives after Resettlement 
Both women and men have encountered tremendous changes in their lives 
following resettlement. Evaluation of the impact of the changes on women and 
men's lives can only be satisfactorily attempted after some years of 
resettlement. Nevertheless, what we can do is to foresee some gender impacts 
and to illustrate some activity changes after resettlement. 
It is envisaged that girls' education will eventually improve in the 
resettlement areas of both Ningxia and Yunnan. Some case studies show that 
resettlement households have a tendency towards having fewer children in 
each family. In the place of origin, where families have more children, family 
educational resources tend to focus on boys' rather than girls' education when 
family resources are limited. In the resettlement areas, family educational 
resources may be used for the education of both boys and girls when the 
family's financial status is improved and there are fewer children to be 
supported. For example, Mr. Xi Qi, who is now living in Moon village but is 
originally from Xiapu Village, said in the field interview: 
"I feel ashamed when I think about my hometown where people raise 6 and 7 children but 
feed them with potatoes. People here only have 2 to 3 children, but they feed them with good 
food, even fish, which I have never had in my life, and they provide them with good education. 
I now have one boy and one girl. I will support them to go to school as long as they are 
capable." 
It is also foreseen that women's health status will eventually be improved in 
both resettlement areas in Ningxia and Yunnan. Several factors are 
contributing to this: (1) Women have better access to health services, especially 
during their period of pregnancy and child delivery; (2) The heavy workload of 
women has reduced, even though the length of their working hours may 
remain the same. 
Households in both Ningxia and Yunnan will encounter changes in 
agricultural activities. For the same reasons as mentioned above, only the 
changes in Ningxia will be discussed here. In their place of origin in Ningxia, 
women devoted two-thirds of their labor time to crop production, whilst the 
men contributed only one third. In contrast, in the resettlement area, women 
devoted around 10 percent of their entire labor time to crop production and 
men only 5 percent. On the other hand, women's labor input into animal 
production doubled as compared with their commitment in their place of 
origin. In the place of origin, it took women about an hour every day to take 
care of animals and men also sometimes share tasks when they were at home. 
This differs from the resettlement area, where it is not unusual for women to 
spend three hours a day on this task, and usually without the assistance of the 
men. 
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One clear change in women and men's lives in Yunnan, however, is the 
increased involvement of women in market activities. The interviews indicated 
that, while women shared only 27% of these activities in the place of origin, in 
the settlement area they were responsible for half (51.5 %). Hence in the future 
it is likely that we will witness a burgeoning of trading and market enterprises 
among women. 
The Policy Dimension of Resettlement Projects 
Dichotomy of declared aims and objectives pursued 
Introduction 
In chapter four I analysed the outcome of the resettlement projects, exploring 
the key questions of who has benefited and in what ways. The findings showed 
that in both Ningxia and Yunnan the resettlers belonged, in large part, to the 
better-off groups from the places of origin who were now able to enjoy the 
much improved natural resources, infrastructure and cash income levels. In 
short, it was those who had already achieved better access to land and 
resources and a relatively higher standard of living that reaped the advantages 
of resettlement. This raises the question of whether this outcome was in line 
with the primary objectives of a government programme that was aimed at 
poverty alleviation. 
The present chapter examines why precisely should policies and projects 
aimed at poverty reduction end up benefiting the better-off rather than the 
poorer farmers. My central argument hinges on the paradoxical adoption from 
the outset of the project of both 'economic growth' and 'poverty reduction' 
objectives. Once this was manifest, it was only a matter of time before the 
poverty reduction objective was overshadowed and finally displaced by the 
pursuit of the economic growth objective. It is therefore important to 
distinguish between these two kinds of aims and justifications. On the basis of 
this, the chapter concludes by stressing that while resettlement seems 
appropriate for tackling problems of regional development, the same cannot be 
said for achieving poverty reduction. 
This chapter falls into two parts. Part I is a detailed description of policies 
and policy implementation. It covers information at national and 
regional/provincial level, and at the level of the research sites. The information 
is drawn from government documents, secondary data and interviews with 
government officials. There are four main sections. The first introduces the 
origin of government-organized voluntary resettlement projects in China and 
the second reviews national level policies and their implementation. This is 
followed in the third and fourth sections by accounts of the financial support 
and implementation of such projects in Ningxia and Yunnan. Part II builds 
upon the empirical findings and analysis of these two case studies in order to 
offer a research-based assessment of Chinese resettlement policy. 
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Part I: Official Version of Policy and Its Implementation 
5.1 Origin of government-organized voluntary resettlement projects in 
China 
The origin of the government-organized voluntary resettlement projects of this 
study is two-fold. One stems from a local initiative, the other from a national 
program. The original ideas for such efforts were to improve infrastructure and 
to construct irrigation in the plains in order to resettle population from the 
poor, dry mountainous areas. Irrigation infrastructure for the improvement of 
crop production and the movement of population to areas with better 
agricultural conditions is part of human history. Perhaps what is different in the 
origin of the type of activities that I refer to are the following features. They 
have a short time scope - all have occurred in current Chinese history. They are 
organized and supported by central and provincial/regional governments in 
the name of poverty reduction. They are voluntary in nature. The local initiative 
for such resettlement projects is the Water Pumping Program of Tongxin 
County of Ningxia. The national initiative is the "Three Xi Fund" program.1 
The water pumping program of Tongxin County of Ningxia2 
The Policy formulation of the "Three Xi Fund' was enlightened by a water-
pumping project called the 'Water Pumping Program of Tongxin County of 
Ningxia'. This program started in June 1975 and included two sub-projects - the 
'Tongxin Water-pumping System' (started in June 1975), and the 'Guhai Water-
pumping System' (started in 1978). The overall project infrastructure was 
completed in 1987 with a total investment of 178.85 million yuan. The total 
irrigated land reached 240,000 mu (16,000 ha). This project was implemented in 
a place where there was a vast area of dryland. After the completion of the 
water-pumping program in Tongxin County, land productivity increased from 
50-80 kg /mu (750-1200 kg/ha) to 600-800 kg/mu (9000-12000 kg/ha). The total 
beneficiary area covered 350 thousand square meters, which covered 52 
administrative villages, 17,100 households and 85,200 people. Among those 
who benefited, 35,200 (6,700 households) were already living in the area and 
50,000 (10,400 households) were resettlers. 
' This paragraph presents views of the author. 
2
 Source of Information:"Report on Resettlement and Construction of the Water-pumping 
Project of Tongxin" by Party Committee of Tongxi County and People's Government of 
Tongxin in October 1996. 
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The "Three Xi" Fund for Poverty Alleviation3 
Government-organized voluntary resettlement for poverty alleviation 
originated in the Ningxia Hui Autonomous Region in 1983, the year in which 
the Chinese government made a special budget available to support poverty 
alleviation activities in the so-called "Three Xi regions" (all have Xi in their 
names, meaning 'west') and they include Xiji County, Haiyuan County and 
Guyuan County of Ningxia Hui Autonomous Region; Dingxi and Hexi 
Prefectures of Gansu Province. The Gusu provincial government put forward 
propaganda such as 'Utilize the advantage of Hexi, assist the poor of Dingxi'. It 
meant that the improvement of irrigation infrastructure would be carried out in 
Hexi to accommodate the resettlement of population from the dry land 
mountainous area of Dingxi. The Ningxi Government also formulated a similar 
strategy. It specified two approaches in its strategy: one the local development 
approach, and the other, the alternative (resettlement) approach. The total 
population of Xiji, Haiyuan and Guyuan Counties were 1.2-1.3 million. It was 
believed that 700-800,000 people could improve their living standards by 
improving the local infrastructure and farming techniques. Resettlement was 
believed to be the only way to alleviate the situation of poverty for the rest of 
the population, that is some 400-500,000 people living in places with no access 
to transportation, lacking water resources, suffering from severe natural 
disasters, a high altitude, and a lack of arable land. 
5.2 Resettlement Policy and Its Implementation at National Level4 
China practices a centralised management and institutional system wherein 
central government wields a big influence at regional and local levels. 
However, this is not to say that the implementation of policy is linear but rather 
a mixed process of adoption, accommodation, misunderstanding and, at times, 
distortion of central government policy at lower levels5. 
Recognition of Resettlement for Poverty Reduction at National Level in the 1990s 
The "Three Xi Development" has always been given positive remarks by local 
and central government. The general impacts were summarized as (1) the 
resettled population is no longer in absolute poverty soon after the 
3
 Source of information: "Report on Resettlement and Construction of the Water-pumping 
Project of Tongxin" by Party Committee of Tongxi County and People's Government of 
Tongxin in October 1996 
4
 Source of information: "Theory and Practice of China's Resettlement for Poverty Reduction", 
by Poverty Alleviation Office of State Council, Edition of Selected Materials about Resettlement 
for Poverty Reduction of National Workshop on Resettlement for Poverty Reduction and 
Development in 21" Century" in Guanxi, December 2000 
5
 This paragraph presents the view of the author. 
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resettlement. Most of the resettlement population made the move in the first 
year, settled in the second year and had enough to feed and to clothe 
themselves by the third year. So resettlement is considered as both a long and 
short-term way to solve poverty. (2) Population pressure in the place of origin is 
reduced. After moving out part of the population environmental problems can 
gradually be resolved, and the return of arable land to grassland and forestry 
become possible. (3) The wasteland and water resources of the resettlement 
areas can be fully utilized. 
With the recognition of such positive impacts, resettlement for poverty 
reduction and development was further legitimized by the '8-7 Poverty 
Alleviation Program' issued by central government in 1994, a program to 
alleviate the poverty of 80 million poor people within a period of seven years. 
The program states that 'resettlement is recommended for population living in areas 
where productive and living conditions are difficult for survival and development'. 
Resettlement Project Implementation across China 
With the policy support of central government, many provinces and regions 
started resettlement projects in the mid-1990s onwards. Table 5-1 provides a 
summary of the investment and population resettled in 16 provinces of China 
based on available statistics. 
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Table 5-1: Government-organized voluntary resettlement in China's 16 
Provinces/Regions 
Province/ 
Region 
Gansu 
Ningxia 
Inner-
Mongolia 
Guangdong 
Guangxi 
Guizhou 
Sichuan 
Qinghai 
Xinjiang 
Hebei 
Shanxi 
Tibet 
Hubei 
Liaoning 
Yunnan 
Shaanxi 
Total 
Starting 
year 
1983 
1983 
1986 
1991 
1993 
1994 
1994 
1994 
1994 
1994 
1996 
1996 
1996 
1997 
1997 
1998 
Resettled 
population 
(thousand) 
560.92 
300 
180 
225 
212.3 
85 
25.8 
130 
155.9 
72.7 
117 
43.2 
200 
14 
169 
288 
2580 
Population 
to be 
resettled in 
overall plan 
(thousand) 
500 
300 
200 
No 
information 
20 
300 
100 
130 
337.8 
46.7 
220 
300 
300 
26 
830 
1226 
About 5000 
Subsidy 
per person 
(yuan) 
463 
1000 
4500 
1100 
3500-4500 
1000 
1300 
5000 
3000-5000 
1000 
8500 
3000 
3000-6000 
2000 
Investment 
made (100 
million 
yuan) 
2.64 
2.87 
5.3 
2.59 
11 
0.8 
0.38 
7.62 
6.344 
0.81 
3.5 
5.37 
5.7 
About 56 
Total 
investment 
needed 
(100 
million 
yuan) 
30 
3 
10 
10 
2.325 
7.4 
30 
2.5 
6.6 
25.5 
1.7 
40 
30 
About 200 
Source: edition of selected materials on resettlement 
Workshop on Resettlement for Poverty Reduction 
Guanxi, December 2000 
for poverty reduction from the 'National 
and Development in the 21" Century', 
The above table shows that many people are still to be resettled in the 
government-organized resettlement projects in the future. Although 
governments at different levels also recognise the many difficulties encountered 
in resettlement projects, they are convinced of the effectiveness of resettlement 
for poverty reduction and development. 
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5.3 Resettlement Policy and its Implementation in Ningxia 
Policy and its implementation at regional level 
Achievement made in Ningxia6 
Twenty-three resettlement areas were established in 16 years of effort from 1983 
to 1999. All such areas have access to irrigation water. Of the 23-resettlement 
areas, 11 are intra-county, and 12 are inter-county. Of the eleven intra-county 
resettlements, six were on land reclamation sites that had previously been 
empty of population. Five were based on land reallocation, where resettlers 
were moved to areas where the average arable land area per household was 
higher and where, after improvement of existing irrigation systems, local 
government was able to reallocate land holdings and put aside arable land for 
resettlement. 
Up to 1999, the total investment made had reached 287.27 million yuan 
(about 35 million US$). Irrigated land accounted for 560 thousand mu (37.3 
thousand ha) and the total resettled population numbered 216,885. The 
population already resident in the area that had locally benefited numbered 
83,874. 
The provision of a policy framework from Central Government to Ningxia 
Regional Government7 
In the early 1990s, the Ningxia regional government was given the following 
policy framework and standard by the national government: 
• Each resettler should be given an 80 yuan (about US$ 10) subsidy for 
house construction and a timber quota of a half cubic meter with par 
value; 
• Trucks should be arranged as and where possible to help resettlers to 
move. Later, this item was changed into a subsidy of 80-100 yuan (about 
US$ 10-12) per household towards transportation costs. 
• All kinds of taxes would be waived for the first five years after 
resettlement, including the agricultural tax paid in grain. 
• Water rates would be waived for five years time after resettlement. 
6: "Theory and Practice of China's Resettlement for Poverty Reduction", by Poverty Alleviation 
Office of State Council, Edition of Selected Materials about Resettlement for Poverty Reduction 
of National Workshop on Resettlement for Poverty Reduction and Development in 21" 
Century" in Guanxi, December 2000 
'Source of information: Interview of Mr. Ma Zhenjiang on August 16, 2001, the director of 
Division of Resettlement, Poverty Alleviation Office of Ningixa 
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• The infrastructure investment would be shared by different stakeholders 
according to the following principles: Regional government was 
responsible for making the investment in physical infrastructure such as 
water supply, electricity, roads and the main irrigation system. 
Respective administrative departments would be responsible for making 
investment in the social infrastructure such as schools, hospital and 
medical services, credit systems etc. The County Government of the 
place of origin would be responsible for providing subsidies to resettlers 
that took account of their difficulties over cash, food and production 
inputs in the very first year of resettlement. It is suggested to use "work-
relief program" when county government has no enough financial 
capacity. Farmers and government should make joint investment in land 
levelling in the resettlement area. 
Regional government's principal supplementary policy8 
• Resettlers were allowed to keep their original homestead and arable land 
for three years, and were free to make a final decision on where to live at 
the end of the three-year period. 
• Resettlers and the resettled areas would be under the administration of 
the county government of the places of origin, which was for eliminating 
the fears and feelings of insecurity of the resettlers. 
Targeting Process:9 
• Steps in the general targeting procedure of the resettlement program is: 
• Identification of the resettlement area and corresponding places of 
origin. 
• Allocation of quotas by regional government to selected county 
governments in places of origin. 
• Allocation of quotas by county governments to township governments in 
places of origin. Quotas basically indicate how many people should be 
resettled every year from each selected township. 
• Allocation of quotas by township authorities to village committees in 
places of origin. Quotas basically indicated how many people or 
households should be resettled. 
• Farmers sign up their names. 
• Village committees select eligible resettlers from those who have signed 
up. 
* Source of information: Interview of Mr. Ma Zhenjiang on August 16, 2001, the director of 
Division of Resettlement, Poverty Alleviation Office of Ningixa 
'Source of information: Interview of Mr. Ma Zhenjiang on August 16, 2001, the director of 
Division of Resettlement, Poverty Alleviation Office of Ningixa 
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Main regional criteria for those who would be eligible for resettlement10: 
• Poor households from poor areas 
• Those who have observed family planning 
• The more educated - where at least one family members has completed 
middle school education 
• The younger population, in general they should be under 35 years old. 
• Be hardworking. 
• Resettlement application to be made in the name of the household 
(which meant resettlement was about household rather than individual 
resettlement). 
• Those who suffered from dementia, were widowers, or simple-minded 
were not allowed to sign up. 
The above-mentioned criteria were just the principal ones. The local authorities 
were allowed to formulate site-specific criteria. 
Policy changes in Ningxia in July 1997" 
In April 1997, a joint program was formulated between Ningxia Hui 
Autonomous Region and Fujian Province. Fujian, as a relatively richer province, 
made a commitment to invest in Ningxia for resettlement for poverty reduction 
and development project. 
The criterion for household selection changed at this stage. The level of 
poverty was no longer used as a key criterion for selection. Those who were 
willing to move and who had the economic capacity to do so would be given 
the opportunity. In 1997, 2000 yuan (about 244 US$) was required for getting 
resettlement permission. It was said that the money would be used for public 
infrastructure, such as digging wells, road construction and drinking water 
system. 
Policy changes in Ningixa in September 2000u 
Before September 2000, resettlement areas were under the administration of the 
county governments of the places of origin, even though the areas were located 
in the administrative border of other counties. Both governments and 
resettlement populations paid a high cost for such a management model. For 
many years, governments in the counties of origin insisted on administering the 
resettlement areas mainly because they could directly manage the earmarked 
10
 Source of information: Interview of Mr. Ma Zhenjiang on August 16, 2001, the director of 
Division of Resettlement, Poverty Alleviation Office of Ningixa 
11
 The same as above 
12
 The same as above 
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funds for resettlement. However, the effectiveness of the management was not 
encouraging because they lacked the knowledge to manage irrigated farming 
areas since their previous knowledge and experience was with dryland farming 
only. At the same time, there was insufficient cooperation and support from the 
county authorities in the resettlement areas and counties of origin. Since these 
authorities had no official roles in managing the resettlement areas, they were 
reluctant to get involvement when they were needed. Furthermore, the county 
government in the place of resettlement considered the resettled population to 
be a burden because they were much poorer than their own resident 
population. Neither did the authorities in the places of origin have great interest 
in the resettled population, because any investment in them made no 
contribution to the direct development of their own county. For solving these 
problems, on September 15 of 2000, the management of the resettlement area 
was officially transferred from the counties of origin to the resettlement 
counties for all 12 resettlement areas in Ningxia.13 
Policy and Its Implementation in Minning Resettlement Area and in the Research Site 
Current development status of the resettlement area14 
The resettlement area is now officially named Minning Resettlement Area, 
named after the cooperation between Fujian Province (the abbreviation of 
Fujian Province in Chinese is 'Min') and Ningxia Hui Autonomous Region 
(whose abbreviation is 'Ning'). The other name of the area is Yuquanying 
Resettlement Area. It is named after the original landowner - Yuquanying State 
Farm. The total resettlement area covers 66 thousand mu (4,400 ha). It governs 
nine administrative villages and 50 sub-villages. Up to July 2001, the total 
resettlement population had reached 18.5 thousand, and the total number of 
households numbered 3,300. The total investment had reached 33.79 million 
yuan (4.12 million US$), of which the central and regional government had 
invested 23.51 million yuan, and the Fujian Provincial Government 10.28 
million yuan. 
The development objectives and overall plans of the Minning Resettlement 
Area15 
The overall development objectives of the resettlement area set by the 
government of Ningxia are the following: 
11
 There are in total 12 inter-county resettlement programs in Ningxia. 
14
 Source of information: Interview of Mr. Pu Zhenru on August 9, 2001, the director of Minning 
Development Zone of Yongning County of Ningxia Province 
15
 Source of information: Interview of Mr. Pu Zhenru on August 9, 2001, the director of 
Mingning Development Zone of Yongning County of Ningxia Province 
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• To develop it into a demonstration area for resettlement for poverty 
alleviation; 
• To develop it into a demonstration area of modern agriculture; 
• To develop it into a demonstration area of industrialized agriculture; 
• To develop it into a demonstration area of home yard production, 
through generating cash income from having high value crop production 
around the home yard. 
Settling process16: 
• Registration. After the completion of the targeting process described 
above, resettlers are selected. Those selected receive a resettlement 
permission certificate from the township government of the place of 
origin. With this certificate a resettler can go to the resettlement office for 
registration. 
• Land allocation. Individual households will receive a piece of land for 
cultivation and to build a homestead: The location of the land is decided 
by lottery. 
The total resettlement area has been divided into several administrative 
villages, and each administrative village is composed of several sub-villages 
consisting of about 50 households. A lottery is used for the allocation of land to 
resettlers because land quality differs from one plot to the other and issuing a 
site allocation by lot can avoid conflicts. Secondly, people from the same 
communities of origin tend to group together and this often leads to the 
development of clan power. A lottery ensures that people from different 
villages and townships will be intermixed. Thirdly, the grouping of people 
from different places helps to generate broader contact among resettlers. 
The resettlement process reviewed by a government official17 
Ma Zhenjiang, Director of the Division of Resettlement and Poverty Alleviation 
Office of Ningxia, in reviewing the resettlement process in the resettlement area 
stated that after the selection of resettlement households, a date for moving 
would be set. The Village Committee would arrange for trucks to collectively 
assist the movement of resettlement households. Normally, it was the strong 
laborers, mostly the men, that went first to the resettlement areas. They needed 
to prepare the basic living and farming conditions, such as house construction 
and land levelling, before moving the whole household. In the beginning, many 
"Source of information: Interview of Mr. Pu Zhenru on August 9, 2001, the director of 
Mingning Development Zone of Yongning County of Ningxia Province 
17: Interview of Mr. Ma Zhenjiang on August 16, 2001, the director of Division of Resettlement, 
Poverty Alleviation Office of Ningixa 
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resettlers just dug pits and covered them with plastic as temporary places to 
stay. Then they started to build houses and level land. Government officials 
from the places of origin had to come with the resettlers. They were responsible 
for the farmers' technical training. Officially recognized resettlers would be 
given a subsidy, official residential permission, and homestead and arable land. 
Those who resettled without official permission had to take full responsibility 
for themselves and take the risks associated with having no officially 
recognized status. Some resettlers decided to move back to their places of origin 
after living in the resettlement area for sometime and in such cases, often sold 
their land and houses to someone else even though such land trading was 
illegal. There were also cases where resettlers decided not to farm but to engage 
in off-farm activities in nearby areas. 
In conclusion, the post-resettlement population could be categorized into 
three types: (1) Resettlers who lived in the resettlement areas. Some focus on 
farming activities, and others focus on non-farming or off-farming activities; (2) 
People who travelled back and forth, keeping on their livelihoods in both places 
of origin and the resettlement area, and thus committing their time to both 
places. (3) Returnees who decide to go back to their places of origin after living 
in the resettlement areas for a period. 
Brief profile of the development of the Resettlement Area18 
• 1990: a resolution was passed to establish the Yuquanying Resettlement 
Area and the Resettlement Office of Xiji County was set up to implement 
the plan. At that time, about 20 staff from different government bureaux, 
agricultural, livestock, forestry and construction, formed a team and 
worked in the resettlement areas. 
• Late 1990 and early 1991: the Xiji County government organized officials 
and technicians from various bureaux (agriculture, forestry, water 
conservation, livestock, urban construction, electricity and land, to carry 
out development planning in the resettlement area. 
• July 1991: the Resettlement Office organized land levelling, constructed 
irrigation systems in the so-called 'eastern railway area' of the 
resettlement, and expanded the level one pumping station. For these 
works, the resettlement office provided the machinery and the farmers 
gave their labour. 
• September 1991: land planning was carried out, including the most 
important decision on land allocation policy. Each resettled household 
was to be given 8 mu (0.53 ha) of arable land and 0.8 mu (0.053) of 
homestead land. 
"Source of information: Interview of Mr. Pu Zhenru on August 9, 2001, the director of 
Mingning Development Zone of Yongning County of Ningxia Province 
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• October 1991: the 500 households who had participated in the farmers' 
self-organized resettlement initiative were given first priority to resettle 
in the resettlement area. Some of them, as the first group of resettlers, 
came to build their houses. 
• Autumn 1991: the school was opened with one classroom, shared by 28 
children of different ages. 
• 1991: the water management station was established. 
• 1992 - 1993: the level two water-pumping head was constructed. 
• End of 1992 saw the completion of Yuquanying Middle School. 
• 1993: the resettlement office started to organize land development in the 
so-called 'western railway area' of the resettlement. 
• Autumn and winter 1993: construction of a 7-km road. 
• May 1994: the level two pumping station started to provide irrigation 
water. 
• July 1994: the regional government added the so-called Ganchengzi area 
to the overall resettlement area. Land was reclaimed and a water system 
was constructed in the new area, and a quota of 1,500 households was 
made for voluntary resettlement. 
• August 1994: 670 households resettled in Huangyi Village and Wuhe 
Village. 440 households resettled in Muland Village and Moon Village. 
• Spring 1995 to autumn 1996: a drinking water system was constructed, 
after which some resettlers were able to get access to tap water. 
• October 1995: the Ganchengzi and Western Railway (three grades) 
Primary Schools were established. 
• Winter 1995: Number 5 sub-village of Shuanggou Village was the first to 
get access to electricity. It was planned that electricity would be made 
available to all the villages by the end of 2001. 
• Autumn 1996: the building of the Resettlement Office was completed. 
Officials from the both the local county or county of origin were now 
able to start full-time work in the resettlement area (previously they had 
had to travel between their home offices and the resettlement area). 
• 1997: the level one main channel was extended to increase irrigation 
coverage from 2,000 mu (about 244 ha) to 8,000 mu (about 976 ha); 
• 1997: cooperation between Fujian Province and Ningxia Hui 
Autonomous Region was established. It was agreed that the Fujian 
authorities would invest in and thus support the development of the 
resettlement area. 
• 1997: a water tower was built and a 16-km water pipe was laid. A well 
was dug to provide drinking water for Nanjiang and Minning Villages. 
• 1997 to 1998: about 1100 households moved to the resettlement area. 
They settled in Nanjiang Village and Minhe Village. 
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1998: the level two main channel was constructed and so irrigation 
coverage reached 16,000 mu (about 1,951 ha) of arable land and 3,000 mu 
(about 366 ha) of home yard land for cultivation. 
Winter 1998: electricity was made available in Moon, Lanyi and Wuqi 
villages; 
September 1998: Minning Primary and Middle Schools were completed. 
1998: eleven wells were dug to meet water demand for home yard 
production; 
1998: a 1.1-km road was constructed; 
1998: a power transformation station (35 thousand-volt) was built. 
1998: a post office was built, a telecommunication station was 
established, and a grain storage station was constructed. 
1998: a researcher and technicians from Fujian University conducted 
research on the feasibility of a mushroom plantation in the resettlement 
area. The study proved that mushroom production in the resettlement 
could be productive and this resulted in researchers and technicians 
from Fujian beginning mushroom production extension work in the area. 
1998 to 1999: 280 commercial apartments along the main street of the 
resettlement area were built for sale, covering 8,400 square meters. 
June 1999: a clinic was established. 
September 1999: a market place was set up. 
1999: flood control infrastructure was put in place. 
June 2000: the third National Workshop on Mushroom Technology was 
held in Yinchuan. The Minning Resettlement Area was selected as the 
field visit site for the participants. 
September 15th 2000: the resettlement area was administratively handed 
over to Yongning County Government. Before September 15th, the Xiji 
County Government was administratively in charge of the resettlement 
area even though it was geographically located in Yongning County. 
In 2000 a 1.7-km length of flood control bank was built, along with a 5-
km flood discharge channel. 
August 2001: with the expanding of telecommunication capacity in the 
area, individual households were able to install private telephone lines. 
August 2001: the Minning Resettlement Office submitted an official 
application for the resettlement area to receive Township status and form 
a township level government. 
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5.4 Resettlement Policy and its Implementation in Yunnan 
Policy and its Implementation at Provincial Level 
A short history of resettlement for poverty reduction and development in 
Yunnan1' 
Stage one: 1996 to the end of 1998. In 1996, The Provincial Leadership Group for 
Resettlement and Development was established, which was responsible for the 
coordination of resettlement projects at provincial level. During this stage, most 
resettlement projects were inter-prefectural. By the end of 1998,11 resettlement 
sites had been established, and 32,000 people had been resettled. Many lessons 
were learned from this stage, and one key lesson learned was that inter-
prefecture resettlement created many problems, such as problems related to 
resettler adaptation to new the areas that were far from their places of origin. 
Stage two: end of 1998 to the end of 2000. Many such resettlement projects 
were launched in 80 Counties across Yunnan Province. In March 1999, the 
Provincial Government released Provincial Document No. 67, which indicated a 
strategic change of resettlement focus from inter-prefecture to intra-county 
resettlement. 
Stage three: from the end of 2000 to date. Resettlement for Poverty 
Reduction and Development has become a key strategy for regional 
development. To December 2000, the total resettlement population in Yunnan 
had reached 169 thousand, returnees accounted for less then 10% 
Government justification for resettlement for poverty reduction and 
development20 
The provincial government was fully convinced that resettlement is the most 
effective way to reduce poverty and stimulate development. This is firstly 
because it is believed that resettlement is the most rapid way to reduce poverty. 
The hard evidence provided by Yang Bin, Deputy Director of the Resettlement 
Division of the Poverty Alleviation Office of Yunnan, is that 70% of resettlers 
were no longer in absolute poverty within two years of resettlement. Second, 
resettlement programs can promote economic and industrial development, and 
production structural adjustment. Third, it is believed that reduced population 
pressure in the places of origin will improve the ecological environment. 
Fourth, farmers adopt new ideas and concepts very quickly after resettlement. 
" Source of information: Interview with Mr. Yang Bin, the deputy director of Resettlement 
Division of Poverty Alleviation Office of Yunnan, on July 9,2001. 
20
 Source of information: Interview with Mr. Yang Bin, the deputy director of Resettlement 
Division of Poverty Alleviation Office of Yunnan, on July 9, 2001. 
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And finally, resettlement is in line with the central government development 
strategy of promoting the development of small and medium size towns and 
cities. 
Resettlement policy at provincial level21 
• Arable land of 3 mu (0.2 ha) per person should be guaranteed for 
resettlers, and that one mu out of the three must be relatively highly 
productive for insuring food security. A 300 yuan (37.5 US$) subsidy 
should be provided for improving land productivity. 
• Homestead land of 0.3 mu per household should be guaranteed; 
• Compensation should be provided to the original landowners if their 
land is to be utilized for resettlement. No compensation would be 
attached to State owned land. Collective land should receive compensate 
of 250 yuan/mu (about 457 US$/ha). The sources of funding for paying 
the compensation should be arranged in the following ways: the 
provincial government should provide land compensation payment for 
cross-prefecture resettlement; provincial and county government should 
jointly provide a land compensation fee for intra-prefecture resettlement; 
and the county government should be responsible for intra-prefecture 
resettlement. 
• A housing subsidy of 6,000 yuan (750 US$) should be given to each 
resettlement household in inter-prefecture resettlement; 5,000 yuan (625 
US$) should be given to each resettlement household in inter-county and 
intra-county resettlement. Dwelling space for each resettlement 
household should be more than 60 square meters. The authorities should 
be responsible for construction of houses for resettlers, but resettlers 
should contribute their labor. 
• Resettlers are requested to do register their households after two years of 
living in the resettlement areas, and those who wished to do so earlier 
registration would be given permission; 
• Land contracts in the places of origin would be terminated two years 
after resettlement; 
• The provincial budget for inter-prefecture resettlement is 10,000 yuan per 
person, which includes both the household subsidy and investment on 
infrastructure. 
• 1.5 percent of the total input for any resettlement project should be used 
for technology extension work, such as: technical training and technical 
demonstration; 
21
 The same as above 
150 Voluntary Resettlement in China 
• It is strongly suggested that resettlers should be under the 
administration of the local government in the resettlement areas rather 
than by government in the place of origin; 
• Agricultural taxes, taxes for local special products, enterprise tax, tax for 
the construction of infrastructure and for fixed assets were to be reduced 
or waived. 
Description of Policy and Its Implementation at County Level and in the Research Site22 
Resettlement policy of Cangyuan County Government: 
Selection of resettlement sites: (1) The areas should have good natural resource 
endowment in terms of land, forestry, water and others; (2) The areas should 
have less population density, so that land can be made available to meet the 
following requirement: each household to have 0.3 mu of homestead land, and 
each person could have on average, 1 mu (0.07 ha) of arable land, 3 mu (0.2 ha) 
of forest land for firewood and 3 mu (0.2 ha) for economic activities, such as 
fruit tree, coffee, sugar cane or tea production; (3) The areas should have good 
access to drinking water facilities, electricity and roads. 
Budgeting principles: The amount of subsidy in cash and kind to resettlers 
is based on how much can be left after infrastructure investment out of the 
overall budget available. In concrete, the first step is to budget for the overall 
infrastructure needed; the second is estimate how many households or people 
are to be resettled, and the third is to come up with the amount left for giving as 
a subsidy to each resettlement household. 
Land Compensation: Governments at prefecture, county and township 
level have no financial capacity to pay land compensation, so resettlers have to 
pay for that when it is needed. 
Targeting process: 
• First Step: Provincial government allocate quota to prefecture and county 
level 
• Second Step: County and township government identify target groups 
for resettlement 
• Third Step: Report back to provincial government for approval 
Selection criterion of eligible resettlers set by county government: 
• The net income per capita per year of resettlers must be lower than 560 
yuan (about US$ 68); 
22
 Source of information: interview of Mr. Luo Kaixiang on July 14 and 15, 2001, Director of 
Poverty Alleviation Office of Cangyuan County of Lincang Prefecture, Yunnan Province 
• 
The Policy Dimension of Resettlement Projects 151 
Those who are eligible to move should be from places with extremely 
poor living and production conditions, with no development potentials, 
and with poor access to drinking water and transportation; 
They must be willing to move; 
• They should be younger then 45 years old; 
• They should have labour capability; 
• They must be literate; 
• They should be knowledgeable about production technologies. 
Project implementation at county level 
In 1999, the first central/provincial government supported project on 
'government-organized' resettlement for poverty reduction and development 
was approved in Cangyuan County. The total budget was 37.9 million yuan (4.7 
million US$). The project plan was to resettle 4000 people within the 4 years 
from 1999 to 2002. Up to the end of 2000, 2,461 people had been resettled. The 
project implementation included basically three steps: field survey, project 
design and implementation. 
Field survey: Even though the project was only approved in 1999, its 
preparation started much earlier. In May 1997, the county government 
organized the first meeting to discuss issues related to central/provincial 
supported resettlement projects after being informed that Cangyuan County 
had been listed in the overall provincial plan. More than 40 people from various 
government bureaux and township governments participated in the meeting. 
Resettlement policies were formulated in this meeting. A field study was 
organized straight after the first meeting. Four study teams were formed. Sites 
for field study were basically identified on data from county statistics and 
information from county poverty alleviation office. In total, 36 villages of the 7 
townships were visited, among which 16 villages of 4 townships were proposed 
as the places of origin, and 20 villages of 3 townships were proposed as the 
resettlement areas. It took a month to do the study. The following activities 
were conducted in the field survey: household visit, farmers' meeting, and 
mobilization of farmers' participation. The main information gathered at 
household level from proposed places of origin concerned the farmers' basic 
living and production conditions, and their opinions on resettlement. The main 
information gathered at village level from the proposed places of origin was 
land to population ratio, average grain possession, average net income, sources 
of income, industrial development and qualification of the labor. In the 
proposed resettlement areas, the following activities were conducted: 
convincing the local population to give some of their land to resettlers, 
identification of the resettlement site, and policy propaganda. In June 1997, a 
survey report was completed. 
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Project design: The County Poverty Alleviation Office, which is in charge of 
all poverty reduction activities in the county, formulated an overall project 
design based on the field survey report in cooperation with various bureaux. 
This overall design was then submitted to the Provincial Poverty Alleviation 
Office. Then a feasibility study was conducted in 1998 after the overall design 
had been approved. 
The overall project design consisted of 7 sub-projects in 7 administrative 
village. Mangkaba Resettlement Project is one of the 7 sub-projects. All the sub-
projects follow the same policy framework and implementation process. 
However, the details of project implementation may differ from one to the other 
due to site-specification. 
The justification for the Mangkama Resettlement Project is the following: 
(1) The resettlement site, Mangkaba, is on the border with Burma. It was 
designated as a provincial trading port in 1997. (2) The natural resource 
endowment is rich in water resource and forestry. (2) Farmers' income level in 
the selected place of origin is relatively higher so that they had a certain 
economic capacity to cope with resettlement. 
Project implementation at the Mangkaba resettlement site: 
A project implementation team was formed for the implementation of the 
Mangkaba resettlement project. The team comprised people from different 
bureaux. The team set up an office on the site for organizing land levelling, 
homestead land allocation, village road construction, a drinking water system 
among others. While the team started working on the site, farmers were also 
requested to build their houses. 
Land issue: There is no arable land allocation involved in the project. 
Mangkaba resettlement project is an intra-village resettlement project, which 
means that the place of origin and the resettlement area fall within the same 
administrative village. The distance between the place of origin and the 
resettlement area is 28 km. Resettlers will keep the same land holdings after 
resettlement. However, homestead land will be allocated to each resettlement 
household according to the set standard. The land where resettlers were to 
build their home area was currently being used as rotation land by locally 
resident farmers. The County government requested these farmers to give up 
this land for free. 
Household residential registration. Resettlers were not allowed to be 
registered in the place of origin and the resettlement site. Once they had moved, 
they had to give up their residential registration in the place of origin. 
House construction standard: Resettlers were requested to build houses 
with at least a 1.5 meters of brick wall. No straw and wood structure sheds 
were to be allowed in the resettlement site. Resettlers were requested to build a 
pigsty and cattle-raising shed while building their house. Each resettlement 
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household was to be given 1,500 yuan (188US$) in cash, 80 asbestos shingles 
and other construction materials in kind (worth about 1,800 yuan in total) 
(about 225 US$). 
Home yard production promotion: 10 pomelo seedlings were distributed 
free to resettlers for promoting home yard economic production. However, the 
survival rate of the pomelo seedlings was very low, which was believed to be 
caused by the resettlers' having little knowledge of fruit tree cultivation. 
Energy saving promotion: Two demonstration households were selected to 
install a bio-gas system for promoting bio-gas for cooking energy rather then 
firewood. Each demonstration household was given a 3,000 yuan cash subsidy. 
However, one of the two systems installed has never been in use because the 
quality of construction is so poor it will not run. 
Technical training: The resettlement policy at provincial level demands that 
a certain percentage of the budget should to be used for technical training. But 
this was not implemented. 
Brief Profile of the Development of the Resettlement Site 
• Early 1999: the Mangkaba resettlement project was approved by the 
provincial government. The provincial government provided financial 
support for a quota of up to 100 households/500 people. 
• March 1999: the Township government organized a meeting to discuss 
the Mangkaba project. Village party secretaries, village committee heads 
and deputies of Manggang Administrative Village and some sub-village 
leaders participated in the meeting. At the meeting, township officials 
delivered the resettlement policy to the participants. Sub-villages of 
origin were finally identified. Straight after the meeting, sub-village 
meetings were held in the relevant sub-villages. In these meetings, 
farmers were informed that they could sign up their name with sub-
village leaders. 
• June 1999: County government organized a meeting with sub-village 
leaders, at which they were to submit the list of names they had 
gathered. In total, 126 households signed up their names, and they were 
all permitted to move. In the meeting, sub-village leaders were asked to 
pass on the message that farmers were requested to start to build their 
houses in October. 
• October and November 1999: Plots of homestead land were made ready 
for farmers to choose, which means that the project implementation team 
had drawn up 126 plots of homestead land for the 126 households to 
choose where to build their houses. Each piece of homestead land was 
188 square meters (18 m x 16 m). 
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• Mid-November 1999: Another sub-village leaders' meeting was held. 
The purpose was to ask sub-village leaders to urge farmers to come to 
the resettlement site to see the progress made, to speed up preparation of 
house construction materials, and to come to get them to build their 
houses quickly. Resettlers were asked to complete their house 
construction by June 30th, 2000 (in the end only 10 households finished 
building their houses by the deadline). At that time, many farmers came 
to say that the designed size of homestead land was too small to raise 
animals such as pigs and chicken, and they requested to have larger 
plots of homestead land. To respond to the farmers' request, the size of 
the homestead plots was extended to 320 square meters (20 m x 16 m). 
However, for having houses in tidy line and row, some plots were much 
less than the standard size, for example, less than 20 m in length, or a 
width of less than 15 meters. When farmers found out that the size of 
their homestead land was smaller than it should be, it was already too 
late to do anything. 
• March 2000: A sub-village leaders' meeting was again held to urge 
resettlers to build their houses. 
• June 2000: A sub-village leaders meeting was held for getting 
information on how many farmers had built their houses. The 
information was used for issuing subsidies because only those who had 
built their houses were eligible to receive a subsidy. 
• July 2000: County Poverty Alleviation Office gave out subsidies to 
farmers who had finished building their houses and, at the same time, 
announced that subsidies to those who did not finish building their 
houses by June 30*, 2000, would be reduced to 1000 yuan (about 125US$) 
in cash and only 80 asbestos shingles (worth about 1600 yuan, about 
200US$, in kind. 
• May 2001: Many resettlers only managed to finish building their houses 
in May 2001. Subsidy to these resettlers had not been given at the time of 
the field interview in July 2001. By May 2001,131 households in total had 
been resettled, 886 people had moved, and 8 households were to move 
after their house construction had been completed. The total number of 
resettlement households exceeded the planned number. Farmers who 
did not complete building their houses by June 30*, 2000, received only 
the asbestos shingles subsidy. Those who accepted their cash subsidy in 
asbestos shingles received their full subsidy in value. But those who still 
wanted a cash subsidy were not guaranteed when or whether they 
would get it. 
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Part II Discussion 
The policy analysis of this research aims to 'demythologise' planned 
intervention. To achieve this we need to consider a number of issues: 
(1) Planned intervention is composed of 'multiple realities' and so we will need 
to know 'whose reality counts' (Chambers, 1997). However, the answer to 
this is not straightforward because the issue of differing meanings and 
judgements always entails a 'battlefield of knowledge' (Long, 1992). That is, 
people from different backgrounds and with different experiences and 
interests will express divergent views on what they expect from 
development. Such differences and the negotiations over meaning that 
follow are illustrated in this research by how arguments about poverty 
reduction are overshadowed by those concerning the goals of economic 
growth (for an elucidation of this, see later section in this chapter). 
(2) We will need to differentiate between theoretical and policy models. But 
frequently '[t]he interrelations of theoretical and policy models are.... often left 
unexplicated and therefore unclear. It becomes important then to focus on 
intervention practices as they evolve and are shaped by the struggles between the 
various participants, rather than simply on intervention models, by which we mean 
the ideal-typical constructions that planners, implementers or clients may have 
about the process.' (Long, 2001:30) In this chapter, Part I has concentrated on 
intervention models of government at different levels; while Part II intends 
to elucidate intervention practice. 
(3) Planned intervention is mostly not supported by adequate analysis at the 
bottom end of the intervention process. Indeed the bottom end of the process is 
largely assumed rather than fully described and analysed. There is, for example, no 
adequate analysis of power relations and organisational resources and social 
expectations' (Long, 2001:47). One of the findings of this research is that most 
resettlement policy guidelines remain on paper only. 
(4) '[S]tate policies are not all that consistent and often not easily identifiable' (Long, 
2001:47). This statement is illustrated by two findings: that no clear policy 
guidelines existed on where the places of origin should be located exactly, 
and that ambiguity of policy made it possible to divert the use of resources 
for poverty reduction to the support of economic growth. 
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Concerns Arise in Government Policy and Its Implementation 
No clear policy guidelines on where the places of origin should be 
In the resettlement process in both Ningxia and Yunnan, the very first step is 
the identification of places of origin. However, no specific guideline or criteria 
of how to choose the places of origin can be found in any policy papers. Such 
questions were raised in the field research with officials at different levels. 
Unfortunately, no further information can be provided, simply because there 
were no such criteria or specific policy guidelines to follow. The policy 
indication can be traced at national level is what is stated in the '8-7 Poverty 
Alleviation Program': 'Resettlement is recommended for population living in 
areas where productive and living conditions are difficult for survival and 
development'. However, it is impossible to use this policy statement as such to 
make any specific targeting, and also the policy statement at the national level 
was not intended to provide site-specific criteria. The outcome of the absence of 
a clear policy guideline is that the villages of origin for the resettlement project 
were among the relatively better off villages. Xiapu Administrative Village in 
Ningxia ranks among the two best-off villages of the seven villages in Xiapu 
Township. In Manggang Administrative Village, Yunnan, the income levels of 
farmers are the highest of the nine administrative villages of Nanla Township. 
The field research indicates that the unit for targeting the area in the place 
of origin Varies for the different projects in different provinces/regions. The 
targeted unit in Yunnan is the sub-village area (sub-villages in the mountainous 
area in Manggang Administrative Village). This means that farmers from the 
sub-villages in this mountainous area were eligible to move as long as they 
fitted the further selection criteria. In such case, mis-targeting at unit level is 
avoided as long as the targeted sub-villages are correctly targeted. The targeted 
unit area in Ningxia is the county (Xiji County). This means that farmers from 
Xiji County are eligible to move as long as they fit the further selection criteria 
for resettlers. In such a case, mis-targeting tends to take place at a lower level. It 
means that resettlers tend to come from relatively better-off townships or 
villages. 
Such tendency is the result of negotiation processes between different levels 
of administration. Very often, the decision about where the project is to be sited 
rests on the power leverage of local officials and the political significance of the 
places rather than being in accordance with the indicators and guidance of 
policy. In Ningxia, resettlers from Xiji County owe their thanks to the 
leadership of Mr. Ma Zhengxun in gaining political support from the provincial 
government for the resettlement project23. In Yunnan, resettlers owe thanks to t 
' For the detailed story, see Section 6.1 of Chapter Six 
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he geo-political significance of their location which borders Burma. Hence, the 
significance of policy guidelines are degraded in the process of policy 
implementation. Assuming that government wishes to improve project 
monitoring, then clear policy guidelines are required for resettlement projects 
for the correct targeting of places of origin. And it is much easier to target the 
right place of origin if the unit of targeting is at a lower administrative level. 
The focus on the development of a resettlement area diverts the use of 
poverty reduction resources to economic growth 
That no clear policy guideline existed for targeting the places of origin is not 
surprising, because the foci of both projects in Ningxia and in Yunnan are on 
the development of resettlement sites rather than on poverty reduction for the 
poorer population in the places of origin. 
Government has made a colossal investment in the resettlement area in 
Ningxia and a large investment in the resettlement site in Yunnan. In the 
process of resettlement in both projects, no attention has been paid to 
development within the places of origin. In the field research, the preliminary 
findings were already showing that the majority of resettlers were the better-off 
farmers. It meant that the poorer farmers in the places of origin would remain 
poor after the project. The researchers raised this preliminary finding with local 
officials. The answers received were that in the first place it was important to 
focus development on the resettlement area/site, otherwise farmers would not 
move. Secondly, the population in the places of origin, in the end, would all be 
moved out, so that it was a waste of money to make any further investment 
there. Furthermore, any returns on inputs were too low. However, neither 
argument stands. Firstly, the development potential in the resettlement 
area/site is already apparent to farmers and therefore a great incentive to move. 
In the end, the poorer farmers are only a small percentage of the overall 
resettled population due to social and economic constraints. Secondly I cannot 
see any possibility of moving all the population out of the places of origin 
because of the social and financial constraints involved. Only the better of in the 
places of origin in both Ningxia and Yunnan in the end had the possibility to 
move and there are yet poorer places. Secondly, saying that 'all' the population 
will be moved is in essence against the principle of voluntary resettlement, 
since some farmers may not want to move even when they are living in 
perceived impossible conditions. 
In fact, the important role of the Minning resettlement area of Ningxia now 
lies in its support of regional economic development. The significance of the 
development of the Mangkaba resettlement area of Yunnan lies in its role in 
promoting trade with Burma. The Government had made a big investment in 
infrastructure in the resettlement area by using poverty alleviation resources, 
and all the achievements realised in the resettlement area are also claimed as 
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achievements for poverty reduction. However, the outcomes of the resettlement 
process show that, in fact, the resources have been used in such a way as to 
support economic growth rather than poverty reduction. Hence, the focus on 
the development of resettlement areas, first of all, does not serve the declared 
aim of reducing poverty in the places of origin, secondly, it diverts poverty 
reduction resources to the promotion of economic growth. 
Policy guidelines on the selection of resettlers remain on paper only 
Looking at policy guidelines for selection of resettlers and crosschecking on 
who has actually moved, we can draw the very clear conclusion that policy 
guidelines are not implemented. 
Field studies in Ningxia show that among the total population resettled in 
the research site in Xiapu sub-village, the poor population amounts to only 7 
percent. This is a joint product of having no clear policy guidance for selecting 
resettlers, and the social dynamics ongoing in the process of resettlement. The 
first criterion listed in the regional principal criteria for who is eligible to be 
resettlers is 'Poor households from poor areas'. This criterion gives no concrete 
indication on where these poor areas are, or on who the poor households are 
and how to justify selection. Information from several sources, including the 
story of Ma Yongzhen24 in Moon Village, confirmed that more than a quarter of 
resettlers who are now living in Moon Village purchased their land. Land 
trading among individual landholders is illegal in China. However, it has been 
going all the time in the resettlement area in Ningxia. And with increased land 
productivity and improved social and irrigation infrastructure, land prices are 
rising dramatically. So, those who purchased their land are again among the 
better and best-off farmers, not only in villages of origin but even in the region. 
Field studies in Yunnan show that the poorer population amount to only 14 
percent of the total population resettled in the research site of origin in 
Shangwantang, and Shangwantang and Huoshaozhai sub-villages. Unlike in 
Ningxia, policy guidance in Yunnan about the selection of resettlers is rather 
precise. The criterion of resettler selection is that net income per capita per year 
of the resettlers must be lower than 560 yuan (about US$ 68). However, in the 
implementation stage, such poverty criterion was not referred to. This is a 
reflection of both true attitude of officials towards resettlement and the problem 
in using income level as an indicator. In the implementation process, all farmers 
who are willing to move and who are capable of moving are all given 
permission to move. The average annual net cash income of the resettlers was 
2,772 yuan, more than double that of the remaining population in the research 
site in the sub-villages of origin. Such phenomena drew no attention from local 
officials because their primary interest is in the economic development of the 
24
 For detail story of Ms. Ma Yongzhen, please look at chapter five. 
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resettlement site rather the poverty reduction impacts on the place of origin. 
Income level is the most widely used standard or criterion in development 
projects. In my view it is problematic to use income level as an indicator in 
complex rural communities. I have not come across a single project that has in 
fact targeted the beneficiary group by applying the income level as an indicator, 
although many project documents do make this claim. 
There are also other criteria in the policy guidelines. Education, age, health, 
family planning status are also used as selection criteria in Ningxia, and 
education, age, labor capability, level of know-how are used as selection criteria 
in Yunnan. However, these criteria were not reflected at all in the actual 
implementation process. 
The development belief carried in the criteria of resettler selection is 
controversial to project aims 
As mentioned in the previous section, criteria for resettler selection are actually 
not implemented. However, it is still worth discussing the meaning of such 
criteria because they can reflect government belief in development. 
There are two items respectively that refer to education and age in the 
regional principal criterion for selection of resettlers in Ningxia. It says that 
'being educated' means that at least one family members should have 
completed middle school education; and 'being younger population', means 
that in general 'they should be younger than 35 years old'. There are also two 
items respectively that refer to education and age in the selection criteria of 
Cangyuan County of Yunnan. It says: 'Illiterates should not be considered; and 
settlers should be younger than 45 years old'. 
Very often, the majority of the population is illiterate in places where living 
conditions are extremely difficult and the population is very poor. The aim and 
the policy are controversial in a poverty reduction project if the project requires 
an educational level of the beneficiaries. It is widely accepted that people who 
are too old to work should not participate in poverty reduction projects, but 
rather they may be helped by relief projects. But being younger than 35 years 
has nothing to do with labour capacity and being 45 is also too young to be 
excluded from the labor force. When I asked the local official why the criteria 
stated a preference for the younger population, I was told that this is for the 
consideration of the future development of the resettlement area. 
My interpretation of the criteria is that, even though the overall aim 
claimed by the projects is poverty reduction, the underlining rationale is 
actually for the economic development of the resettlement. Such an underlying 
rationale was later legitimised in the new policy guidelines in Ningxia in 1997. 
The criterion of resettler selection changed at this stage. Level of poverty was no 
longer used as a key criterion for selection of resettlement population. Those 
who were willing to move and who had the economic capacity to move would 
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be given the opportunity. Two thousand yuan (about 244 US$) was required for 
getting resettlement permission. This seals the formal transformation of a 
resettlement project for poverty reduction into an economic development 
project. 
How appropriate is resettlement for poverty reduction 
The decade from the end of the 1970s to the early 1980s was a transitional 
period for the Chinese government when the focus of official policy shifted 
from political movement to economic development. The foundations for 
economic development were still very weak and the majority of the Chinese 
population was poor. Economic development served directly the purpose of 
poverty reduction. At the time institutional reform and projects for 
development had a direct impact on poverty. 
In the wake of several decades of socialist movement, income differentials 
among the population were small. Official statistics appeared to confirm that at 
the time, voluntary resettlement was an appropriate policy to tackle poverty 
reduction. 
Consequently central government allocated substantial resources and 
remains today committed to further enhancing its support for poverty 
reduction and development. However, I would argue that the current national 
and provincial policies for resettlement for poverty reduction are based on the 
success stories of the 1980s, which are no longer relevant to the situation of 
1990. 
National statistics show that the majority of the poor population in China's 
rural areas had overcome absolute poverty by the early 1990s (see table 6-2). In 
the 1990s growing economic disparity manifested itself in the following 
manner: (1) economic disparity between eastern and western regions increased 
substantially; (2) Rural communities near cities prospered, towns even more so; 
(3) Rural communities with better access to transportation became better off; (4) 
Rural communities endowed with good natural resources were the first to 
escape poverty; (5) Income disparity among farmers within the same 
communities became more and more pronounced due to a number of social and 
economic factors. The same intervention policy would affect different economic 
groups differently. My research shows that within the beneficiary group of re-
settlement projects the better-off farmers soon outnumbered the poorer farmers. 
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Table 5-2: Number of Poor Population in Rural China 
Year 
Before 1978 
Early 
1990 
1991 
1992 
1993 
1994 
1995 
1996 
1997 
1998 
1999 
2000 
1980s 
Central Government 
Designated Poverty 
Line (in 
200 
300 
304 
317 
350 
440 
530 
580 
640 
635 
625 
625 
yuan) 
Total Poor Population in 
Rural Areas (in 
250 
125 
85 
94 
80 
75 
70 
65 
58 
50 
42 
34 
32 
millions) 
Percentage of Rural 
Population (%) 
9.5 
10.4 
8.8 
8.2 
7.6 
7.1 
6.3 
5.4 
4.6 
3.7 
3.4 
Sources: 
Data before 1978 and early 1980s from Zhu, Fengqi, Anti-poverty Research in China, China's 
Planning Press, 1996, pp5 
Data from 1990 to 1998: China Conquering Rural Poverty, World Bank County Report, 
China's Financial and Economic Press, 2001, pp25 
Data from 1999 to 2000: Monitoring Report of China's Rural Poverty in 2001, China's 
Statistics Press, pp8 
Poverty reduction versus economic growth 
People from different academic backgrounds and experience have a variety of 
views on the meanings of development. Table 5-3 shows the meanings over 
time as summarised by Pieterse (2001). It illustrates the complexity of the 
meaning of development. 
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Table 5-3: Meanings of Development over Time 
Period 
1870> 
1850> 
1940> 
1950> 
1960> 
1970> 
1980> 
1980> 
1990> 
Perspectives 
Latecomers 
Colonial economics 
Development economics 
Modernization theory 
Dependency theory 
Alternative development 
Human development 
Neo-liberalism 
Post-development 
Meanings of development 
Industrialization, catching-up 
Resource management, 
Trusteeship 
Economic (growth) -
Industrialization 
Growth, political & social 
Modernization 
Accumulation - national, 
Autocentric 
Human flourishing 
Capacitation, enlargement of people's 
choices 
Economic growth - structural reform, 
deregulation 
Authoritarian engineering, disaster 
Source: Pieterse, 2001:7 
The term 'development' is a neutral term, with no negative or positive meaning 
in itself. Yet people tend to refer to development only as a positive sense. We 
therefore have to be cautious and put the term development into its respective 
context. 
The changing meaning of development is closely linked with development 
intervention by developed countries in the developing countries following the 
Second World War. Such development intervention is often carried out in the 
form of development projects with different foci. Many development projects 
share the objective of poverty reduction. The various international 
organizations and development agencies have their own interpretation and 
policy guidelines for poverty reduction and economic cooperation. This implies 
that different policies and approaches can be adopted for poverty reduction and 
economic cooperation. 
We can see clearly from the above table that the meaning of development 
has always been linked to the concept of economic growth, although it has been 
commonly accepted in development studies that development is not equal to 
economic growth. Development has broader social and political ramifications, 
including justice, equality, human rights and so forth, which are fundamental to 
the rationale of poverty reduction. 
The term 'development' came into fashion with the process of 
decolonisation in the early 1950s, as more and more development projects took 
hold throughout the formerly colonised territories. At one extreme, 
development may be simply an extension of the idea of growth, taking into 
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account growth in the capacity to generate consumer goods and progress 
towards a more equal distribution, along with growth in consumption per se 
(Little, 1982). Or development may be defined in terms of the fulfilment of basic 
needs such as food, clothing, shelter, health care, and education (Streeten et a l , 
1981). Alternatively, development may be denned in terms of the levels of 
individual functioning and capacities' (Sen, 1988a; Marglin, 1990: 2). 
The World Bank economist, William Easterly (2002: 13-14), believes that 
there is a linear link between economic growth and poverty reduction. In his 
book The Elusive Quest for Growth, he used the research results generated by his 
colleagues to show how economic growth and poverty reduction are directly 
linked: 
'My World Bank colleagues (Ravallion and Chen) collected data on spells of economic growth 
and. changes in poverty covering the years 1981 to 1999. ...The answer was quite clear: fast 
growth went with fast poverty reduction, and overall economic contraction went with 
increased poverty.' 
He further argues: 
'There are two ways the poor could become better off: income could be redistributed from the 
rich to the poor, and the income of both the poor and the rich could rise with overall economic 
growth. Ravallion and Chen's ...findings suggest that on average, growth has been much 
more of a lifesaver to the poor than redistribution.' 
At macro-level, economic growth will certainly contribute to the wealth growth 
of the whole society, which may also benefit the poor. My question is, however, 
do we need to analyse whom among the poor benefit. In Ravallion and Chen' 
research, 'the poor were defined as the part of the population that had incomes below $1 a day 
at the beginning of each period they were examining.' 
My concern in targeting poverty groups is the necessity to differentiate 
poverty levels among the poor population in general. In my research sites, 
according to statistics, the average farmers' income level of the whole 
administrative village, or even the whole township is consistently below the 
government designated poverty line. For example, the average farmers' net 
income per capita per year in 2000 in Manggang Village (the research area of 
Yunnan) was 521 yuan (about 65 US$), substantially below the national poverty 
line of 625 yuan (about 78 US$) in 2000. This means that we can generally target 
the entire population in Manggang village as poor. 
However, in looking at the outcome of resettlement in my research 
findings, on average the net cash income level of the re-settlers is more than 
double that of the population staying behind. Who then should benefit from 
poverty reduction projects? Should it be those who are better off and therefore 
have the capacity to move? Economic growth models analyse poverty reduction 
from a macro-level, neglecting this disparity among the poor. 
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The economic growth of a region and a county will certainly bring more 
opportunities to rich and poor alike by enabling them to generate better 
incomes. The development of local industries and urban centres for example 
provide opportunities for wage labour to the poor population, who are in need 
of cash and who cannot make a living on their very limited arable land. The 
challenge is how to uplift the poorest groups to directly benefit from economic 
growth, or only marginally benefit from economic growth. 
The fundamental concern of economic growth is economic return from 
investment made, rather than on who might benefits from the investment. It is 
difficult to have promising economic returns from investing in poor areas with 
an overwhelmingly poor population. Hence the economic growth model will 
forever benefit the better-off groups first, and the poorer groups may benefit 'at 
the margins'. Economic growth is necessary for social development and poverty 
reduction but is not sufficient to ensure that the poor benefit equitably. 
The objectives of poverty reduction projects always include the increase of 
income of the poor, which is absolutely justifiable if the beneficiaries are indeed 
the poor. The problem is when such an objective is translated into an indicator 
for measuring project achievement then the pursuit of economic output may 
overtake other concerns such as justice, equity and human rights. It is always 
easier to measure economic output than other social and political objectives. 
I argue therefore that the pursuit of economic growth in poverty reduction 
projects should not displace the pursuit of the broader objectives of such 
projects. The reality of our projects teaches that once economic objectives make 
their entry, the economic growth model will become the dominant model, 
assisted by the local social dynamics and government organizations motivated 
first and foremost by the economic growth objective. 
Hence I would argue further that the distinction between a poverty 
reduction and an economic development approach holds the key to achieving 
poverty reduction. It is based on the observation that poverty reduction is still 
the government's overall commitment and that the undermining of social 
justice and equality in poverty reduction projects is due to dependence on 
misleading epistemological and methodological approaches and concepts. 
The first objective of the overall development objectives of the resettlement 
area set by the government of Ningxia is 'to build it into a demonstration area 
of resettlement for poverty alleviation', which clearly indicates the key objective 
of poverty alleviation. The second and the third objectives are 'to build it into a 
demonstration area of modern agriculture' and 'to build it into a demonstration 
area of industrialised agriculture', sending a clear message about the pre-
eminence of economic growth. Going through the brief profile of the 
development of the resettlement area, we see the emergence of a new 
development area with huge investments, with potential prosperity and highly 
attractive for those who have the capacity to look for a 'new' life and for 
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development opportunities. What one sees is how the second and third 
objectives are pursued in this development picture to the detriment of the first. 
The second and the third overall development objectives of the resettlement 
area set by the government of Ningxia clearly reflect the focus on regional 
development. Looking back at the policy guideline released in 1997, one sees 
that the level of poverty was no longer used as a key criterion for selection of 
resettlement populations. Those willing to move and having the capacity to 
move would be given the opportunity to do so. 2,000 yuan (about 244 US$) was 
required for getting resettlement permission. It was said that the money would 
be used for digging wells, road construction and drinking water systems. In 
such a case, the economic contribution by better-off farmers was considered 
crucial to supporting the development of the area. 
In the case of Yunnan, the unit of resettlement area is much smaller than 
that in Ningxia. The resettlement area of Ningxia is on the scale of a township. 
In Yunnan it is only part of an administrative village. The resettlement project is 
linked to support the development of the provincial trade port with Burma. The 
objective of poverty alleviation will first be over-shadowed and in the end 
quietly replaced by the objectives of economic growth. 
When a local government focuses more on regional development rather 
than poverty reduction, the policy framework and project implementation will 
automatically favour the better off and not the poor. Regional development 
may promulgate integrated development, but it is often economic growth-
centred integrated development: Poverty reduction is very much marginalized 
and often given no space. The policy guidelines of both Ningxia and Yunnan 
say nothing about regional development having precedence over poverty 
reduction. Yet examining implementation and policy guidelines leads to a 
different conclusion. 
Social Dynamics of the Resettlement Process - The same 
land means different things to different people 
Introduction 
Chapter four evaluated the outcomes of the resettlement process and showed 
that the economically better off make up the majority of the resettlers. The 
present chapter identifies the social factors that have contributed to this and 
examines how economic factors operate within existing social dynamics. My 
argument is that resettlement is the product of interaction among different 
stakeholders, and that such interaction involves cooperation, compromise, 
conflict, incompatibility and negotiation. I further argue that in the process it is 
the better-off farmers who are strategically placed to take economic advantage, 
manoeuvre within local power configurations, utilize their knowledge, mobilize 
their well-established social networks, and thus to benefit directly. In this 
situation, it is the poorer farmers - the supposed beneficiaries - who are 
generally left out. Economic factors, then, are important but they do not offer a 
complete and satisfactory explanation for these outcomes. Indeed, economic 
benefit is frequently the result of other social factors. 
It is important therefore to understand how such poverty reduction projects 
designed to help the economically disadvantaged finish up excluding them. 
Moreover, it is simply inadequate (if not perverse) to excuse the 'failure' of 
these poverty projects by referring to the economic incapability of the poor. The 
first part of this chapter then pays attention to the underlying social factors that 
enabled some farm households to move whilst others were inhibited from 
doing so. 
A second purpose of this chapter is to explore women's issues in 
resettlement. Chapter four illustrated the kinds of changes taking place in 
women's and men's involvement in agricultural work, and showed how their 
lives are affected in different ways after resettlement. However, in official 
resettlement policy gender is not a category of consideration. The household is 
simply assumed to be a unit comprising the common interests of all family 
members including both men and women, and therefore the working social 
unit for resettlement. In contrast to this viewpoint, the cases and analyses 
provided in this chapter show how women's concerns are neglected in the 
process of resettlement at household level and offer some explanation for this. 
Part I pursues a sociological explanation of why the better off move, and Part II 
deals specifically with women in resettlement. 
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Even though the foci of the two parts are different, the rationale for having 
them together comes down to three points. (1) Though often neglected, gender 
dynamics are an essential part of social dynamics. (2) Sociological argument 
must understand how and why the same land acquires different meanings for 
the poorer and the better-off, as well as for women and men. And (3) both parts 
have one issue in common when discussing issues relating to the poor and to 
women, namely the matter of the deprivation of rights. The poorer are deprived 
of their rights in resettlement areas because they have much less access to the 
resources of poverty reduction schemes than do the better off. Women are 
deprived of their rights in resettlement because both women and men are seen 
as part of a unified household, in which in fact only men are the decision-
makers. 
It is difficult to grasp the dynamics of social position and gender, and 
different researchers may look at different aspects of the same problem or 
project. Data for the previous chapter were gathered through questionnaire 
interviews in a structured way, which was designed to yield a systematic 
comparison among different reference groups. However, information for this 
chapter is not drawn from structured interviews, but from open-ended and 
semi-structured interviews. Tools used for such interviews were: individual 
personal interviews, key informant interviews, group discussions, story telling, 
and exercises involving the direct ranking of people and points of view, and so 
forth. It is important to stress that all the issues discussed in this chapter arose 
during the research process rather than being hypothesized beforehand. The 
methodological correctness for such an approach is based on the assumption 
that farmers know their situation best and that logical inference can be drawn 
from the case studies one collects. Clearly one may obtain very different stories 
or versions of such stories from the different people one interviews, and of 
course individuals differ in their life experiences. And it doesn't make sense to 
put the pile of stories into SPSS or Excel tables for analysis no matter how many 
stories we gather. The only option we have is to attempt to understand what the 
stories tell us, to listen to more stories, and to identify key issues in the process 
of listening and interpreting the stories. Of course it is researchers themselves 
who identify the stories and issues they find relevant and they base this on their 
own knowledge and experience. This accounts for the sometimes conflicting 
interpretations offered for what appear to be similar texts or phenomena. 
The discussion of these issues and the formulation of critical analytical 
concepts build on the cases of Ningxia and Yunnan, two rather different 
examples of resettlement. Here the question arises as to whether or not these 
case studies can be used for generalization? Case studies are used to provide 
insights into the ongoing social dynamics in order to answer the 'why' of the 
empirical research findings. Everyone in history has a different life span as 
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compared to others, but still everyone's life story reflects social history. Hence, 
we can I believe use personal stories or case studies to interpret trends in 
projects or societies. The case study method tries to tell us 'why', and the data 
analysis in the previous chapter tries to tell us 'what' happened. Nevertheless, I 
cannot say that the trends identified in my research represent (statistically) the 
general trends in all such kinds of project. But certainly I can demonstrate their 
significance for the cases in question and also characterize the types of 
mechanisms or dynamics associated with these processes and trends. Indeed, 
the fact that they exist and manifest a degree of coherence in my description 
suggests the need to explain them by reference to more general theoretical 
principles. As Mitchell (1983:207) puts it, 'The validity of the extrapolation (from 
case studies) depends not on the typicality or representativeness of the case but upon the 
cogency of the theoretical reasoning.' 
The issues and concepts identified and used for the interpretation of the 
social dynamics of the resettlement process are agency, kinship, social network, 
knowledge, power configurations, and rights versus capacity. For elaboration of 
each issue or concept, cases or stories will first be described in detail, followed 
by discussion. 
Part I: Sociological explanations as to why the better off moved 
It is easy enough to explain why the better off can move by simply using 
economic indicators: the better off are able to move because they have enough 
economic capacity to cover the cost of resettlement and to bear the possible risk. 
The need for sociological explanations as to why the better off move is because: 
(1) economic factors always work together with social factors; (2) it is not 
always the case that economic factors take precedence over social factors, in 
some cases, it turns out to be the other way round; (3) sociological explanations 
help to understand how the social dynamics work in a way that prevents 
poverty reduction projects from reaching their target. 
6.1 Farmers' Agency - A force to encounter 
The following story tells us the origin of the Minning resettlement project in 
Ningxia. It illustrates how farmers made the resettlement legal. We can see 
from the following case how a farmer leader, supported by the mass of farmers, 
in the name of poor farmers engaged government into approving a farmers' 
project. Several distinct sites of encounter between farmers and officials, 
between farmers and other stakeholders, and among farmers themselves are 
traced in the following case. 
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The Story of Ma Zhengxuan, a Village Party Secretary 
Mr. Ma is the party secretary of Xiapu Village (place of origin) of Xiji County of 
Ningxia. He was born in 1947. He has high school education. He became party 
secretary in 1980. On August 11, 2001,1 interviewed Secretary Ma at his home. 
He is the one who knows the history of the resettlement to Moon Village. He 
told me the story of how Moon Village became a legal resettlement area. 
Originally, the land of Moon Village belonged to Yu Quan Ying State-
owned Farm. The farm covers a broad range of land that is not manageable by 
its own staff, so that part of its land is left wild. The farm creates many seasonal 
job opportunities for farmers living in the area, especially farmers from the 
mountainous area. Farmers who come to work on the farm as wage laborers not 
only earn an income from working on the farm, but they also obtain know-how 
in irrigated farming and learn the general knowledge of life in the irrigation 
area. Besides all other messages, one clear message these workers got was that 
there was wasteland on the farm. Having learned the farming techniques and 
the benefit of living there, some farmers began to wonder whether they could 
themselves cultivate the wasteland. At the time, Yang Wanchang, who is 
originally from Gu Yuan County (Xiji and Gu Yuan are nearby counties), was 
working on the farm as a marketing official and recognized the intention of 
some of the farmers. So, he wrote up a contract, and then went to the farm 
manager. He proposed to the manager that the farm could easily benefit by 
simply contracting out the wasteland to farmers. In the contract, one party was 
the farm, the other was the Agricultural Committee of Gu Yuan County. A 
state-owned farm is not allowed to contract out its land to individual farmers, 
so individual farmers could not appear in the contract, even though the idea 
behind it was to contract land to individual farmers. Mr Yang succeeded in 
convincing the farm manager to agree to and sign the contract on December 30, 
1988. Then he went to the Agricultural Committee of Gu Yuan County to sell 
his idea. The Committee leaders refused to agree to the contract because they 
were not convinced of the political correctness of such a contract. Although he 
had obtained no official permission, and one party only signed the contract, Mr. 
Yang went back to the village he came from. He told farmers that they could get 
a piece of land in the irrigation area if they would pay a certain amount as 
contract fee, which was 42 yuan/mu (80 US$/ha). He told farmers that they 
could first pay half of the money as down payment. Forty households gave him 
money. Altogether he collected 50,000 yuan (about 6000 US$). When he brought 
back the money to the farm manager, the farm manager refused to take the 
money because there had been no official agreement from the Agricultural 
Committee, and he was afraid to take any political risk by contracting land to 
individual farmers. At the same time some of the farmers had found out the 
land under the contract was not irrigated land but wasteland. The initiative was 
about to fail. 
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Having heard the information, in March 1989, Village Secretary Ma went to 
find a copy of the contract and, although it had no official stamp from one of 
the parties and of course was not notarised, he still thought that the farmers 
might stand a chance of getting access to the farm land. 
Around October of 1989, Secretary Ma, together with six other farmers, 
went to collect soil samples from the farm. Then they went to the county town 
of Xiji, and first took the soil to the laboratory to have its quality examined. 
What they found out was that the soil was good for farming so long as there 
was water available. They then went to see the officials of the County Party 
Committee and the County Government. They expressed the farmers' 
willingness to contract the land from Yu Quan Ying State-owned Farm. He 
stressed that this was the only possibility to help the poor farmers in the 
mountainous area. County officials said that the idea was good one, and that 
was so far all they could say. So, although Mr Ma had received no official 
support, he was encouraged by the positive discussion. 
Having received a positive reaction from the Agricultural Construction 
Committee of Xiji County, although there was no written document, in March 
1990, secretary Ma and his people went to the supervisory body of the state-
owned farm, the Agriculture and Land Claim Bureau of Xiji County to express 
their wish. What they wanted was to contract the land based upon the contract 
formulated by Mr. Yang Wanchang. But they were denied. 
Secretary Ma did not give up. Between March and May 1st'he made many 
manoeuvres to seek opportunities. He fully understood that the contract was 
not effective because one party only had signed it. He understood that state 
policy restricts the free contracting of land to individuals. He was also aware 
that in reality they did not have a legal framework to substantiate their request. 
He knew that he could not reach his goal by taking the official route. So he 
simplified the whole story into a distorted short version to stimulate the 
farmers' anger. He reformulated the story in this way: "The farm manager did 
not honour the contract so that those poor farmers who had already paid their 
money could not get their land. Yang Wanchang had taken the money away so 
that the poor farmers had lost both their hard-earned money and their land." 
This story passed around very quickly, creating great anger among the farmers. 
While doing so, Secretary Ma started to prepare an action to draw the 
government's attention. He planned the action based on a Chinese saying: 
"When too many people commit illegal practices, the law cannot punish them". 
He created the belief that those who supported and joined the action would get 
land when the action succeeded. 
The major action took place from May Is' to May 10th. Under the 
organization of Secretary Ma, over 500 farmers from Xiji County, Gu Yuan 
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County and Hai Yuan County1 gathered around the office building of the Yu 
Quan Ying State-owned Farm. They sat there quietly. They brought food, pans 
and firewood with them. They said that they would not go unless they were 
properly answered. Secretary Ma formed a small team to manage the action to 
ensure that: (1) Farmers kept discipline, because they wanted to impress on the 
government that they were victims rather than insurrectionists; (2) there was 
enough food for every one; (3) Medical services were provided; (4) A secretary 
would take down the names of all the people who joined the action so that they 
would be sure of the possible benefits from the action. 
This farmer's action drew great attention from the government of Ningxia 
Autonomous Region and also from the central government. The government 
realized that they must solve it in a proper way and manner because the 
majority of the people who joined were of Hui nationality, otherwise, the 
problem might turn into a political issue. Observers were sent from the 
government to the site, they reported that the farmers were very disciplined; 
and that the farmers said nothing bad about the government, but only longed to 
have better land. 
On May 11th, 1990, the regional government sent 12 big buses to take the 
farmers back home and promised that a resolution would be made to meet their 
request. While the buses were taking the farmers home, a discussion was taking 
place in the regional government office. Three farmer representatives from the 
three counties were invited to the government office. Secretary Ma was one of 
the three. The farmer representative, Mr. Wang Hanqing from Gu Yuan County 
said in the meeting that "the government should not only give the land to the 
farmers, but should also give full management rights of the area to farmers, 
because the farmers will lose once government interfered." A furious row burst 
out between Mr. Wang and an official. Secretary Ma stood up, calmed down the 
official and pushed Mr. Wang out of the room in order to stop the fight. Then 
Secretary Ma was given the opportunity to talk. Secretary Wang said: "No 
effort could succeed without the support of the Communist Party and the 
Government. Land is important, but we can do nothing with the land without 
irrigation and a road. Irrigation and roads can only be built with government 
financial investment. The farmers gathered together because they were so poor 
and they needed help from the government. So we are here to ask for 
government support." Secretary Ma won big applause for his speech. 
A resolution was made on that day. Three areas were identified as 
resettlement areas, one for each county. Xiji County got the best area, which is 
where Moon Village is now located. The other two counties got two very poor 
areas with heavy saline soil, where now very few people have been resettled. 
1
 These are the three poorest counties in Ningxia Autonomous Region and in China as a whole. 
Many Muslim people live in this area. 
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All the farmers who had joined the action were given priority to move to the 
resettlement areas. Secretary Ma kept the record book very carefully. The record 
showed that all together there were 520 farmers who had joined the action. 
Among them, 410 were from Xiji County. And among the 410 (79% of the total) 
from Xiji, 140 (27%) were from Xiapu Township. 80 of them (15%) were farmers 
from Secretary Ma's village. 
Discussion 
Agency is a very useful concept in explaining the influencing powers of, in 
particular, those who are assumed powerless. It is not an easy concept to grasp. 
Ortner (1999: 147) in her article 'Thick Resistance: Death and the Cultural 
Construction of Agency in Himalayan Mountaineering' defines the concept of 
agency in the context of her research as "agency (which can be shorthanded as 
empowerment) is both a source and an effect of power ... it is both a source and an effect of 
'culture'." That it should be defined by two further difficult concepts, 
'empowerment' and 'culture' makes it even more difficult to grasp. However, 
the use of the concept of agency opens an arena for understanding the 
interaction of different actors in a given context, especially when conflicts of 
interest are involved. The purpose of my case study and analysis in this section 
is therefore not to enter further into the conceptualisation of agency, but to 
understand its practical functions and implications. My interest is to elaborate 
how agency functioned in a specific context of resettlement in order to draw 
people's attention to the complex reality of rural transformation. I choose to use 
Long's (2001:240) conceptualisation of agency as the basis for the discussion: 
'Agency refers to the knowledgeability, capability and social embeddedness associated with 
acts of doing (and reflecting) that impact upon or shape one's own and others' actions and 
interpretations. Agency is usually recognized ex post facto through its acknowledged or 
presumed effects. Persons or networks of persons have agency. In addition, they may attribute 
agency to various objects and ideas, which, in turn, can shape actors' perceptions of what is 
possible. Agency is composed, therefore, of a complex mix of social, cultural and material 
elements. Strategic agency signifies the enrolment of many actors in the 'project' of some 
other person or persons'. 
The core of the above case is about shaping other persons' actions in the 
interaction that takes place between the different actors. In the first place, 
Secretary Ma shaped the other farmers' views on the contract and land issue, 
and in so doing turned it further into an organized action. The farmers' 
organized action influenced and shaped the government's resolution. This is a 
very typical case of how farmers can shape government action. People, 
especially Chinese people, are accustomed to thinking that government is the 
most powerful body in shaping people's actions. However, in the above-
mentioned case, we may conclude that government had the authority, which 
may be turned into power to shape people's action, but that 'persons or networks of 
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persons have agency which may impact upon or shape one's own and others' actions and 
interpretations' (Long, 2001). Under the current Chinese system, the government 
is authorized to control almost all the country's natural and financial resources. 
This authority over resources makes the government a powerful body for 
shaping people's actions, as Secretary Ma declared in his speech: "irrigation and 
roads can only be built with government's financial investment. So we are here 
to ask support from government". However, although farmers have no 
authority, they do have agency and so can shape the government's decision-
making, such as making the former illegal contract into an official project. 
Shaping of others requires appropriate responsive strategies and action, 
which often involve 'speculation' about discourses. Ma Zhengxuan and his 
supporters did not accept that mountain farmers should have no access to 
irrigated land, and what they did was actually an extremely politically sensitive 
movement to request land rights. But Ma Zhengxuan did not put forward this 
discourse and agenda when he confronted government officials. He used 
politically acceptable discourse (official discourse) to legitimate their illegal 
action. He is a skilled and persuasive negotiator, and good at manipulating 
discourses and he makes use of the other party's discourse to his good 
advantage. Such a strategy is often used by the perceived powerless. They use 
the discourse of those in power to realize their own hidden agenda. 
The production of farmers' agency through social interaction 
It is at points of social interaction that actors define their individual and 
common or conflicting interests. Such sites involve physical encounters, 
conversations and exchange of ideas, and often focus on the performance of 
publicly recognised events. It is through an understanding of such interactional 
dynamics that one comes to identify and weigh up the importance of collective 
action as well as processes of opposition, incompatibility and negotiation. 
(1) The emergence of a common identity in the process of interaction among farmers. 
The term 'farmer' categorises people who are engaged in farming as their major 
employment, though this common label does not necessarily generate any 
common identity among farmers. In fact, farmers are such a heterogeneous 
group that it often does not make sense to label them in this way, although this 
does not deny the possibility of some such form of identification emerging 
under certain conditions. Identity is a difficult concept because it is hard to 
generalize or specify one's identity. However, a specific context can make 
identity emerge. For example, gender identity emerges in a mixed sex group, 
but not in a single sex group, where maybe race emerges as identity. In the 
above-mentioned case, Hui nationality and being the poor from a mountainous 
area emerged as crucial identities for getting mutual support. There are no 
statistics to show the distribution of Hui and Han people in lowland and 
mountainous areas, but Hui people tend to think "why shouldn't more Hui 
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people move to a better area". Secretary Ma told me that poor farmers from 
mountainous areas were discriminatingly named 'Mountain Men'. Mr. Ma said 
repeatedly to his supporters in the process of rallying them to the cause "We 
must prove that once we are given an opportunity we can create a good life as 
well, just like those 'water ducks' (name given to the people living in irrigated 
area) can." At that special moment, no matter whether they were poor or rich, 
no matter which village they came from, the mountainous 'poor' Muslim 
people were all brothers. In that event, they shared the risk and were hopeful to 
gain the benefit together. 
(2)The forming of common interests in the interaction process, which further activates 
agency. 
The ability to influence others or to pass on a command (e.g. to get them to 
accept a particular message) rests fundamentally on 'the actions of a chain of 
agents each of whom 'translates' it in accordance with his/her own projects' 
(Long, 2001, see also Latour 1994). People form collective modes of action on the 
basis of common interests and interlocking projects (Long and van der Ploeg, 
1994). The common interests and project that farmers had in the above-
mentioned case focused on obtaining a piece of better land in a lowland area. 
Such an interest became an incentive for farmers to develop collective agency. 
(3)The forming of farmers' collective action strategies at the interface with government 
officials. 
Common identity and common interests brought the farmers into alliance. The 
collective action of this alliance was the demonstration in front of the State 
farm. Farmers used this collective action as a strategic break-through in this 
case. Power does not always lie in the hands of those who have authority. As 
Long (2001:10) says: 'Someone having power or knowledge does not entail - like the zero-
sum model - that others are without.' An ancient Chinese saying, from Tactics ofSunzi 
says, 'By knowing yourself and knowing the other party, you will win every battle', which 
gives a winning strategy when two parties confront each other. If one wants to 
win a power game, then on the one hand one has to know what advantages one 
has and how to use them, and on the other hand, know what the other party 
wants and what are its weaknesses. Secretary Ma knew what the government 
wanted to hear and what the government feared. He knew that what 
government wanted to hear, especially in a time of social chaos, was that 
"Government has been doing a good job for poor farmers", which was what he 
said in the meeting with government officials and this made him win the best 
land for his people. He knew that what government feared was social 
instability, which was why he organized a disciplined farmers' gathering. 
Farmers' agency is something to be taken into consideration. Formulation 
of regulations or policies should fully consider farmers' acceptance and 
resistance because any regulations or policies that are not seen by the farmers as 
being in their interests will only stay on paper rather than being implemented 
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in reality. Consideration does not mean follow, but understanding and analysis. 
There are many examples of how policies cannot be well implemented because 
of people's resistance, even if those policies claim an ultimate goal of serving 
the good of the people. Take the example of the tree planting in Xiapu village. 
The 'Return land to forest and grass' policy is to protect the environment and 
local people's long term livelihoods, but it often faces great resistance from local 
people. In the case of Xiapu, the trees planted under WFP project support were 
all cut down after the completion of the project2. Punishment or guarding very 
often cannot prevent local people from cutting trees. For meeting their needs, 
farmers have many ways to manoeuvre against regulations. This is the agency 
that farmers have. For any successful project, farmers' agency must have been 
mobilized. 
The irrigated land in the resettlement area is very valuable, especially after 
several years of investment by both government and farmers. According to my 
field interviews, the land price has increased about 50 times already since 1990. 
This at least indicates two things: firstly, there is a high demand for 
resettlement in the resettlement area; secondly, land is being sold and 
purchased even though arable land in China is not a liberalized commodity. 
Governments at different levels have formulated policies to stop such land 
trading. In 1996, Xiji County government issued an official document (No. 15 
Document, Yuquanying Resettlement Development Area of Xiji County) to stop 
the trading of land. Two clear points were made in this official document: one is 
that farmers from outside Xiji County are not allowed to resettle in this 
resettlement area; the other is that land selling and land transfer are not 
allowed. It was also made very clear that land would be confiscated if 
purchased or not belonging to the officially recognized owners. However, what 
happened in reality was that those who purchased land and who were from 
outside Xiji County were still living in this resettlement area. I was told in the 
field survey that the Resettlement Office was unable to implement the policy 
because resistance was too great. It was estimated that more than 30% of the 
resettlers purchased their land. These people made the following efforts to 
prevent the implementation of the policy. (1) They continued the use of the 
name of the legal owner after land transfer so that it is difficult for officials to 
find out the fact of land trading. (2) They formed informal alliances among 
resettlers who bought land so that they would stand together if needed. (3) 
They made lots of contacts, especially with officials at different levels, to 
pressure the Xiji County government into not implementing the policy. 
Such ongoing land trading and continuous price increase of land has 
excluded poorer farmers from involvement in the resettlement. Economic 
advantage not only has an economic function, it can also generate other social 
!
 For detailed information, see chapter three. 
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functions. The reason why so many people can overcome the policy barrier of 
banning the purchase of land is not only because they have money to buy the 
land, but also because they use various channels to make the illegal purchase 
possible. These channels can be through relatives or friends. Some of these 
channels work well when they are reinforced by money. 
We cannot then use a simply right or wrong judgment to measure the 
outcome of human agency. The movement led by Ma Zhengxuan won the 
possibility for the farmers from Xiji County to move to the irrigated farming 
area. The ongoing and hidden land trading to a great extent has excluded poor 
farmers' access to the resettlement area. Both were the outcome of human 
agency, both were in the first place illegal actions but were accepted by the 
official framework. 
In both Ningxia and Yunnan, some poorer farmers also moved to the 
resettlement areas even though they only make up a small number of the total 
resettlers. So we cannot conclude that resettlement programs do not benefit the 
poor at all, but we can conclude that resettlement to prosperous areas benefits 
the better off more than the poor. This is an outcome of the operation of agency 
We cannot quantify agency itself due to its nature of 'embeddedness' and its 
composition of a 'mix of social, cultural and material elements'. The effects can 
only be found out ex post facto, and thus a functional analysis offered only by 
observing how agency manifests itself. Persons or network of persons, 
institutions or government agencies all have agency. We may compare ways to 
give outlet to agency, but we cannot quantitatively compare who has more 
agency. Farmers' agency can be restricted by government policy in one way, 
but it will find other ways of outlet whenever it is possible. Such outlet 
emergence can have various forms: forming of alliances, being resistant, 
shaping other's behavior, enrolling other people or government officials or 
agencies etc. Agency of the poorer is restricted in outlet due to social and 
economic disadvantage, especially in competitive conditions. When the better 
off and the poorer are in competition for the same resources, such as 
resettlement to a prosperous area, it is easier for the better off to win because 
they can mobilize more social and economic resources than the poor. Hence 
resettlement to a prosperous area cannot be used for poverty reduction. Such 
resettlement may be used for economic development plans. 
Interface analysis provides the possibility of identifying different sites of 
agency. Human agency cannot be identified unless interaction between 
different actors takes place; and the power of agency cannot be recognized 
unless counter power co-exists. The dramatic interface scene involving 
demonstration in front of the state farm illustrates key elements of an interface 
perspective3. As Long (2001:69-72) puts it: 'Interface., lis] a site for conflict, 
' It is important here to stress that, although social relations must feature in all interface 
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incompatibility and negotiation. Although interface interactions presuppose some degree of 
common interest, they also have a propensity to generate conflict due to contradictory interests 
and objectives or to unequal power relations.' We see the following key actors in this 
scene: farmer leader, farmers, farm manager, and government officials. The 
farmer leader put huge pressure on government by organizing the farmers' 
demonstration, but he did not make any critical statement to government 
during the whole process. That was to give he and farmers room to withdraw 
or to move forward for even more confrontation, depending on how the 
government responded. That was also to give government a space to act 
positively to the farmers' request without loss of face. In the process of the 
farmers' demonstration, the farmer leader kept testing the space for maneuver, 
and he closely observed government's response when planning his next coping 
strategy. At the same time, high-level government officials kept sending 
observers to define the nature of this farmers' demonstration. The interface 
between the different actors did not remain static but kept shifting and 
redefining itself. One could not say that the outcomes of the interactions taking 
place were predetermined. 
It is not only at dramatic events that one can identify interfaces. They also 
may emerge in ordinary day-to-day circumstances. The ongoing land trading in 
Minning Resettlement Area is an example of how government policy was not 
implemented and instead a black market arose involving in day-to-day 
encounters among different local actors. The key actors involved were: farmers 
who had officially recognized pieces of land in the resettlement area, farmers 
who had no land in the resettlement area and an interest in buying land, and 
government officials at various levels. When conducting field interviews, I 
came across a female farmer who, I understood, had a piece of land in Moon 
Village in the resettlement area of Ningxia. A village leader introduced me to 
her then he left as we agreed that he would do so in order for me to talk 
privately with her. I first asked how much land her family had, and from when 
did she start living here. She told me that she and her husband had 8 mu of 
farming land and that they had come here in 1998. Then I asked her where was 
her village of origin. She told me that she was from a village of Yanchi County. I 
was surprise and said: "Oh, so you are not from Xiji County. Do you know how 
many farmers who live here are not from Xiji County?" She was immediately 
alerted by my question. She stopped talking with me, looked at the floor. Then 
she said: "I am here living with my old uncle, helping him with his farming. I 
myself have no land here." I knew that she would no longer tell me the truth 
because she was not sure about what I was going to do with the information 
situations, when we talk about 'interface' we are underlining the fact that there exist 'critical 
point[s] of intersection between lifeworlds, social fields or levels of social organisation where 
social discontinuities, based upon discrepancies in values, interests, knowledge and power, are 
most likely to be located' (Long 2001: 243). 
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that she would give to me. When I came out from this woman's house, I saw a 
farmer standing on the road side smoking. I could see that he was interested in 
talking with me. So, I went over to him and started chatting. He invited me to 
go to his home yard, where he told me that he had bought two pieces of land in 
Moon Village. He said that he was not afraid to tell me this because more than 
thirty per cent of the residents in this village have purchased such land. He said 
that some effort was once made by the resettlement management office to stop 
the sales of land, but that this was only done due to the political and 
administrative pressure from above. He said: "I've heard that you are from 
Beijing, then you must have the opportunity to meet with provincial officials. I 
guess that they will not raise land issues because there are so many other 
problems to worry about. Will you make a report to the provincial officials? I 
hope that you will raise with them the issue of high electricity fees for 
irrigation." 
From this one can see the different reactions of the woman and the male 
farmer when they put their views to me. They are also likely to do the same in 
their contact with other people, such as fellow farmers, local officials, high-level 
officials, other outsiders, though on the other hand, the encounters they 
experience may over time lead to some change in their perceptions and 
responses. For example, farmers' attitudes to land prices, official regulations 
concerning land possession in the resettlement area, and to land sales are likely 
to change as the interactions between the different actors are reconfigured. 
6.2 The function of kinship - Shared risk gives a safer feeling 
The following cases are about pioneer resettlers. In the whole process of my 
research, I repeatedly asked myself the same questions: who has moved and 
who has not, why were some able to move and others not. When I interviewed 
Ma Shaolin, who was among one of the first to move to Moon Village, I realized 
the important function of kinship, especially in the case of social change. It is 
hard to judge how many resettlers gained kinship support and how much they 
gained, but the fact of what Ma Shaolin said that 80% of the pioneer resettlers 
were his relatives is convincing enough to show its function. It also implies that 
kinship works for both the poorer and the better off. Very often, the better off 
only form alliance with the poorer when they need non-economic support. 
The Story of Ma Shaolin 
Mr. Ma is now living in Moon Village in the resettlement area of Ningxia. He is 
32 years old and a high school graduate. He learned sewing in 1990 right after 
his graduation. He is married and has a 5 years old son and a daughter of 7 
years. Mr. Ma is the party secretary of the village. The family opened a 
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relatively big shop in the village selling all sorts of items for daily consumption 
items and for farming. It also provides services, such as making windows and 
doors. His wife manages the shop on a daily basis. Mr. Ma's father is the party 
secretary of Xiapu Village of Xiji County in Ningxia Hui Autonomous Region, 
which is the place of origin of many resettlers in Moon Village. 
He studied for middle and high school in the county town of Xiji County, 
which is 20 kilometers away from his village of origin. He had been longing to 
leave his poor village for a long time, so that he went to seek a new life in a 
place nearby his current residential place in November 1991. There is a railway 
nearby Moon village, people name the area east of the railway as Railway East 
Area, the area west of the railway as Railway West Area. Moon Village is 
located in Railway West Area. In 1991, Mr. Ma started living in Railway East 
Area, which was then deserted sandy land. I asked him why he chose to stay in 
the wild land without proper irrigation at that time. He answered that he could 
not think of staying all his life in the poor village where he was born, he wanted 
to create a new life in a new world. He believed at that time that the area where 
he is now living would have a bright future because the land was even and not 
far from the capital city of Ningxia. At that time, there were only about 60 
people living there, they were all new resettlers. Most of them were relatives. 
Mr. Ma said that 80% of them were his relatives. For example, three of them 
were cousins, 8 uncles, and the others more distant kin. At the beginning of the 
settlement, nearly all of them came without their families, so that the group 
consisted solely of males. At that time, they were not legal residents. 
I asked Mr. Ma how he felt when he had no legal residence. He said that he 
knew from his father that nothing is impossible in this world. His father had 
been the Village Party Secretary in his village of origin for about twenty years. 
He had to deal with government rural policies and farmers' responses on a day-
to-day basis. He learned that government policy would never work out 
according to policy statements but according to people's interpretations and 
manipulation. For instance, policies regarding forest protection and illegal land 
claims never worked out as formally intended in his village of origin. Those 
who cut trees were not really punished. Reporting to the higher level 
administration was always formulated according to the expectations from 
above rather than reflecting the facts. Hence, he concluded that there is no clear 
boundary in reality between legal and illegal status. However, to take 
advantage of the possibility living in the grey area of illegal status, one needs a 
coping strategy. After Mr. Ma generated his idea of moving to the Railway East 
Area, he started discussions with many of his relatives when occasions when 
they were having meals together or during causal visits. Some of these persons 
began to follow his idea simply because they believed that this was a choice 
made by the son of the Village Party Secretary and it must be a good one since 
he was a high school graduate. Mr. Ma said that he would not live in the new 
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settlement area alone no matter how firm his idea was. The risk in social, 
economic and political terms would be too high for him to move alone. That is 
why he migrated together with a group of male kinsmen. His coping strategy 
followed the Chinese saying: "Law does not punish the numerous [offenders]. In the 
meantime, the possibility of the relatives supporting each other would be much 
higher than in the case of non-relatives. 
In June 1994, Xiji County government legalized the area as a legal 
resettlement area. Thus the 60 people became legal residents. Mr. Ma 
remembered that 370 households were given permission to resettle. However, 
many of those from the 370 households decided not to stay after their first visit 
to the resettlement area in August, because what they saw was deserted land, 
with insufficient irrigation water and high temperatures. Mr. Ma guessed that 
about 100 households decided not to resettle. Those 100 households sold their 
right to resettle to other people. 
Ma Shaolin received help from his father both in the spiritual and financial 
sense. For example, when he moved from Xiapu village to Moon Village, his 
father paid 1000 yuan (about 125 US$) for transportation for him and also gave 
him 2000 yuan (about 250 US$) for production inputs. 
The Story ofXi Qi 
Xi Qi is 30 years old. He has one boy and one girl. He told me: 
"When I was in my place of origin, we lived in a big family with 24 
members, but we only had 37 mu (about 2.5 ha) of dry land in total. I could not 
feed my own children. I simply had no way out. When I knew that I could 
move to the resettlement area, my reaction was that I would move as long as 
grass could survive on that land. I knew that I myself had no money to pay for 
the land and no materials to build a house to stay. I borrowed money from all 
possible sources that I could have access to. I asked my father to allow me to cut 
two poplar trees to build a house in the resettlement area, but he only gave me 
some waste materials from our old house instead. I came to the resettlement 
area in 1991 together with Ma Shaolin. I came because I had nothing to lose 
compared with Ma Shaolin. Why should I have any fear when he had none, 
considering his education and family background. I thought at that time that I 
would stay here as long as a tree can grow one or two leaves on this land. I had 
a safer feeling because many relatives came together. We did not necessarily 
financially support each other, but it kinship implied as kinsmen we would 
help situations of destitution. I managed to stay. In 1994,1 was given the official 
allocation of 8 mu (about 0.5 ha) of land and I also bought an additional 8 mu 
for 1,600 yuan (about 200 US$) from someone who did not want to come. The 
one I bought land from only came to the resettlement area once and then gave 
up because he was not confident about the future life here. All of us who came 
early bought more land later. We knew the government ban on land sales. But I 
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didn't have more to lose than others who bought more than one plot. I spent 
2,600 yuan (about 325 US$) to level the two pieces of land. I now feel very glad 
that I moved here. I now live a much better life than those who are living in my 
village of origin. I would have had more than 2 children if I hadn't moved. In 
my home village, farmers raise 5 to 6 children on potatoes. Now, I choose to 
have less children but feed them on rice, wheat, meat and even fish." 
Discussion 
The study of kinship 'has existed ever since the mid-to-late 1800s, when LH Morgan and his 
interlocutors invented the study of kinship...' (Peletz, 1995:344), and 'for an anthropologist, 
kinship is the hard core' (Leach, 1967: 10). 'Contemporary kinship studies tend to be 
historically grounded; tend to focus on every day experiences, understandings, and 
representations of gender, power, and difference; and tend to devote considerable analytic 
attention to themes of contradiction, paradox, and ambivalence.' (Peletz, 1995 343) Despite 
all the different and changing aspects involved, I understand that two main 
threads have always been interwoven in the study of kinship: one is the 
symbolic meaning of kinship, the other is the structure and function of kinship. 
Thus, for example, Anderson et al (2001: 5), paraphrasing Jan den Ouden's 
work on kinship, point out that 'Kinship does not imply a set of rules, roles and relations 
that force people into immutable forms of behaviour. Rather, these 'structures' are interpreted, 
manipulated, and meaningfully and strategically deployed by specific social actors ... kinship is 
a set of structural properties or organizing principles and, thus, a resource in social action'. But 
any structural interpretation faces the risk of reducing the reality, because 'after 
all, kinship is a matter of flesh and blood, the result of sexual passion and maternal affection, of 
...a host of personal intimate interests' (Malinowski, 1930:19). In my thesis, despite 
the appreciation of the complex reality involved in kinship relations, I pay more 
attention to the practical functions of kinship relations. That is, I wish to draw 
attention to the complex reality of rural social change by bringing the issue of 
kinship relations into what is usually perceived of as an oversimplified planned 
intervention process. 
Very often, when we discussed with local officials why people decided to 
resettle, they tended to say, "because there is better land, better irrigation and 
more opportunities". However, from the above case, we can see clearly that 
land and water were not the only decisive factors shaping people's decision-
making, since, in the face of the same land and water availability, some people 
chose to stay and others not. The above case shows that kinship relationships 
were a very important influencing factor for the pioneer resettlers who first 
lived in the resettlement area. Kinship relationships in themselves may not be 
very active or functional. Their dynamic lies in the interactions that take place 
among relatives, and which bring certain tangible rewards. Like interfaces, a 
network of kinship ties 'becomes an organised entity of interlocking relationships and 
intentionalities. Continued interaction encourages the development of boundaries and shared 
expectations that shape the interaction' (Long, 2001:69-72) and the commitments of the 
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parties involved. These ties are reinforced when the network or group of kin is 
pitched against outsiders or competing kin groups. 
The reason why kinship can be a resource for social action is that kin 
relationships have the following practical functions: 
(1) A kin relationship is a good basis for developing mutual trust. Trust is 
important for getting access to resources. People will only lend money to those 
they can trust so that we very often find, especially in poorer communities, that 
farmers borrow money from relatives. People prefer to exchange labour and 
share costs with kinsmen/women because they believe that they will not be 
cheated, and they know where and how to get their money back if they are. 
(2) A kin relationship may offer the parties to the exchange free help when one 
or other needs it. This does not happen so easily among acquaintances. 
(3) A kin relationship may provide the parties with mutual financial support, 
though such help may only be secure among close relatives. 
(4) A kin relationship frequently guarantees the parties mutual support for 
publicly expressed opinions without ever questioning their legal correctness. 
This is widely reported to have been the case in so-called 'traditional' Chinese 
society and continues today. 
The key point here is that kinship is essentially a resource for action rather 
than a certainty for action. All the above practical functions of kinship are more 
likely to take place among kin than non-kin, though we must also note cases 
where 'fictive' kinship (i.e. close friendships, or forms of child or adult 
adoption, that are cast in the same social and moral mould) perform the same 
role. On the other hand, there will be many cases where no significant exchange 
takes place between the members of a kin group, but do within social networks 
based on other criteria. 
As the case describes, in 1991 a group of people resettled. At that time, they 
had no legal status and they had no access to sufficient production 
infrastructure, which means that they lived in a situation of high risk both in 
terms of agricultural production and in the political sense. What do people need 
in a risky situation? Support, and from whom do we tend to look for this? From 
people we trust and who trust us. Yet who trusts us, and whom do we trust? 
Those we know better; namely family members This, then, is how I interpret 
why, in the above case, 80% of the first group of settlers were kinsmen of Mr. 
Ma. He felt a lot safer, he said, to have his relatives around even though so 
many things were unpredictable. More importantly, Mr. Ma developed 
interlocking relationships among pioneer resettlers in the course of day-to-day 
life. Many of these he had contact with in his village of origin. Hence the 
sharing of risk even among relatives cannot be taken for granted. 
The above cases give an explanation of why some of the poorer farmers 
could also manage to move. When people are desperate for something, they can 
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mobilize all their energy and resources to reach their goal, just as did Xi Qi. 
However, it is easier for people to do things when they have enough resources 
and confidence, especially economic backup, rather than when they possess 
only courage and no fear of losing due to their having nothing. 
The wording of government policies has to be standard, firm and formal. 
The ideology behind such official language is that policy is about enforcement. 
The expectation from policy implementation is a linear outcome. Kinship, a 
concept used in everyday life and in sociological studies, is not compatible with 
such policy language. It reflects the gap between ideologies of government 
policies and day-to-day social dynamics. When policy for resettlement was 
formulated, no official would think that kinship would play a very important 
role in the initial stage of resettlement. The implication of our research finding 
is that the actual process of resettlement is an outcome of social dynamics and 
does not necessarily run in accordance with the criteria of policy frameworks. 
The resources and instruments that the government has are different from those 
of the farmer. Government has control over land, infrastructure, credit and 
other scarce resources, while farmers have agency, kinship and social networks. 
The government's image of projects is how government enrolls farmers because 
of its control over of scarce resources. However, farmers respond to 
government projects based on the social system they are embedded in and the 
personal knowledge they have acquired, rather than on the policy framework. 
Farmers can resist, distort or make use of policies or projects. So, there are gaps 
between officials' and farmers' views about the project, and between the 
government approach and farmers' day-to-day livelihood dynamics. The bigger 
these gaps are the bigger the gap between government-claimed objectives and 
the outcome of the project implementation will be. 
6.3 Social networks -work differently for different people 
The following two cases show how a better-off family could obtain support 
from its social network to be able to move to the resettlement area whereas a 
poorer family could not. The previous section discussed the concept of kinship. 
There is overlap between the concepts of kinship and social network, though 
networks include relations beyond kinship. That is, kinship relations can only 
become part of a social network. The motivation for setting up such networks is 
more for achieving certain social, political and economic returns, whereas the 
dynamics in kinship relations is more for the sharing of resources and risks. 
Hence, despite the overlap of the two concepts, the boundaries and the effects 
of the two concepts are different. 
For a proper understanding of the following cases, some important 
background information is necessary. Local officials told us that Mangkaba 
Social Dynamics of the Resettlement Process 185 
Resettlement Area in Yunnan had been identified as a demonstration 
resettlement project for poverty reduction, so that everything must be 
implemented well for providing demonstration effects. In China, once a 
demonstration site is established, the site will expect a lot of visitors, including 
officials at different levels. Hence local officials would always try their best to 
set up an impressive demonstration site. A question to ask is what are the 
indicators for an impressive demonstration. I had a discussion with the local 
officials about this. Local officials said: "First, the resettlement village should 
have a very good appearance, such as: good housing, clean public toilet, good 
water supply etc. Second, farmers should earn higher income after moving 
here." I asked what they meant by good housing and was told that new houses 
should have a stone foundation and the first 80cm should be of brick 
construction. No straw and wood structured houses would be allowed. Now I 
understand why many farmers who did not move told me that they could not 
move because they could not afford to build a standard house. 
The Story of Peng Zhongmin 
Mr. Peng is now living in Mangkaba Resettlement Site of Mang Ka Village of 
Chang Yuan County in Yunnan. He originally lived in Xia Wan Tang sub-
village of Mang Ka Village, and he was the sub-village head. Mr. Peng is 40 
years old. His wife is 35 years old and they have three children, two daughters 
of 17, and 9 years old. The son is 12 years old. He told me how he moved to 
Mangkaba B Resettlement Site: 
"I got to know about the resettlement program from government 
mobilization meetings. Officials first came to inform us about the resettlement 
program in April 1999. They came to our village every couple of days, all 
together they came five or more times. Very often they knocked on farmers' 
doors when they called for meetings. I went to one of the meetings. In the 
official meeting, hardly any farmers presented any of their own opinions. I did 
not say anything either in the official meeting. I have to think hard before 
making any decision. My decision was made in the exchanges I had with my 
other family members, relatives, neighbours and close friends. I discussed the 
matter with my wife. I told her that the government was concerned about us 
and was offering us a very good policy. We could now move to Mangkaba, 
which was near to the market. We could grow vegetables, and we could do 
small business. Besides this, the government would provide us with 80 pieces of 
asbestos tiles and 1,500 yuan (about 183 US$) as subsidy. We were also to be 
given a quota to cut down some trees for building our new house. I think that 
moving to Mangkaba is especially good for our children's future. After saying 
this, my wife agreed with my opinion, and my children were excited about 
moving to Mangkaba. My eldest daughter said, "It is a great opportunity to 
move to Mangkaba, because we can do business there and it is very good for us, 
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the next generation." I then went to see my relatives and friends to get their 
opinions. They all supported the idea to move. One of my uncles said: "There is 
a saying: 'Trees die by moving, people thrive by moving'." I went then to meet 
my friends who were doing business in Mangkaba. They all gave me positive 
perspectives. I was especially impressed by a comment from one of my friends: 
"Life without alternatives will shrink. You have few development alternatives 
in your village of origin, but you have many opportunities here in Mangkaba." I 
felt very much encouraged. Then I participated in tree cutting organised by the 
township government. I cut 90 trees for building my new house. Later, 
government finished its residential plan for the Mangkaba resettlement site. 
Together with some neighbours, I went to the site to select where to build my 
own house based on the government's ground plan. At that time, not so many 
people had made their final decision to move so I had plenty of choice as to 
where to build my house. It was good that I came with a few neighbours, 
otherwise I might have hesitated in making a final decision because we were 
among the very first to make such a decision to move. After having selected 
where to build, I started to look for people who could help me to build my 
house. I borrowed more than 2,000 yuan from my brothers and uncles, and 
more than 4,000 yuan from a friend who lives in the resettlement area." 
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The following table summarizes steps of house building as described by Mr. 
Peng. 
Table 6-1: Expenditure spent and help gained in building a house in 
Mangkaba Resettlement Area in Yunnan - The case of Feng Zhongmin 
Step 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
Total 
Activities 
Dig 
foundation of 
the house 
Purchase of 
stones 
Purchase of 
sand 
Purchase of 
lime 
Build the 
house 
Purchase of 
bricks 
Purchase door 
and window 
frames 
Purchase 
concrete 
Purchase mud 
and sand 
from riverbed 
Transportatio 
n of wood 
Purchase of 
tiles 
Render walls, 
fix frames, etc 
Build kitchen 
Move 
Time 
spent 
(no data) 
5 days 
2 days 
2 days 
25 days 
2 days 
1 day 
Half day 
2 days 
6 days 
Half day 
11 days 
15 days 
3 days 
75 days 
Who 
participated 
Peng and 
his two 
brothers 
Peng 
Peng 
Peng 
Peng and 6 
relatives 
Peng 
Peng 
Peng 
Peng 
Peng 
Peng 
Peng and 
his two 
brothers 
Peng and 
his two 
brothers 
Neighbours 
and 
relatives 
Expenditure on 
renting cars or 
trucks 
0 
325 
160 
20 (using a 
friend's truck) 
215 
10 
20 
100 
360 
20 
0 
0 
240 
1470 
Other 
expenditures 
0 
250 
100 
170 
2970 
2100 
1800 
900 
300 
0 
1800 
0 
0 
1000 (for eating) 
11390 
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Then Mr. Peng continued his story: 
"During the days we built the house, I stayed nearly all the time at the in 
Mangkaba site, and my wife and children were responsible for farming at 
home. On the first day we started to move, I hired two tractors from my home 
village, and 16 people from the village (two of them my brothers, ten of them 
my cousins and uncles, four of them neighbors) helped me to load stuff onto the 
tractors. They also each gave us a cash gift of 60 yuan (7.3US$). We served those 
who helped us nice meals. I walked back to my own village the next day. We 
continued to pack up. We finally moved everything down two days later. Five 
people from my own village, my two brothers, two cousins, and an uncle came 
to help. Now, I am here with a great hope, but also with a debt of more than 
6,000 yuan (about 750 US$)." 
The Story ofBai Laoda 
Bai Laoda lived in Xia Wan Tang sub-village (place of origin) of Mang Ka 
Village of Yunnan. Many people from that village moved to the Mangkaba 
resettlement site. Bai's family stayed behind. Bai Laoda is the eldest son of the 
family. He had just graduated from a local technical school and is now looking 
for a job. His father is 48 years old and his mother is 50 years old. His first 
younger brother is 15 years old, and still studying in high school. His second 
younger brother is 13 years old and studying in primary school. His elder sister 
is 24 years old. She is illiterate and moved to her husband's place after 
marriage. His younger, unmarried, sister is 18 years old with primary school 
education. 
I asked him whether he knew about the resettlement program and what he 
thought about it. He answered, "I knew about the resettlement program. It is, of 
course, good to move to the resettlement site, but we are simply not able to 
move because we have no money to build a house in the resettlement site. My 
family has already borrowed more than 7000 yuan (about 850 US$) from 
relatives and friends to support my education and my brother's." 
I asked him: "I heard that many other people borrowed money to build 
their houses, why don't you also do that. Do you have relatives and friends 
from whom you can borrow money?" He answered: "Every family here has 
many relatives around. The problem is that my family has borrowed money 
from all possible sources, from nearly all our close relatives and some distant 
relatives, and we have not repaid the money. Now, when they know that we 
have no capacity to repay the money, they will not lend us money again." 
Discussion 
According to Mitchell, Barnes first introduced the notion of social network in 
1954. The idea arose because researchers found that 'they could not present their 
findings adequately within the framework of a typical compact institutional analysis 
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characteristic of the structural approach' (Mitchell, 1974:281). Powell and Smith-Doerr 
(1994:368), in their article 'Networks and Economic Life', point out both the 
significance of the application of the concept and the challenge to be met in 
fully developing it. 'In contrast to deterministic cultural (oversocialized) accounts, 
networks afforded room for human agency, and in contrast to individualist, atomized 
(undersocialized) approaches, networks emphasized structure and constraint. Indeed, networks 
offered a middle ground, a third way, even if no one was quite sure whether networks were a 
metaphor, a method, or a theory' (Barnes, 1972). Researchers choose to explain 
different aspects of these relationships according to the purpose they have in 
mind, such as communication, flow of gossip, exchange etc. For field research 
methods, Mitchell (1974:295) concluded that 'at present it seems that no alternative to 
data collecting based upon participant observation has been devised that is suitable for testing 
propositions derived from network notions'. Long (2001:242), from a more rigorous 
actor-oriented perspective, provides a condensed concept of network: 
'Networks are made up of sets of direct and indirect relationships and exchanges 
(interpersonal, inter-organizational and socio-technical). They usually transcend 
institutional domains and link together a variety of arenas. Networks are characterized by 
flows, content, span, density and multiplicity.' 
In current academic and policy discussions, the importance of the human and 
social components of development, seen as complementary to economic and 
technical factors, has gained increasing attention. The return to the study of 
social networks and social capital are examples of such appreciation. Pretty 
(2001:211) identifies the benefits of social capital in the following way: 
'As it lowers the costs of working together, social capital facilitates co-operation. People have 
the confidence to invest in collective activities, knowing that others will also do so. They are 
also less likely to engage in unfettered private actions that result in negative impacts, such as 
resource degradation. Although there are already many different descriptions of social capital, 
we identify four central aspects: relations of trust; reciprocity and exchanges; common rules, 
norms and sanctions; connectedness, networks and groups.' 
In the present research I have chosen to work with the notion of 'social 
network' rather than the more general term 'social capital'. My reason for doing 
so is that I wished to focus on the mobilisation of social ties and their associated 
normative components, and not so much on overarching cultural and 
institutional frameworks. The central point here is that 'bonds of trust and 
support do not reside in the realm of abstract moralities or cultural dispositions 
[or formal rules and regulations] but rather in the strategic management of 
ongoing relationships, exchange contents and social meanings that are 
constructed around them' (Long, 2001:155). My primary interest then is in the 
individual's or group's ability to mobilise a variety of resources through the use 
of networks and to do this, as Portes (1995:200) puts it, 'on demand'. 
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But having made this point, I would like to add that the 'rediscovery' of the 
importance of social capital has undoubtedly helped to encourage economists 
to take more serious account of these social and human phenomena. It may also 
have increased the confidence of social workers and development practitioners 
to provide a practical orientation to planned social organisation. It is my choice, 
though, to use the concept of social network to address the day-to-day 
processes and practices of social organisation. 
In the context of my research, the functions of networks can be identified as 
follows: 
(1) Information benefits. Information flow brings out an element of the interface 
perspective. The interface between information providers and receivers is 
not only a site of information passage, but also that of informal 
organization, development initiatives and interlocking relationships. Many 
networks have an informal structure. Actually, it is hard to define types of 
network structure and functions due to their dynamic nature. But clearly 
information flow is one such important function. In the questionnaire 
survey of my research, the interviewees were asked where they gained the 
information about resettlement. I received 27 responses from the Yunnan 
research. There were two channels of information transmission, one is 
through government officials or village meetings, and the other is through 
friends, neighbours and relatives. Twenty-two per cent of the respondents 
said that they acquired the information from official channels, and 88% 
from informal channels. The information flow through networks meets the 
information gap between formal structures and the individual farmers. 
(2) Construction of knowledge. Burt (1992:13) refers to network contacts as 'a 
matter of trust, of confidence in the information passed and the care with which contacts 
look out for your interest.' Hence, the benefit from network contact not only lies 
in access to information, but also to trust in the information passed. 
Trustworthy information is essential for decision-making. In the case of 
Peng Zhongmin, he acquired information on resettlement from official 
channels, but, as he emphasises, his discussions with his relatives and 
friends were the key to his decision to move. Persons in networks thus 
process information through their network contacts and this leads to the 
construction of knowledge. In this sense, knowledge arises from a complex 
set of interactions and encounters with different horizons. 
(3) Resource benefits. The existence of an effective and diverse set of social ties 
gives the possibility of mobilising material and financial support for the 
solution of pressing problems. But the extent to which social networks can 
generate such resources will differ between the poorer and better off. 
Nevertheless, we must recognise that, whatever the nature or volume of 
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material and financial flows, such flows tighten network relations and 
generally encourage other network functions. 
In the case of Peng Zhongmin, he spent in total 12,860 yuan (1,608 US$) for 
moving and building his house. The following table shows the economic status 
of different groups of population in the place of origin and in the resettlement 
site. We can see that resettlers had to borrow more money than they had 
previously had to borrow after they moved to the resettlement site. Most people 
had just finished constructing their houses and settled in the resettlement area 
when we conducted the interview. Nearly all interviewees told us that they had 
borrowed money to construct their house and for transportation Let us assume 
that farmers repay their loan or debt by using their cash accumulation. I here 
define cash accumulation as cash income minus cash expenditure. On average, 
cash accumulation of the population that remained in the place of origin was 
154 yuan annually (about 19 US$) (cash income minus cash expenditure), while 
that of the resettlers while living in the place of origin was 625.8 yuan (about 78 
US$). If we assume that the 6,287 yuan (786 US$) that resettlers borrowed on 
average was all used for house construction and for moving, then it would take 
them about 10 years to repay the loan/debt assuming that they stay at the same 
economic level as before. If the ones who remained had moved then it would 
have taken them more than 40 years to repay the loan/debt assuming that they 
stayed at the same economic level. No one will borrow an amount of money 
that may take 40 years to repay. Maybe, one can earn more income after 
resettlement, but it is hard for people to make decisions based only on 
possibility. 
Table 6-2/Table 4-19: Household Annual Cash Income, Expenditure and Debt 
in Yunnan 
Loan/Debt Cash income Cash expenditure 
Population remaining in the place of 905 
origin 
Resettlers in the place of origin 3514 
Resettlers in resettlement place 6287 
Residents in resettlement place 3576 
1290 
2772.8 
2790 
3845 
1136 
2147 
7666.1 
1761 
Economic reasons are key factors in decision making for resettlement. However, 
although resettlers in general are better off than those remaining behind, they 
are not rich enough to cover all the resettlement related costs so that they have 
to borrow a great deal of money too. For example, Mr. Peng borrowed more 
than 6,000 yuan (about 750 US$). When Mr. Bai said that his family had no 
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money to move, he basically meant that he was no longer able to borrow 
enough money because his family had already borrowed about 7,000 yuan 
(about 875 US$) for his education. 
Network building for the better off 
Mr. Peng has been always been supported by his social network in the process 
of resettlement. In the beginning he received psychological support from his 
relatives and friends by encouraging him to move. Then, he borrowed money 
from his friend, brothers and uncles for the construction of his house after his 
decision to move. And then, he had his brothers, relatives and neighbours to 
help with house construction and with moving. At the same time, he also 
received small cash gifts from them. One night during our stay, Mr. Peng 
organized a family banquet for the so-called 'happy movement'. Everyone who 
had ever offered help in the process of the movement was specially invited and 
all others in the village were also welcome. All the research team members were 
also invited. The network can be certainly strengthened and enlarged through 
such an event. 
Network 'depletion' for the poorer 
Mr. Bai's family borrowed money from relatives and friends in order to support 
his education. He has now finished his study, but his family has not repaid the 
debt. Now, they are unable to get further support from the friends and relatives 
who once helped them. As Mr. Bai said: "When they know that we so far have 
no capacity to repay the money, they will not lend us money again." Mr. Bai's 
family is no longer able to get support from the same network. It seems that the 
network, or the social capital it embodied, has for the time being been 
exhausted. 
Resettlement projects that expect farmers to make an economic input beyond 
the poor person's social and economic capacity will only in the end help the 
better off. This is because the better off not only have a better economic 
foundation than the poor but they also have a more effective social network to 
support them. 
6.4 Knowledge - Arising from 'an encounter of horizons' 
The following two cases tell us how people with different knowledge about the 
same thing make different decisions. Most people in poor mountain villages in 
Xiapu County of Ningxia have heard about the resettlement. However, their 
level of knowledge about the resettlement area differs a lot. People can gain 
knowledge from different channels, such as books, mass media, interpersonal 
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contact, personal experiences and so on. The effectiveness of knowledge from 
different channels on decision-making is different. Unlike researchers and 
scientists, who often refer to secondary data, direct personal experiences are 
always the most effective knowledge pool for farmers in their decision making. 
Better-off farmers and poorer farmers from places of origin very often have 
different levels of knowledge about the resettlement areas. Better-off farmers 
have more resources to enable more mobility to gain personal knowledge about 
the resettlement area. For instance, better-off farmers could afford to pay for the 
costs of acquiring personal knowledge by, in the case of Ningxia, paying a visit 
or even testing the life there for a short period. 
The Story of Ma ]iye 
Ma Jiye is now living in Moon Village in the Ningxia resettlement area, He is 30 
years old. He has two boys of 8 an 6 years old. Mr. Ma said: 
"I started doing off-farm labour before 1990. I worked in places nearby 
Yinchuan (the capital city of Ningxia), and found that people living in the plain 
area had a much better life than those living in the mountains. I noticed that 
farmers with irrigated land would never face the problem of starvation, but 
farmers with rain-fed land had always to work for food. I dreamed to have a 
piece of land in the plains. I joined the farmers' gathering of May 1st to May 10th, 
1990, through which I gained the right to be allocated a piece of land in Moon 
Village. Each household could only get 8 mu (0.53 ha) of land. In 1994, land was 
allocated by lottery to avoid dispute. That was how I got my land finally. When 
many farmers sold their right of resettlement to other people, I was not 
influenced. 
In the summer of 1994, I came to build a simple house because we were 
told that those who had not built a reasonable house in the resettlement area 
would not be allowed to resettle. Some other people also came to do the same. 
Land allocation of for each household was decided by lottery, so that people 
from different villages were all mixed. We did not know each other in the first 
place. I needed help to build a house, so did the others. It took me about half a 
month to build a simple house. During that period, we all lived together and ate 
together so that we became familiar with each other very soon. Not knowing 
each other beforehand did not prohibit mutual help. It became really hot then. 
Having no irrigation system at that time, we were not able to grow crops. To 
build a house there was just a way of claiming a piece of land there and, of 
course, to provide a place to stay for the next visit. I would not have done it 
without government pressure. I did not come for the next two years. I went to 
Xinjiang, Lanzhou and other places for wage labour. 
In April 1995,1 came to Moon Village again. Just to try my luck, I planted 
mizi [bulrush millet]. I spent all together 112 yuan (14 US$) for seed and hiring 
draught animal power. I stayed for about two months in Moon Village. I went 
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back home for a month. After harvesting the crops at home, I came back to 
harvest the crops that I had planted in Moon Village. I harvested 4 bags of mizi. 
I went back home with the harvest. I did not come again for another two years 
because I the harvest was not much without irrigation. 
In March 1997,1 came to Moon Village again and found out that we could 
then grow crops because the irrigation system had started to run. I decided to 
build a real house. It took us about a month to build the house. During that 
period, I was responsible for overseeing the construction and my wife was 
responsible for growing crops in the home village. I did not stay the whole time 
in Moon village during that one month because I had to help with farming and 
harvesting at home, so that I had to travel all the time, which cost me over 500 
yuan (62 US$). We spent more than 7,000 yuan (850 US$) building the house. 
We borrowed 4,000 yuan (488 US$). In September, we moved. We spent about 
400 yuan (49 US$) hiring a truck. Finally, we had resettled." 
The Story of Ma Wenli 
Mr. Ma Wenli lives in Shangma Village of Xiapu Township. Unlike Xiapu 
Village of Xiapu Township from which many households moved, only one 
household, whose head was the deputy secretary of Xiapu Township 
government, moved to the resettlement area from Shangma Village. Although 
both Shangma and Xiapu Villages are in Xiapu Township, Shangma Village is 
much more remote in terms of transportation. Ma Wenli said: "I am 55 years 
old. My wife died several years ago and I am living with my son, my daughter-
in-law and three grandsons. We have in total 27 mu of dryland. My son goes for 
off-farm activities from Spring to Autumn every year, from which he makes a 
cash income of about 1000 yuan every year. The officials from County and 
Township government once came to inform us villagers that we could apply to 
move to Yuquanying resettlement area (Minning Resettlement Area) in 1992. 
Each household had to pay 300 yuan resettlement fee. I did not apply because I 
had no money to pay the resettlement fee. I have never been to the resettlement 
area. Some people said that one could make a better living there and could 
produce enough food to eat. Others said that only those who were rich could 
afford the irrigation charges and could therefore make a better life. Those who 
were poor and could not afford the irrigation charges had an even had a worse 
life than had had before in their home of origin. I would like to move there if I 
now had another chance." 
Discussion 
Fredrik Barth (2002: 1) defines knowledge as 'What a person employs to interpret and 
act on the world ... [it] includes feelings (attitudes) as well as information, embodied skills as 
well as verbal taxonomies and concepts: all the ways of understanding that we use to make up 
our experienced, grasped reality.' Barth's definition of knowledge emphasizes both 
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the possession and the substance of knowledge. For further understanding of 
how knowledge contributes to day to day life and decision-making processes, 
we have to look into the dynamics of knowledge. Norman Long uses concepts 
of knowledge processes and knowledge construction to elaborate the dynamic 
nature of knowledge. The concept of knowledge processes implies that 
knowledge is not static but is always constructive and destructive. Long (2001: 
242) states that, 
'Knowledge construction is, at one and the same time, 'constructive' in the sense that it is 
the outcome of many decisions and selective incorporations of previous ideas, beliefs and 
values, and 'destructive' in the sense of transforming, disassembling or ignoring other 
existing frames of conceptualization and understanding, and 'localized' in specific 
institutional domains and arenas whether of global or local scope'. 
People employ knowledge. The possession of knowledge empowers people. 
Decisions and actions are outcome of knowledge processes. The actors involved 
may interpret the same projects differently in knowledge process. 
The knowledge that different actors possess cannot be attributed with equal 
weight. That is, knowledge is not neutral, rather it intimately and unavoidably 
involves political issues (Sillitoe, 1998:231). One obvious example is that 
farmers' knowledge is unlikely to have been taken account of in the 
government officials' knowledge system. In the resettlement process, farmers 
are seen as passive recipient of whatever is offered by the government. 
Government officials have not developed awareness of the need to appreciate 
farmers' knowledge. This is a result of the long dominating development belief 
system of economic growth and modernization. The misfit between such a 
development belief system and local social dynamics often leads to failures of 
planned intervention. The widespread adoption of bottom-up participation as 
opposed to top-down modernization approaches (Sillitoe, 1998:223) has opened 
up challenging opportunities for pursuing development alternatives. The 
recognition of indigenous knowledge is in line with such pursuits. 'What 
precisely is involved in this concept (indigenous knowledge) is nowhere 
defined', declares Stirrat (1998:242). Sillitoe (1998:223-35) tends to define 
indigenous knowledge versus scientific knowledge in research areas of natural 
resources management, even though he also recognizes that there are also 
relations of power and domination involved, which are only addressed in 
passing in his paper (ibid.: 243). I suspect that the key issues are not the 
concrete substance of indigenous knowledge, especially the technical content of 
it. I wonder whether we can ever define the boundary of indigenous versus 
scientific or modern knowledge. The significance of the concept is its social, 
cultural and political implication for recognizing the 'lowers' knowledge. 
Furthermore, 'Indigenous knowledge is not locally homogeneous. Differences will exist along 
gender, age, class, occupational, and other lines and among individuals of similar social status' 
(Scoones and Thompson, 1994:16). 
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In the field survey, I very often asked farmers who gave up resettling: 
"Why did you choose not to resettle?" A range of answers was received. For 
example, one farmer said: "I did not have enough money to resettle. You know 
it costs a lot to build a house, and it costs a lot to hire a truck to move". The 
answer sounded reasonable, but it actually did not reflect the real complex 
decision-making process. It seems that the most influential factor is whether or 
not one has money to invest, but in my view, it is the confidence to take the risk 
of investing. What gives people confidence for future investment is knowledge 
about the likely return from the investment. Ma Jiye had worked as a wage 
laborer on the plains and had spent some time as an agricultural laborer on 
irrigated farming land before he resettled. Such experiences gave him the 
knowledge that he could have a better life by farming on irrigated land and 
living in the plains. Many other farmers also heard that one could lead a better 
life by having irrigated land, but such second hand messages were not strong 
enough to build their confidence for a decision-making as big as resettlement. 
Looking back at the case of Ma Shaolin, he told me that about 100 farmers sold 
their right to resettle to other farmers soon after they received their allocation of 
land in 1994. Those 100 farmers must have heard of the better life to be had in 
the plains area, which was why they had joined the farmers' gathering in May 
1990 and gained the right to have such a piece of land. However, they gave up 
the idea right after they saw the wilderness they had in hand at that time, 
because they had self no experience or first hand knowledge about irrigated 
farming. Most of those farmers who sold their right for sure could have 
generated enough money to make the resettlement investment. 
I have no doubts that Ma Wenli's family is very poor, and that it is now 
difficult for them to generate enough money to purchase land in the 
resettlement area. I am also sure that Ma Wenli could have afforded to pay the 
300-yuan resettlement fee and built a simple place to stay in the resettlement 
area in the early stage of resettlement. But he could not decide to do that, 
because he had no knowledge about what was actually going on in the area and 
how he could make a living there. The message he got from other people even 
generated more doubt about the possibility to make a better life there because 
some people had told him that "only those who are rich can afford the 
irrigation fee so that they have a better life, and those who are poorer can't 
afford it so that they have an even worse life than they had at home." The 
contrast case to Ma Wenli's is the story of Mr. Xi Qi (For the detailed story, see 
Section 6.2 of this chapter) Mr. Xi Qi was in debt for all his resettlement cost, so 
he was for sure not in a better economic situation of Mr. Ma Wenli. But, Mr. Xi 
Qi moved. 
'An interface approach depicts knowledge as arising from 'an encounter of horizons'. The 
incorporation of new information and new discursive or cultural frames can only take place 
on the basis of already-existing knowledge frames and evaluative modes, which are themselves 
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re-shaped through the communicative process. Hence knowledge emerges as a product of 
interaction, dialogue, reflexivity and contests of meaning, and involves aspects of control, 
authority and power.' (Long, 2001:71) 
Knowledge is constructed in the process of interaction among different actors, 
and from personal experiences, so that it cannot be given. Therefore, we cannot 
blame people for having no knowledge, but we have to question why they have 
not had the opportunities to know. This is fundamental for defining how to 
help the poor. Poor people are often blamed as ignorant of 'available good 
opportunities'. But the same opportunity means different thing to different 
people. It is difficult to convince people to believe in something beyond their 
personal knowledge. This is especially true for farmers. If we cannot think in 
the way that poorer farmers think, we should not be surprised about the gaps 
between policy goals and farmers' responses. 
Different economic situations may generate different levels of knowledge 
about the outside world because poor economic situations certainly restrain 
mobility. Ma Jiye could afford to travel many times to the resettlement area to 
learn about the situation there and also to generate his own knowledge about 
making a life there because he actually cultivated land there before he finally 
moved. 
The anticipation of quick achievements in government program/project 
rationale and project implementation often results in the exclusion of benefits 
for the poorer. To gain knowledge about any new place needs time. Knowledge 
cannot be taught but learned. One can hear of opportunities but confidence is 
best built on personal knowledge. The poorer have slow or even no response to 
new initiatives because they very often have less or little knowledge about the 
outside world, and they also have less capacity to take risks, foreseen and 
unforeseen. Hence, the poorer should not be blamed by their less active 
response to any new initiatives. Rather the government should review its 
program/project rationale and formulation, especially the time span for project 
implementation and the choice of resettlement area in the case of resettlement 
projects. 
There are different types of resettlement in the government organized 
voluntary resettlement programs in terms of distance from places of origin. 
Types of resettlement include cross-provincial, cross-county, cross-township 
and cross-village resettlement and intra-village resettlement. The resettlement 
project in Ningxia on which we conducted our research is an example of cross-
county resettlement, and the one in Yunnan is an intra-village resettlement. 
People with less mobility tend to have more knowledge of nearby places and 
have little knowledge of distant places, which proved to be true in the two 
research areas. Everyone we interviewed in the villages of origin in Yunnan had 
been to the resettlement site because it was only two hours walking distance 
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away. But many people in the village of origin in Ningxia had never been to the 
resettlement areas because the distance was about 400 km. 
By emphasizing the importance of knowledge, we have to realize that 
knowledge is only one of the many determinants. Many farmers from the place 
of origin of Yunnan did not move due to economic constraints even though 
they had relatively better knowledge about the resettlement area. My point is 
that it is difficult enough for farmers to move even though they can manage 
financially, no need to say how difficult when first of all they have to overcome 
the economic constraint. 
6.5 Power configurations 
The following case shows that Mr. Ma Yongzheng could get rid of local power 
control, left his village of origin and settled in resettlement village as long as he 
could afford the cost of resettlement. The case confirms that the resettlement 
project for poverty reduction have already ended up as an economic 
development project. Social and economic dynamics are working under the 
economic growth model. Under the economic growth model, economic factors 
take precedence of other factors such as political power despite the influence 
that political power may have. Observations about power configurations 
involving the Village Head and the Village Secretary in the resettlement village 
aims to address the relationship between authority and power. Both cases 
inform us about how resettlement opens up opportunities for new power 
relations in which some factors may acquire a different weighting in 
comparison with how they function in places of origin. 
The Story of Ma Yongzheng 
Ma Yongzheng is 52 years old and now living in Moon Village. He has primary 
level school education. He moved from Xiapu Village of Xiapu Township. His 
wife, who is 48 years old also finished primary school. He has 4 children, a 
daughter of 18, and three boys of 16,14 and 10 years old. The girl has primary 
school education, the first boy has also primary school education, and the two 
other boys are both still in primary school. He moved to Moon Village in 1998. 
Mr. Ma told his story thus: 
"When I had the idea to move, my family disagreed. My parents said to me: 
'We were born here, and we have been here all our life, you were born here and 
you could also stay here.' My parents thought that there would be no good 
future after moving. There are mainly two reasons for them to say so. One is 
that the amount of land allocated to each household is very small. Only 8 mu to 
each household no matter how many children you have, and children will have 
no chance to get land after they grow up or get married. The other reason is that 
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wage labour cannot earn much money even if there are wage labour 
opportunities. I understand why my parents think in this way because they 
have spent their whole life in Xiapu so it is hard for them to think of living in 
other places. Not only my parents, but also my 5 brothers disagreed with my 
proposal. They think that Xiapu isn't so bad and that people can survive so that 
there is no need to move. Some other people in my village of origin also think 
that I am stupid to move because they think that everywhere is the same. I 
thought a lot before I moved, but the reason why I made my decision without 
any hesitation was because I wanted to get rid of a religious imbroglio." 
In the early 1990s, there occurred a big affair between two religious groups. 
People in the sub-village where Ma Yongzheng previously lived belonged to 
two different Muslim groups, the Sha Gou Group, and the other called the Chen 
Jia Gou Group. The leader of the Chen Jia Gou Group was Ma Yucheng, and the 
leader of Sha Gou Group was called Ma Fuli. Ma Yucheng was then one of the 
leaders of the Administrative Village. [Mr. Ma requested that the names of the 
villages should not be mentioned in any written papers, so the name of his sub-
village of origin is given here]. The Chen Jia Gou Group was relatively smaller 
and weaker than the Sha Gou Group so that it always came under the Sha Gou 
Group in religious practice. In 1990, Ma Yucheng once proposed to the Sha Gou 
Group that it should become on an equal level to the Chen Jia Gou Group. The 
Sha Gou Group took such a proposal to mean a separation of the Chen Jia Gou 
Group from the Sha Gou Group and so Ma Yucheng's proposal was refused. 
There has been a dispute between the two groups since then. 
He explained: 
"There were 48 households in my sub-village of origin, 42 households belonged 
to the Sha Gou Group and 6 households to the Chen Jia Gou Group. The water 
source of the village is located in the place where members of Chen Jia Gou 
Group lived. Since the dispute members of the Sha Gou Group were often 
refused water from the water source. With the accumulation of all sorts of 
disputes between the two groups, something big happened on May 14, 1991. 
On that day, while members from the Sha Gou Group were at religious 
worship, members of Chen Jia Gou Groups from different villages came and 
challenged Sha Gou Groups. Confrontation started and neither of the two sides 
withdrew. About 20 people from the Sha Gou Group were killed because they 
were not prepared. Even the leader of the Sha Gou Group, Mr. Ma Fuli tried to 
calm down his members after the killing, for members of the Sha Gou Group 
wanted to take revenge. Then, members of the Sha Gou Group went and killed 
more than 30 members of Chen Jia Gou Group. The Chen Jia Gou Group then 
got hold of several dozen guns and killed even more members of Sha Gou 
Group who were only equipped with agricultural tools. After this gunfight, the 
government assigned troops to stop the conflict. Leaders from both sides were 
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arrested and are still in prison. The Chen Jia Gou Group finally gained its 
separation from the Sha Gou Group even though both groups lost their 
previous leaders. 
"I belong to the Sha Gou Group. I was then the leader of our local security 
team, so I had authority to access the guns. When the conflicts upgraded to a 
gunfight, my people asked if they could take the guns in my charge. Although I 
am not highly educated, I do know how serious that would be if I used the guns 
for such purposes, so I refused. Since then, I have been cut off from my 
religious group. I was not allowed to participate in any religious activities in 
my group. My relatives were forced not to make contact with me. One of my 
brothers was physically attacked simply because he came to visit me. My family 
and myself were deeply affected by this. I felt very much depressed and could 
not have a normal life there. I felt that I really needed to go somewhere else to 
start a new life. 
"If the village leaders of my village of origin would have had a decision-
making role in deciding who could move and who could not, I would not have 
had a chance to move. Religious leaders sometimes are village leaders, and if 
not they have a strong influence on the village leaders. Sometimes my village of 
origin received government poverty alleviation support, such as relief or low 
interest loans, and it was always those leaders who decided who was to get 
these resources. The criterion of allocation for those resources was not those 
who were the poorer, but which religious group they were in or who was more 
powerful or who was close to those in power. However, in the case of 
resettlement project, I could buy land as long as I had money. In the first place, 
in 1997,1 bought two pieces of land in Minning Village of the resettlement area, 
which is next to Moon Village. I paid 3,900 yuan for each piece of land. Later, 
Minning Village requested that all those who had bought land must finish 
building their houses by the end of September 1997. The house standards set by 
the Resettlement Office was so high that each house would cost at least 10,000 
yuan. I could not afford to build an expensive house within such a short period 
of time so I sold the land in Minning Village and bought two pieces of land in 
Moon Village. I bought the land from two households who could no longer to 
manage to live here due to lack of labor. I knew the two households through a 
close friend. More than 40% of the resettlers now in Moon village purchased 
their land rather than got the allocation from the resettlement project for 
poverty reduction. 
"I have a positive view of life in the resettlement area. The village of origin 
I lived is located in a mountainous area. Although there is vast land there, the 
harvest can hardly be assured. Such extensive cultivation has no future. 
However, in the resettlement area, there is a good harvest as long as there is 
water. At least, food security is assured. Furthermore, we can easily get cash 
income from wage labour. This is because we have easy access to good and fast 
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transportation to the state-owned farms, to big cities and to information here. I 
normally work as a wage labourer 10 days every month. I feel no regret at all at 
moving. 
"Of course, expenditure here is much higher then in the place of origin, but 
my views are wider here, my thought gets active here, and I believe that my 
children will have a better future here." 
The Village Head and the Village Party Secretary 
Normally, the administrative village committee is composed of Village Party 
Secretary, Village Head and Village Accountant. The Village Party Secretary is 
supposed to be the one in full charge of village affairs. He/she is appointed by 
the Party Committee of a level than the village, and is therefore not elected by 
the villagers. When we first arrived at Moon Village, together with township 
officials, the person who received us was Mr. Ma Wenxi, the Village Head. In 
the first meeting held in the village it was important to be accompanied by a 
higher official. This gave us "official" status, so that we could be sure that we 
would be well received by the village, at least "publicly". The first such meeting 
also indicated who was to be responsible for our visit to the village. Normally, 
the person from the village committee who always receives outsiders or higher 
officials is the one who is in power. Mr. Ma Wenxi warmly welcomed us. I 
informed him our research plan in Moon Village. He arranged three villagers 
who could lead us the way, and he arranged a family who would prepare lunch 
for us. 
On the second day of our research in the village, a young man approached 
me when I was eating watermelon after lunch on the side of the village path. 
We started chatting. He told me that he was the Village Party Secretary: Ma 
Shaolin4. At this moment, I realised that it was always the Village Head rather 
than Village Secretary who had played the role of host. He invited me to his 
house. On the way to his house, we met a group of farmers who were standing 
around the irrigation canal. Seeing that we were approaching, most of them 
quickly went away. This was to my surprise. Normally, my experience when 
visiting the countryside was that, though farmers might not come close in the 
beginning, eventually they would and they certainly would not go away 
quickly, since they were always curious to know what outsiders were doing 
there. 
By the time we approached the irrigation canal, there were only two 
farmers left. I asked them what they were doing there. One of them answered: 
"The water flow was too small last time when I paid for irrigating my field. I 
4
 Ma Shaolin is the eldest son of Mr. Ma Zhengxuan, the village secretary in the place of origin, 
who organised farmers' demand of resettlement land. (See 6.1 Farmers' Agency - A force to 
encounter). For detailed story about Mr. Ma Shaolin, see, The Story of Ma Shaolin, Section 6.2: 
The Function of Kinship. 
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heard that irrigation water might come again today. So I would like to get some 
more water for my field." I asked: "Does this happen often?" Mr. Ma Shaolin 
answered instead of the farmer, saying to me: "No, not often. The case is that 
farmers do not clean their field channel to enable an easier water flow into the 
field." I looked back to the farmer for confirmation. He put his shovel on his 
shoulder and went away. 
Mr. Ma and I had to continue on our way to his house. I found out that he 
had a big house and a big home yard, much bigger than the average size for 
other villagers. We had a long talk in his home where I got to know some 
information about the origin of the resettlement project, about his place of 
origin and his life in the resettlement area. 
After my meeting with the Village Party Secretary, the Village Head did not 
wait for us anymore on the side of the village path every morning as we entered 
the village by car. However, this did not affect our field investigations because, 
by then, we had basically found out where to go. Later, one day, I saw the 
Village Head driving a motorcycle at high speed on the outskirts of the village. I 
waved him down and he approached. I then asked where he had been. He told 
me that he had been busy settling a conflict between two neighbours. One 
family has a plum tree in its home yard. Apparently, the 10-year-old boy from 
the neighbouring family picked up some plums. But just before running away, 
he was caught by the owner, who beat him about the head. That was yesterday. 
This morning the boy was in a serious condition, so together with the parents 
he sent the boy off to the county hospital. He returned from hospital to report to 
the township official about the case and had a discussion with the plum owner. 
Now, he was going to the hospital again. He was about to ask about our 
research, but I let him go quickly because I can see anxiety on his face. 
Discussion 
The information presented in the above section has raised issues of power 
configurations between religious groups, individual manoeuvres against 
existing sites of power, the dynamics of power and authority, and so forth. The 
data that I was able to obtain opens up a discussion of, rather than provides a 
detailed lay out of, the power configuration in any given context. 
Hindess summarizes discourse on the conceptions of power in modern 
western society as follows: 
'Two conceptions of power have dominated Western political thought in the modern period. 
One, which has been especially prominent in recent academic discussion, is the idea of power 
as a simple quantitative phenomenon. Power, in this sense, is nothing more than a kind of 
generalized capacity to act. The second, more complex, understanding is that of power as 
involving not only a capacity but also a right to act, with both capacity and right being seen 
to rest on the consent of those over whom the power is exercised' (1996:1) 
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The capacity of power can only be possibly quantified when power is exercised 
so that the a rgument is that 'the wishes of those with more power will normally prevail 
over the wishes of those with less' (ibid: 2). In this way Hindess believes that Weber's 
conception of power falls under power as simply capacity, as Weber identifies 
power wi th 'the chance of a man or a number of men to realize their own will even against 
the resistance of others who are participating in the action' (Weber, 1978:926). 
Power as a right to act refers to 'power as legitimate capacity'. Hindess goes 
on to argue that '[t]he importance of this understanding of power is particularly clear ... in 
discussions of the power that is thought to be exercised by the ruler of a state or by its (central) 
government.' This conception of power as a right to act has a close link with the 
political system of a country. Under a democratic system, 'the sovereign (or 
government) is conceived of as issuing commands which the subjects - by virtue of the consent 
which they are presumed to have given to the sovereign's rule - are expected to treat as having 
the character of binding obligations. While the consent of its subjects, then, is thought to 
provide the sovereign with the right to govern, the attendant obligations on those subjects are 
supposed to provide the sovereign with the capacity to do so' (Hindess, 1996:12). 
In contrast, Long (2001:242) defines power by emphasizing its dynamic 
features. This conception of power, I believe, is more relevant for the analysis of 
the social dynamics of rural communities. 
'Power configurations are depicted in terms of the idea of interlocking actors' projects made 
up of heterogeneous sets of social relations imbued with values, meanings and notions of 
authority and control, domination and subordination, and sustained by specific patterns of 
resource distribution and competition (i.e., power construction). Power cannot simply be 
possessed or accumulated. Nor can it be precisely measured in terms of quantity or quality. It 
emerges out of social processes and is better considered a 'product' rather than a 'given'. 
Having power does not entail that others are without it: there is no zero-sum game. However, 
power may become reified in social life; that is, people often think of is as a unitary coercive 
force wielded by 'the ruling class', 'agents of the state' or 'the establishment'. 
The dynamics of power configurations imply that power is not equivalent to 
official authorized authority. The latter can be relatively static for a period of 
time. However, power configurations are changing all the time. Power 
leveraging and balancing is taking place as interactions among the different 
actors moves on. Official authorised authority can be only one element in the 
constitution of power configurations. 
Long (2001:71-72) argues that the notion of power configurations is a key 
ingredient of social and organisational interfaces: 'Power is the outcome of struggles 
over meanings and strategic relationships. Like knowledge, power is not simply possessed, 
accumulated and unproblematically exercised (Foucault, in Gordon 1980:78-108). Power 
implies much more than how hierarchies and hegemonic control demarcate social positions and 
opportunities, and restrict access to resources. It is the outcome of complex struggles and 
negotiations over authority, status, reputation and resources, and necessitates the enrolment of 
networks of actors and constituencies (Latour, 1994, Callon and Law, 1995) Creating 
room for manoeuvre implies a degree of consent, a degree of negotiation and thus a degree of 
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power, as manifested in the possibility of exerting some control, prerogative, authority and 
capacity for action, be it frontstage or backstage, for flickering moments or for more sustained 
periods (Villarreal, 1992:256)' 
Power relations are never static. Those who are in power always try to 
control and those who are not in power often try to get out from under it, which 
is a natural dynamic in any power relations, and one that leads to a changing 
power configuration. The Sha Gou Group tried to keep its control over the 
Chen Jia Gou Group who tried to get rid of their control. This led to conflicts 
between the two groups and ended up with a new power relationship in the 
separation of the two groups. The decisive factor for Mr. Ma to move was to 
get away from the stranglehold of the old power relations. In the resettlement 
area, everyone was busy trying to build a new life, and together they are 
building a new community, where new power configurations will emerge. 
Segments of old power constructions may still influence these new 
configurations in the new community but only in a limited way. Ma Yongzheng 
no longer lived under the shadow of past events after he moved, even though 
some people in the village knew about his story. 
It is very hard for outsiders to understand the power configuration and 
processes ongoing in any local community. Insiders live within the power 
dynamic in the course of their everyday lives so that they are able to figure out 
what situations are about and how to deal with them. Local people are always 
careful in answering questions from outsiders because they have to be cautious 
not to offend those in power. Being sensitised to the fact that all the resettlers 
are Muslim, I paid great attention to how religion played a role in influencing 
people's ideas and decision-making in the resettlement process. I often asked 
interviewees: "What did your religious leader say to you about the 
resettlement?" Answers often were: "We did not talk much about resettlement 
in religious practices." I did not give up, then further asked: "Does your 
religion play any role in your day-to-day life besides that of going to the 
mosque?" The answer was: "Our leaders told us to work hard for a better life, 
do not quarrel with your neighbours etc." I gave up asking further questions 
because I realized that the understanding of religious implication could not be 
reached through a simple question and answer exercise. Power can only be 
possibly embodied or manifested when power is exercised, especially in 
competition or conflict. I asked Ma Yongzheng in relation to the conflicts 
between his group and the other one that had caused the death of so many 
people, whether there were any essential differences between the two groups?" 
Mr. Ma said: "Oh, it is difficult to explain. The major difference is that my 
group (the Sha Gou Group) forbids drinking and smoking, but the Chen Jia 
Gou Group allows drinking and smoking." Of course such seemingly simple 
religious practices often have deeper meanings and values and affect social 
interaction in everyday life and of course such differences were probably not 
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the only divisive elements between the two groups. Whatever the real source of 
the differences, still the religious conflict taking place in the early 1990s in 
Xiapu township manifested the power that religious groups can have in 
provoking conflicts and in controlling people's behaviour. 
Being Village Party Secretary, Mr. Ma Shaolin should, according to his 
official status, be the most authoritative figure in the village. Furthermore, he is 
the son of the Village Party Secretary in his village of origin, so he may have 
authoritative support from his father and his father's kinsmen. Yet, '[p]ower is 
not simply possessed, accumulated and unproblematically exercised' (Foucault, 
in Gordon 1980:78-108) Mr. Ma Shaolin's official position does not necessarily 
grant him power. I observed that the officials at the township level did not 
regard Mr. Ma Shaolin as the first figure to host outsiders. On our arrival at the 
village, the research team was introduced to Mr. Ma WenXi, the Village Head 
not to Mr. Ma Shaolin, the Village Secretary. Being asked to receive outsiders 
and higher officials imply recognition from a higher authority. Having official 
status does not mean that one has the power to exert control. We should not 
here understand control in military terms, that is, that for each order from a 
'superior', the 'inferior' must react with obedience. In day-to-day life, especially 
in the countryside, exerting control always take place in an informal manner. 
Even if sometimes farmers may be called to participate in official meetings, 
such organised formality has nothing to do with how power is exercised. This is 
why an interface analysis is extremely useful in revealing the nature of power 
configurations. Feigning ignorance or using tactics of avoidance are typical 
farmers' resistance to authority. Mr. Ma Shaolin could not exercise power if his 
fellow villagers avoided meeting him or ignored his appearances, which is 
precisely what I observed. 
Authority is granted by the superior, but power is gained from within and 
given by the so-called 'inferior' subordinates but may also be reinforced by the 
superior him or herself. If we view power as the outcome of struggles over 
meanings and strategic relationships, then Mr. Ma Wenxi seems more powerful 
than Mr. Ma Shaolin, even though he is officially supposed to be secondary to 
Mr. Ma Shaolin. The prestige and leverage that local leaders have depend 
crucially on how much farmers can count on them in solving day-to-day 
problems and incidents or conflicts. Power of a local leader is nourished by 
his/her willingness to become involved in and show good capabilities in 
problem and conflict solving. I guess that this is how Mr. Ma Wenxi developed 
his power when I saw him busy solving conflicts between two neighbours, and 
his standing when helping the sick child. 
The social dynamic of poverty reduction at the micro-level is that the 
allocation of poverty reduction resources is often not directed by the degree of 
poverty but by power configuration. One clear phenomenon in most, if not all 
societies and communities, is that those in power are not the poor. When there 
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are opportunities for a better living, those in power will always have better 
access to them than those who are not. When resources or opportunities for 
poverty reduction appear to be opportunities for a better living, those who are 
in power use their power and social networks to benefit from them themselves 
rather than first giving opportunities to the poorer in the same communities. 
This is why many poverty alleviation projects have ended up supporting the 
better off rather than the poorer. 
Resettlement projects were often claimed as being for the purpose of 
poverty reduction so that they could get support from the poverty reduction 
resources offered by central and local governments. However, in the 
implementation process, these projects were implemented under an ideology of 
economic growth. The direct impact of this is that the economic capacity of 
individual farmers becomes the dominant determinant of resettlement. Under 
such circumstance, power structures no longer necessarily determine access to 
the opportunity. This allows those with economic capacity but placed 
unfavourably in the existing power structure to take advantage of the 
opportunity. However, such possible positive impacts will only favour those 
with economic capacity, rather than those under deprivation from both poverty 
and the power structure. In fact, economic power and political power always 
reinforce each other and form an alliance. This is why poverty reduction 
projects often fail to reach the poorer and the poorest. 
Part II: Women in Resettlement 
Part I of this chapter explored why the same land means different things to the 
better off as against the poorer. Various sociological concepts were introduced 
to analyze how social and economic factors work together so that the majority 
of the resettlers were from the better off rather than the poorer farmer 
households. In Part II I aim to explain why and how the same land means 
something different to women than to men. Chapter four illustrated how 
women and men were affected differently in terms of their involvement in 
agricultural production after resettlement. Such different gender impacts imply 
that women and men are likely to have different views on resettlement. This 
section of the chapter then illustrates how women's views barely figure in the 
resettlement process because their influence in decision-making at household 
level appears to be insignificant. However, my focus on decision-making at 
household level does not imply that at the policy level farmers, whether male or 
female, have any major impact on decision making. 
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6.6 Why women are a silent group in resettlement - Capability or right? 
The following cases show that women had less say then men at the household 
level in the decision-making processes of resettlement. The first case explores 
this issue of the lack participation in decision making through a narrative 
provided by the wife of a returnee settler. The second case shows how the wife 
and daughters were largely excluded from the husband and father's decision to 
move to the settlement area; nor were they involve in his decision to return. 
The Story of Li Jianhua, A returnee 
Li Jiahua now lives in Xiapu Village of Xiapu Township in Xiji County of 
Ningxia. She is 25 years old and has primary level education. She married in 
1994. Her husband is 27 years old. They have three children, one boy and two 
girls. She told the following story: 
"I was married in 1994. By then my husband had already bought a piece of 
land in Moon Village. It cost him 280 yuan. I went to see our land in the 
resettlement area before we moved. I was happy to find that we would cultivate 
irrigated land. I was also happy to find out that my workload would be reduced 
because the area of land would be much smaller than we cultivated in Xiapu. 
My husband was a donkey trader before we moved to Moon Village and he 
continued this business after we returned. We moved in 1995. We stayed there 
for 5 years until we returned in 2000. There were several reasons for us to move 
back. My husband was not very happy to stay there because he could not 
continue his donkey trading business. We also found that the production inputs 
were too expensive even though production output was high. My husband 
finally decided to sell the land when he found out that the price of land in 
Moon village had become so high that he could earn a great profit from selling 
it. He sold our house (40 square meters) and sold the 8 mu of land for 15,000 
yuan (about 1,830 US$). This means that in 5 years we earned 54 times as much 
we paid for it from the increase in land prices in Moon Village. Then, back in 
Xiapu, he purchased a big house for us to live in, a small house and shed for 
continuing his donkey business and a large piece of land for farming. I felt 
regret at returning. Although we now live in a much bigger house than in Moon 
Village, I have to do both fieldwork and housework, including caring for my 
three children because my husband is now off donkey trading. He is seldom at 
home so that he cannot share any of the workload with me. When we were in 
Moon Village I did not feel as tired as now because we had much less land and 
my husband and I always shared the fieldwork. I found that it is easier to 
manage irrigated land than dry land." 
I asked her who decided to come back. She said: "My husband was very 
eager to come back, and I agreed." I asked her whether she would rather move 
there again. She said: "I would be extremely happy if we moved back, but there 
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is little chance to move back because the land price is increasing". I further 
asked: "What would your husband say if you had not agreed with him on 
moving back?" My question surprised her. She thought a little, then said: "My 
husband never expects disagreement from me, so I seldom disagree with him. 
My husband cannot do his donkey business without me." Then I asked her to 
compare life in the two places. The following table summarizes her comparison: 
Table 6-3/Table 4-7: Ma Jianhua's comparison of life in Moon Village and 
Xiapu Village 
Workload 
Economic situation 
Water 
Electricity 
Cooking oil 
Expenditure on gifts 
Moon Village (resettlement 
area) 
Not as heavy as in Xiapu 
Higher income, higher 
Expenditure 
Very convenient 
Stable 
It costs cash 
Less expenditure on gifts. 
(100 yuan /year, about 11 
US$) 
Xiapu Village (place of origin) 
Overloaded 
Lower income, lower 
Expenditure 
It takes an hour to get a 
bucket of water. It is 
inconvenient because it has to 
be collected from a well in the 
yard of another household 
Not stable 
From own field 
More expenditure on gifts. 
(400 yuan/ year) (about 50 
US$) 
The Story of Ma Chunhua and her family 
Ma Chunhua is the eldest daughter of her family. Her father is Ma Zhengzhi, 
who is 48 years old and illiterate. Her mother is 46 years old and also illiterate. 
There are three children in the family, she is 19 years old and illiterate the same 
as her 17 year-old sister. Her brother is 20 years old and has just graduated 
from college. Ma Chunhua told us: 
"My father makes all the decisions in our family, we, including my mother, 
are only informed afterwards. The center of his life is my brother so that all the 
investment he has made is all for the future of his son. My sister and I had no 
chance to go to school at all but my brother studied up to college level. I had no 
knowledge of how and why my father got the land and then sold it. All I know 
is that my father sold the land to my cousin in 1995. My father told my mother 
about having sold the land only after he had done it, and my mother told me 
later. I liked the resettlement area so much when I visited there in 1996 to work 
as an agricultural labourer. In the resettlement area, there are many 
opportunities to go out and find wage labour. My mother always told me that 
women could not decide their own fate. She is somehow right, because I am 
illiterate only because I am a girl. Now, the only possibility to change my life is 
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through marriage. I refused recently again my father's proposal of my marriage 
to a mountain man. I want to marriage someone in the irrigation area." 
Ma Zhengzhi told us: 
"I participated in the 1990 farmers' gathering so that I was given the right to a 
piece of land in the resettlement area. I was given an official allocation in 1994 
and in that year I prepared to build a house and so transported many materials 
there to the site. What I found there was no irrigation water and hardly any 
houses had been constructed at that time. I felt no hope when I saw the desert 
around me. In the end, I came back with all the construction materials and 
decided not to move. I have only one son so that the house and land we have 
here should be fine enough for him to make a good living. I sold the piece of 
land in the resettlement area to my nephew, Ma Shouye, for 700 yuan in 1997. 
We did not go through any legal procedure and we signed no contract either. 
We trust each other because we are relatives. The local authority recognizes 
such arrangements as long as we two have no dispute. I did not have any 
discussion with my wife when I sold the land. My eldest daughter made some 
noise after she heard the news from my wife, but I did not care because she will 
marry out anyway." 
Why husbands make the decisions 
In the survey conducted in Ningxia, we asked who made the decision to move, 
or not to move, and why. The interviewer started the question by asking who 
makes most of the decisions in the family, husband or wife, and then asked the 
reasons for that. In the data analysis, the interviewed households were 
categorized into three: husband made most of the decisions, wife made most of 
the decisions, and husband and wife make decisions together. The following 
tables summarize the results. The number in Tables 6-4, 6-6 and 6-6 is the 
accumulated votes. Once a reason was mentioned, the reason wins one vote. 
Interviewees can list more than one reason, so that the sum of the votes has 
nothing to do with the total number of interviewees. The number of votes 
equals the weight given by interviewees to the different reasons. We obtained 
56 responses, among which about one third were from female interviewees. 
Table 6-4: Who makes household decisions (interviews in Xiapu Village of 
Ningixa) 
Households where Households where Households where 
husbands make husbands and wives wives make 
decisions jointly make decisions decisions 
Number (N=56) 45 8 3 
Percentage 80.3% 14.3% 5;4% 
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Table 6-4 shows that it is mainly the husband or the husband and wife together 
who make decisions in most of the households. There are very few households 
where wives make decisions alone. 
Table 6-5: Why husbands make decisions in the households where husbands 
made most of the decisions 
(N=45) 
Ranking 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
Reasons 
Tradition 
Men have seen more so they know more and have more 
ideas 
Men have better education 
Men do more [have experience]so they can make more 
decisions 
Women are dependent so that they do not want to take 
charge 
Number of Votes 
20 
15 
8 
6 
6 
Table 6-5 shows that the most important reasons given for husbands making 
decisions are that, firstly, traditional gender relations define men as the key 
decision-makers, thus women are given less chance; secondly, men are more 
knowledgeable because they have more opportunities to be so because their 
social experiences are broader. Thirdly, men receive better education and are 
therefore more likely to be literate and thus are considered more capable of 
making decisions. It would seem them that women's lesser role in decision-
making is fundamentally due to the deprivation of their right to develop their 
decision-making capacities. In the first place, so-called 'traditional' gender 
relations deny women the opportunity to be decision-makers, which limits their 
capacity in this regard. They thus have less chance to develop and be 
recognized. Personal experiences are important in generating personal 
knowledge and ideas, and women appear less knowledgeable about decision-
making practices and are also seldom willing to push forward their own ideas. 
The reason for this is not that they are naturally less capable of generating ideas, 
but that they have little chance to gain the necessary experience and know-how. 
Furthermore arents prefer to invest in their sons' rather than their daughters' 
education, and so the right of girls to formal education is never on an equal 
footing with boys. 
Table 6-6: Why women made decisions the households where wives made 
most of the decisions 
(N=3) 
Ranking 
1 
2 
Reasons 
Husbands do not like to be in charge 
The husband died 
Number of Votes 
2 
1 
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Table6-7: Why husband and wife make decisions together 
(N=8) 
Ranking Reasons Number of Votes 
1 Husband and wife should respect each other so that the 5 
family can be in harmony 
2 Decision made together develop confident feelings 2 
3 Husband and wife form one family, they should discuss 2 
and reach consensus. 
Table 6-6 shows that the principal reason why some women made decisions is 
due to the withdrawal or absence of the husband. Women can certainly make 
decisions, but they only gain the full right to do so when men give up their 
right. Nevertheless, we must acknowledge as a general point that, whatever the 
circumstances, women still retain some part to play in household affairs and 
decisions. The story told by Ma Jianhua is full of 'we' and 'our'. This indicates 
that she considered that she and her husband had been jointly involved in this 
venture. Her husband wanted to go back and she tells us that 'she agreed'. 
Table 6-4 also indicates there were 10 (if one discounts the one whose husband 
died) out of 55 households where women made decisions or made them with 
their husbands. The matter is thus somewhat more complicated than the survey 
results suggest. It seems likely that there is a gap between what women and 
men say and how they act and there is the question of the context in which the 
interviews are conducted, that is whether or not both men an women are 
present. 
The other methodological question to bear in mind when evaluating the 
results of these interviews - is that the question about 'who makes decisions, 
husband or wife', is likely to be a leading question and therefore could have 
influenced the answers. One would expect the wife within a Muslim household 
to play the game of saving face for the husband by giving him the manly role, 
even if in fact she makes joint decisions with him. 
Discussion 
Researchers and practitioners in gender studies and practice are often 
questioned about the justification for being concerned about women and 
gender issues. Such an inquiry implies ignorance of the importance of existing 
gender inequality in society. To answer the question, at a theoretical level, one 
must investigate the causes of women's inequality, and at a practical level, 
policy frameworks to promote gender equality need to be formulated and 
discussed. 
Feminist theories help to understand the roots of women's oppression and 
gender inequality. Gimenez (1998:1) summarizes feminist theoretical debates as 
follows: 
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'It was possible, in the heady days of the Women's Liberation Movement, to identify four 
main currents within feminist thought; Liberal (concerned with attaining economic and 
political equality within the context of capitalism); Radical (focused on men and patriarchy as 
the main causes of the oppression of women); Socialist (critical of capitalism and Marxism, so 
much so that avoidance of Marxism's alleged reductionisms resulted in dual systems theories 
postulating various forms of interaction between capitalism and patriarchy); and Marxist 
Feminism (a theoretical position held by relatively few feminists in the U.S - myself included 
- which sought to develop the potential of Marxist theory to understand the capitalist sources 
of the oppression of women)'. 
Radical, Socialist and Marxist feminisms tackle either the patriarchal or 
capitalist system or both of them in seeking the roots of women's oppression 
and the ways to emancipate women. However, Liberal feminism advocates 
women's self-advancement for making it possible for women to develop the 
capacity to compete with men in society. Radical, Socialist and Marxist 
feminisms raise structural problems in society, but not Liberal feminism. The 
key critique of Liberal feminism is that it does not tackle the fundamental 
causes of gender inequality; instead it focuses on individual women's struggles 
against unequal social arrangements. Gender equality cannot be reached 
without a fundamental change in the unequal gender relations embedded in 
existing social structures. Structural change takes time and it is unlikely to take 
place rapidly without revolution. However, it is hoped that with an increasing 
recognition of the voices of weaker groups in society under the democratic 
movement in China, and in the world more generally, women's voices may 
become increasingly heard. In this research, I have raised the question of what 
makes women a silent group in the resettlement process - is it capability or the 
lack of a right to speak? This draws attention to the root/structural problems of 
gender inequality rather than doubting women's capabilities. Where capacities 
are limited it is usually a consequence of entrenched patterns of gender 
inequality. 
Gender relations are fundamentally power relations. The notion of 'two 
faces of power' - the public and the private - provides an analytical angle for 
understanding how women's rights and interests are neglected in existing 
power structures of society. The public face of power implies that 'Possession of 
power can be identified with confidence only in cases of overt conflict... since those who prevail 
... in fact, have more power than their opponents' (Hindess, 1996:4). The private face of 
power can, for example, 'be seen in the covert exclusion of the interests of particular 
individuals or groups from consideration in legislative assemblies ... and other arenas in which 
decisions affecting the life of the community are taken.... There are also instances of the exercise 
of power in which its victims fail even to recognize that their real interests are at risk, and 
consequently make no attempt to defend those interests' (ibid:4-5). Women ' s interest in 
resettlement has not become a public interest. Such silence in the public domain 
does not mean that women have no interests or that their interests have been 
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taken into consideration. The private face of power gives the reason for this 
silence. Such silence means two things: one is that women's interests are 
excluded from public concerns due to unequal gender structures in society; the 
other is that women themselves fail to recognize their interests and make no 
attempt to defend their interests. 
This leads to two main conclusions: 
(1) One should not stereotype gender relations. Instead one should identify the 
dynamics of gender relationships in the process of interaction among 
different actors. Male domination in family and society is a common 
phenomenon in rural China. However, forms of male domination and 
women's room for manoeuvre differ from one family to another and from 
one community to another. 
(2) The subordination of women does not mean that women are powerless 
within the family and society. But women have to fight much harder than 
men in the struggle over meanings, control and access. 
During my interview with Ms. Li Jianhua, I was very impressed by her ability 
and smartness. Her husband was always absent from home, so she had to take 
care of three small children, be responsible for the farm work, look after the 
donkeys waiting to be sold, and undertaken many other daily tasks, such as 
fetching water and cooking. I was amazed by her quick response to every one 
of my questions and the logical way she organized her answers. She did not 
miss answering any of my small questions despite the continual interruptions 
from her children. The family would collapse if Ms. Li Jianhua quitted doing 
any of her key tasks. So I assume that Ms. Li Jianhua has strong bargaining 
power vis-a-vis her husband so long as she uses it or knows how best to use it. 
A technical problem with researching gender relations within a family is that 
the discussions, negotiations, conflicts and compromises between husband and 
wife, or among family members, are unlikely to be exposed to outsiders. As for 
the case of Ms. Ma Chunhua, when she recounted her future fated marriage, 
one could only but feel sympathy for her for the very limited space she has to 
fight in. 
The story of Li Jianhua and Ma Chunhua illustrate that women and men 
have different views about and perhaps conflicting interests over the question 
of resettlement. However, in the latter's case the women's views were not 
reflected in the decisions that the man made apparently without consulting 
them. One widely accepted argument about why men make decisions rather 
than women is that women have lower ability so that they cannot make the 
right decisions. However, as I have argued it is the other way around, because 
women are deprived of the right to make decisions their capabilities are 
suppressed and unable to develop. 
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Household decision-making is a complicated process, which can only be 
properly understood by a close look at basic day-to-day social dynamics and 
problematic situations. The data presented in the previous tables are in fact far 
too simple to capture and understand this process fully. A simple dichotomy 
between 'having' and 'not having' (Villarreal, 2001: 6) is an oversimplification and 
therefore problematic. Women who are deprived of their rights should not be 
simply understood as women having no rights or women having no agency 
with which to create their own space. Furthermore, we have to be careful not to 
confirm the labeling and naming put on women, such as 'ignorant', 'backward', 
'vulnerable', 'poorly educated' and so forth, because labeling and naming imply 
processes of control and regulation, wherein positions of status are created, granted and 
occupied' (Villarreal, 2001:4). 
To talk about women's rights in resettlement schemes entails three 
dimensions. First we should be aware of gender differentiated impacts. Women 
and men are affected differently in the resettlement process. An illustration of 
this is the change in the gender division of labor after resettlement. Second, we 
need to consider the nature of gender differentiated needs and interests. This is 
the case for Li Jiahua and her husband who clearly have different preferences as 
to where to live. Li Jiahua would have preferred to stay in the resettlement area 
because her workload was much lighter there than in the place of origin. 
However, her husband did not want to stay because he could not continue his 
donkey trading business. Third, to tackle the root causes of gender inequality 
involves consideration of land allocation and land entitlement in the 
resettlement areas. 
The central gender-specific problem in the current land tenure system in 
China is that women's individual land rights are subsumed under the name of 
the household. The Household Contract System adopted in the late 1970s and 
early 1980s. Under this system, arable land was and still is allocated to each 
rural household based on the number of household members, including men, 
women and children. So, even though the entitlement of land is given to the 
household, the right of each household member is recognized and contributes 
to the total land area given to a household. Changes in household composition 
resulting from death, marriage of sons and daughters and new births are taken 
into account periodically when land adjustments are carried out at village level. 
However, since the mid-1990s, land adjustment has been discouraged by central 
government due to the stability of land use rights. This trend will affect women 
greatly because it is mostly the woman who moves to the man's household after 
marriage in rural areas. Current studies provide some evidence to support the 
case that more women than men in rural areas have no land. A field study in 22 
villages of 17 provinces found that 5 % of women as against 2 % of men were 
landless. However, among 163 married women interviewed, 32 % said they had 
no land. It also emerged that 80 % of those who were married after 1995 had no 
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land (Lin, 2001). Furthermore, entitlement to land in the name of the household 
head means in practice that land is at the disposal of men since they are the 
ones usually registered as head of household. Furthermore, men's decisions are 
socially legitimized at household and community level in this generally 
patriarchal society. To tackle gender inequality over land issues requires not 
only a gender-equal legal framework, but also a change in attitudes to gender 
relations and an awareness of the differentiated property rights5 among both 
men and women. The provision of a gender-equal legal framework is a 
precondition to raising gender concerns over land entitlement in resettlement 
schemes. Yet such a legal framework is still wanting. 
This chapter has used social dynamics as an umbrella concept to embrace 
the flux of a complex reality. The use of orientating concepts drawn from the 
actor-oriented approach, such as agency, kinship, networks, knowledge and 
power configurations were offered as a way of coming to grips with these 
dynamics. The departure point for this actor-oriented perspective has been 
micro-level processes. However this should not imply that its contribution to 
macro-level analysis is negligible. On the contrary, the understanding of macro 
policy and practice must in the final analysis be evaluated at the everyday, 
micro-end of the policy chain. 
5
 As Peter Ho (2001a:394) indicates: '[T]o date there are not many conflicts [over the land issue], 
because farmers are not well imbued with the idea of "property". But problems are sure to arise 
in the future.' 
Conclusion 
The research findings from the two resettlement projects show that the resettled 
population has greatly benefited from resettlement. Those who resettled in 
Ningxia have benefited economically in that they now have higher net cash 
incomes. They have also improved the value of their productive fixed assets 
over the years in the resettlement area. Resettlers now enjoy much better food 
security than those who remained behind and they have access to better water 
sources and to irrigated land, while those remaining still only have access to 
dryland. Resettlers have much better access to markets in terms of distance. 
Furthermore they have access to telecommunications and their children enjoy 
much better educational facilities. Resettlers to the site in Yunnan had only 
moved about one year prior to the research began, so it was still too early to 
assess the outcomes of their move at household level. The benefits at 
community level, however, were already evident. Resettlers are much closer to 
markets and can therefore go more often. They have access to 
telecommunications, and school facilities are much improved. 
My assessment as to who are the beneficiaries of resettlement extends to 
two levels, the village and the household. The villages selected for the 
resettlement project were amongst the relatively better off villages within the 
overall areas of origin. At household level, the majority of those who eventually 
resettled are the better off farmers, while the poor population from the villages 
of origin makes up a very small percentage of the total resettled. Xiapu 
Administrative Village in Ningxia ranks amongst the two best off villages of the 
seven villages in Xiapu Township. Among the total population resettled in the 
research site in Xiapu sub-village, the poor population amounts to only 7 
percent. 
In Manggang Administrative Village, Yunnan, income levels of farmers 
before resettlement were the highest of the nine administrative villages of 
Nanla Township. Here the share of the poorer population reaches 14 percent of 
the total population resettled in the research site in Shangwantang, in 
Shangwantang and Huoshaozhai sub-villages. 
Hence, we can conclude that it is the markedly better off farmers from 
relatively better off villages who have moved and generally benefited from 
resettlement projects within the scope of this research. This finding may not be 
surprising. It is, however, the first piece of empirical research conducted in 
China that focuses on exactly who have been the beneficiaries of government-
organised voluntary resettlement projects aimed at poverty reduction. 
Resettlement is increasingly recognised as an effective instrument for poverty 
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reduction in China. The justification provided for this policy is based on the 
benefits that the resettled population has evidently derived. 
Nevertheless, I argue that it is misleading to base the policy of resettlement 
for reasons of poverty reduction solely on how the resettled population has 
benefited. The first question to ask of a poverty reduction project is whether or 
not it is the poorer households that have benefited. The conclusion of this 
research is that both resettlement projects failed to meet this criterion, even 
though the resettled population has indeed greatly benefited. 
The study explored three dimensions: the socio-economic outcomes of 
resettlement projects, the social dynamics of the resettlement process, and an 
analysis of the resettlement policy. In these respects, it represents innovative 
research on resettlement in China, both in terms of its level and angle of 
analysis, as well as in terms of the concepts used. 
The finding that planned intervention, especially aimed at poverty 
reduction, failed to reach its professed goals is perhaps not an unexpected 
result. But research on this topic is essential for two reasons. First, poverty 
reduction is still a central task of many developing countries, including China, 
and absorbs a significant slice of available resources, and second, research that 
provides new perspectives may hopefully help to improve the effectiveness of 
interventions aimed at reducing poverty. 
The outcomes of the two resettlement schemes researched are, on the one 
hand, the product of the ambivalence of policy and, on the other hand, the 
result of ignorance about the precise social dynamics at community level. 
The ambivalence of policy processes is due to several factors: (1) the 
discontinuities between central government policy formulation and local policy 
interpretation and implementation, (2) misleading development belief systems 
on the part of government institutions and officials, and (3) the dichotomy 
between policy statements and implementation. The ignorance of the social 
dynamics at community level in the resettlement process relates to the fact that 
government-organised voluntary resettlement projects are carried out under a 
planned intervention approach driven by ideologies and development beliefs 
that fail to correspond with local social realities. 
Ambivalence of Policy Processes 
Discontinuity between centrally and locally driven policies 
The newly issued central government poverty reduction policy document, 
'China's General Guideline for Rural Poverty Alleviation and Development in 
2001', states that 'voluntary resettlement should be promoted in a steady 
manner'. The text further emphasises (1) 'Target groups are those very limited 
segments of the population living in extremely poor conditions and in a harsh 
environment lacking minimal natural resources', (2) 'Resettlement projects 
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should be implemented with a view to returning land to forest and grass', and 
(3) 'Resettlement can only be implemented on a voluntary basis.' 
We can interpret central government policy as follows. The starting point 
for central government policy is in the places of origin. Yet, resettlement is not 
an option for the bulk of the poor population but only for the poorest segments 
of the population living in the most difficult places. 
At local government level, there is no clear policy statement referring to 
resettlement. Hence we can trace the policy rationale only through related 
documents and interviews with key officials. The overall development 
objectives for the resettlement areas as set by the authorities of Ningxia 
Province and Xiji County' are to develop the resettlement areas into 
demonstration zones: (1) for 'resettlement for poverty alleviation' generally, (2) 
for modern agriculture, (3) for industrialised agriculture, and (4) for home yard 
production, whereby cash income is generated through high value production 
around the home. However, there is no indication at local level how 
resettlement could contribute directly to the development of the places of 
origin. 
The Provincial authorities of Yunnan appear fully convinced that 
resettlement is the most effective way for poverty reduction and development. 
The following rationale was given2: (1) Resettlement is the most rapid way to 
reduce poverty. (2) It promotes economic and industrial development and 
enhances the value added to production. (3) It reduces population pressure in 
the places of origin, protects natural resources and the environment, 
particularly in the North-East and the South-West of Yunnan. (4) It helps to 
rapidly promote modern concepts amongst farmers, and finally (5) It 
corresponds to the central government development strategy of promoting the 
development of small and medium size towns. 
My interpretation of the local government rationale for supporting 
resettlement is as follows: (1) Resettlement is an instrument for promoting 
regional economic development, for it can promote modern agriculture, 
industrial development and urbanisation in the resettlement areas. (2) The 
positive impact on the places of origin is assumed to take place automatically 
with the reduction of population pressure after resettlement, obviating the need 
to tend to the development of the places of origin. 
Recalling the interpretation of the central government policy statement, the 
discontinuity between central policy and the rationale of local policy and its 
implementation becomes clear. The perception of target groups differs. The 
1
 Source of information: Interview of Mr. Pu Zhenru on August 9,2001, the director of Mingning 
Development Zone of Yongning County of Ningxia Province. 
2
 Source of information: interview of Mr. Yang Bin, the deputy director of Resettlement Division 
of Poverty Alleviation Office of Yunnan. 
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central government defines its target group as the poorest population living in 
the most difficult places. But for the local government, the focus is on those who 
are able to contribute to the economic development of the resettlement areas. 
The perception of the target areas also differs. For central government, it is the 
development of the places of origin via the dual approach of reducing 
population pressure and investing in the turning of marginal land into forests 
and grassland. For local governments, the priority lies in the development of 
the resettlement areas by investing in infrastructure and the introduction of 
fresh labour resources through resettlement. 
The Poverty Alleviation Office of the State Council is responsible for 
poverty alleviation programs both in terms of financial management and policy 
formulation at central government level. For resettlement projects with central 
government participation, the latter will provide up to one third of the total 
financial requirement. The Provincial and County governments are required to 
provide the remaining two thirds. The message, however, from local 
government is that local government itself is not in a position in fact to make 
any contribution of their own due to a lack of resources. Although local 
government is required to submit its proposals for approval to the central 
government, it will in fact follow its own financial plans and objectives when it 
comes to implementation. Hence, in the discontinuity between central and local 
governments, local government is the winning party. 
Misleading Development Belief Systems 
Economic growth and modernisation models drive the development belief 
systems of policy-makers and planners to favour resettlement projects. The 
ideological underpinnings of such belief systems are manifold. There is a belief 
in the trickle-down effect and a denial of the importance of local knowledge. 
Both are used to justify the specific rationale for the policy processes of 
resettlement. The trickle-down approach is used to explain why, in the view of 
local government, the development of the places of origin will take place 
automatically as soon as population pressure becomes less. By denying local 
knowledge, local government brushes aside all knowledge that has enabled the 
poor to survive and live for generations in a harsh environment. Hence the 
places of origin have, in their view, no development potential, and thus do not 
warrant any extra attention as to development needs of their own. 
The widely accepted assumption about resettlement as an effective 
instrument for reducing the poverty in the places of origin thus hinges on, first, 
the reduction of population pressure. This, it is argued, will leave the 
population remaining behind with more living space, more arable land and 
thus much improved food security. And, secondly, it is maintained that 
pressure will be further reduced on natural resources, and as the demand for 
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grain decreases, will facilitate the implementation of returning land to forestry. 
My research findings demonstrate conclusively that such a linear view of social 
change does not tally with what is actually taking place. In the case of Ningxia, 
the reduced population in the wake of resettlement did not create more living 
space for all those left behind, only for the relatives of resettlers. In Xiapu 
Village of Ningxia, no clear policy was laid down on how to handle the land. 
Resettlers left their arable land to their relatives so that they could also maintain 
a right to keep using the land under informal family arrangements3. 
In Manggang village, Yunnan, one year after resettlement had started, no 
clear policy had been formulated either. Again, in the case of Ningxia, no 
increase of forest area occurred between 1994, the year when resettlement 
started, and 2000 when the government-launched a special 'return land to 
forestry' programme4. Hence, the assumed trickle-down effects in the places of 
origin failed to materialize. 
The modernisation approach assumes the dichotomy of 
traditional/backward and modern/advanced societies, which further implies a 
power structure of 'superior-inferior' and 'centre-periphery'. A denial of the 
validity of the local knowledge present in rural communities and among poor 
farmers is the product of such types of power structure. Widely accepted 
views/labels affixed to poor farmers in poor places include the following: Poor 
farmers are not responsive because they are reluctant to change. They are 
ignorant because they fail to appreciate the importance of modern knowledge 
and the value of education. They are considered shortsighted because they 
destroy the natural environment for short-term practical needs/gains. Hence, 
no attention tends to be given to the development of poor places that are 
considered bereft of any development potential according to the standards of 
modern society. I would, however, like to suggest a different view when 
looking at poor farmers and poor communities. 
Firstly, the mixture of macro-level investment and micro-level development 
initiatives leads to the mistaken perception that poor farmers are passive and 
powerless in initiating development. Hence it is largely believed that 
development initiatives are generated from outside, because investment in 
large infrastructure, including electricity, roads and telecommunications, can 
only be decided at a higher level and come via outside support. Furthermore, 
technological innovation is dependent on external inputs. Public infrastructure 
investment and technological innovation is always realised through public 
resources and is not made conditional on a local lack of development initiative. 
Hence, investment linked to resettlement, and made available at the macro level 
only, cannot and should not be used to support the perception that those who 
1
 For detailed information, see section 3.1 of Chapter IV: Access to Land and Food Security. 
4
 For detailed information, see section 3.1.2.3 of Chapter III: Xiapu Village 
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benefit do so because of their superior willingness/ability to make development 
happen, while those who do not are undeserving on account of their presumed 
lack of ability and initiative. 
Secondly, poor farmers are in fact active development agents, especially 
considering the minimal outside support they receive as compared to farmers 
in better off and semi-urban areas. Taking the example of Manggang 
Administrative Village, Yunnan, farmers in that village received virtually no 
outside support until the resettlement projects started in 1999.5 For generations 
they had to make a living without any external assistance, coping with social, 
economic and ecological changes all the time. The population remaining in the 
village has to continue doing so. Thus, in the practical dynamics of everyday 
life, farmers' agency not only initiates but also drives development. Farmers 
initiated the resettlement project in the case of Ningxia, and farmers are 
decisive actors in the failure or success of any effort in afforestation.6 
Thirdly, the low effective, mostly unsustainable, outside support that 
generally ends in failure should not be blamed on the perceived backwardness 
and ignorance of poor farmers. Rather it reflects the lack of appreciation and 
recognition of the significance of local knowledge by elite experts and outsiders. 
Local people are indeed the most knowledgeable about their surroundings and 
they are deeply interested in improving their lives. Hence, if they appear 
passive, ignorant or unresponsive, the indications are that this is linked to the 
type and manner of outside intervention. Take the example of the reforestation 
project in Xiapu Village, Ningxia. Viewing this without any of local knowledge 
might lead to the accusation that local farmers are responsible for the failure of 
the WFP reforestation projects (World Food Program of the United Nations). In 
1982, about 2000 mu (133 ha) were planted with trees under the standard WFP 
'food for work' scheme. When the project ended in 1986 and with it the food 
subsidies, all the trees were gradually cut down in order to make up for the 
deficit in grain production. It is widely believed that farmers need to be 
educated to recognise that tree planting can improve their ecological 
environment and that an improved ecological environment is essential for a 
sustainable livelihood. But, in fact, farmers do have a clear and accurate view of 
the impact of forestry on their ecological environment7. In 2000, the government 
stepped in to support a "return land to forest and grass" scheme, under which 
an area of more than 2,000 mu were planted with trees - two thirds for 
ecological purposes and one third for fruit, and 630 mu of grassland were 
planted. In the field discussion with the village secretary about what might 
5
 For detailed information, see section 3.2.4 of Chapter III: a brief historical profile of Manggang 
Administrative Village 
6
 For detailed information and argument, see section 1 of Chapter V 
7
 See table 3-6 of Chapter III: SWOT analysis of "Return Land to Forestry and Grass" by the 
farmers in Xiapu Village 
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happen when government subsidies stopped, Ma Zhengxuan thought that the 
fruit trees and grassland might have a chance to survive, but that the trees for 
ecological purposes might be cut down again because they bring no grain or 
cash to village households. 
We can reasonably understand farmers' attitudes and behaviour only if we 
appreciate farmers' local knowledge and experience, generated from within 
their life worlds. Here, the notion of local knowledge is not a narrowly defined 
in opposition to scientific knowledge. Instead the point concerns the recognition 
of the social, economic and cultural components of local communities. Only by 
recognising and understanding better farmers' local knowledge and skills, can 
we interpret farmers' attitudes and behaviour accurately and possibly provide 
them with appropriate support. This is essential to the success of resettlement 
projects and to the goal of promoting poverty reduction in general. 
The Dichotomy of Policy Statement and Policy Implementation 
To justify investment in resettlement, poverty reduction is always claimed as 
the major objective. However, the pay-off of poverty reduction efforts is 
generally low and therefore does little to advance either the standing of the 
responsible institution or the careers of the officials concerned. This has led to 
the dichotomy of policy statement and implementation. As a result, the pursuit 
of other interests displaces the objective of poverty reduction. The Mangkaba 
resettlement site was chosen by the Province as a provincial demonstration site 
for such resettlement projects. In China, once a demonstration site has been 
established many visitors will begin to stream in, especially high level officials. 
Local officials would therefore always try their best to set up a site in a manner 
that visibly demonstrates their achievements. In this case the officials identified 
as one of the most important indicators for good demonstration effects, the 
appearance of the resettlement village. Accordingly, resettlers were not allowed 
to build straw and wood houses, but were required to build new houses with 
stone foundations and walls of brick to a height of at least 80cm. As a result, the 
poorer farmers from the villages of origin were unable to afford to build a 
standard house, which became one of the key reasons preventing them from 
moving.8 
Ignorance of Community Social Dynamics in the Resettlement Processes 
Government-organised voluntary resettlement projects carry the ideologies and 
development beliefs typical of a planned intervention approach, which fail to 
8
 For detailed information and discussion, look at section 3 of Chapter V 
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recognise and match the social dynamics of rural communities. To outsiders, 
rural communities are like 'black boxes'. The dynamics of these 'boxes' are the 
workings of local social networks and organising practices associated with 
collective endeavour and conflict generation and resolution, local power 
configurations, and a rich repertoire of memories of the past based on 
community and individual experience. The deployment of certain central 
concepts in this thesis such as agency, trust built upon bonds of kinship and 
friendship, social networks, knowledge and power configurations constitute a 
concerted effort to unpack these 'black boxes'. Due to ignorance of the 
dynamics of local communities, planned interventions - based as they are on 
predetermined standards, criteria, categories, regulations and timing - often fail 
to reach their objectives; and perhaps even worse, they get no closer to 
understanding the fundaments of social and cultural life and their potentials for 
creating novel forms of enterprise. 
Heterogeneity and Social Dynamics 
Agrarian change is complex and from the very beginning requires working 
with the concept of heterogeneity (Long, 2001:44), and in the process 
responding to the dynamics of different social forms. People may argue about 
whether it is possible, given the complexities involved, to take heterogeneity 
into full consideration in any project. Firstly, it is not easy to obtain knowledge 
of local heterogeneity and difficult to develop a project framework that takes it 
into account. Take for example the setting up of criteria. It is said, they need to 
be 'neat and clean'. In the case of Yunnan, seven criteria were identified for the 
selection of resettlers. However, in reality none of the seven criteria guided the 
selection procedure. One of the seven concerned income level, specified as 
having a net income of less than 560 yuan, or about US$68. Income level is the 
most widely used standard or criterion in development projects but in my view 
it is problematic as an indicator in complex rural communities where sources of 
income are diverse and often irregular. Hence it is next to impossible to get to 
know the net income of each individual household. In contrast, urban 
households receive relatively regular, fixed wages and, unlike rural 
smallholders, meet most of their 'subsistence' requirements through purchasing 
foodstuffs and other goods. I have not come across a single resettlement or 
development project that has in fact targeted the beneficiary group by applying 
a defined income level as the indicator, although many project documents make 
such a claim. 
My research findings show that those who actually moved did so on 
account of the social and economic dynamics pertaining in their communities. 
In the initial stage of resettlement in Ningxia, kinship relations played a very 
important role. Among the 60 pioneer resettlers to Moon Village, Ningxia, most 
were related as brothers, cousins, uncles and in-laws, hence the predominance 
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of the family name Ma. Kinship is the basis for mutual trust and support, and 
extends to sharing labour, money and mutual support in potential conflict 
situations with the authorities. Furthermore kinship affords safety throughout 
the difficult initial stage of resettlement when the future of the entire scheme 
itself is still uncertain.9 Throughout the process of resettlement, social networks 
continue to play a very important role. In the case of Yunnan, none of the 
resettlers could by themselves afford to cover the cost related to resettlement, 
especially of house construction. The social network became the key source of 
financial support for the resettlers. Those who were not able to mobilise their 
social networks failed to move. My case studies show that social networks work 
differently for the better off and the poorer segments of the community. A 
better-off family finds it easier to mobilise a network for financial and other 
support, while the poor have difficulty maintaining effective social networks.10 
Respecting and working with the concept of heterogeneity does not, 
however, mean that an understanding of the local complexities is beyond 
reasonable reach. On the contrary, it is the key to understanding the local 
situation and to according respect to the views of farmers. In the field survey I 
used 'household sorting', a participatory rural appraisal tool," in order to 
identify the relative level of a farmers' livelihood within a given community. It 
transpired that farmers from different communities, even just neighbouring 
sub-villages, often used different indicators to define their livelihood situations. 
For example, in Shang Wan Tang sub-village, Yunnan, farmers used savings, 
food and clothing as indicators (Table 4-2). In the neighbouring sub-village of 
Huo Shao Zhai, farmers used paddy field holdings and the number of buffaloes 
as indicators (Table 4-3). In any case farmers themselves are the ones with the 
best knowledge of their communities and working with the notion of 
heterogeneity provides the entry to tapping this source of knowledge, and 
going to the core of local situations. Standardised and simplified indicators 
generally remain relegated to paper. 
9
 For detailed information and discussion, see section 2 of Chapter V: The function of kinship -
shared risk produces a safer feeling. 
'" For detailed information and discussion, see section 3 of chapter V: Social network - it works 
differently for different people. 
" See section 4 of Chapter II: Research Design and Research Methods/Tools 
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Time Span12 
Planned intervention seen both in terms of ideology and practice must go 
beyond the time definitions inherent in the conventional policy model (Long, 
2001:32). One might argue that the definition of a time framework is central to 
project design, budgeting and the planning of inputs. Yet, the time framework 
adopted on paper often only serves the purpose of bureaucratic reporting, and 
bears little relation to the pace of development on the ground. 
In the case of Ningxia, the resettlement project office required the second 
group of farmers who registered and qualified for resettling to move 
immediately after land allocation was completed in early 1994.13 However, the 
great majority of farmers failed to respond to this official request. In order to 
reinforce the request the management office increased the pressure by 
threatening to rescind the right of resettlement unless farmers had built a 
reasonable house in the resettlement area by the summer of 1994. With fear of 
losing the right of resettlement many farmers went to the site to build their 
houses, but they did not move their families even after completing the house 
construction. In the end, most farmers came to live in the new area some three 
years later, in 1997. For a planned intervention there is a clear beginning, 
demarcated by the definition of goals and means, and a final cut-off point, the 
'end' of the project as defined in the typical evaluation report. During project 
implementation in Ningxia, the resettlement management office had a clear 
concept of timing indicating when the first, second and the third group of 
resettlers should settle. But, in reality, "people process their own experience of 
'project' and 'intervention'" (ibid:32). In Moon Village, Ningxia, resettlers were 
due to settle in 1994. However, in reality, most resettlement activity took place 
in 1997, and resettlers have continued to move in gradually, year by year, to the 
present. When I visited Moon village in the summer of 2001, there were still 
empty plots in between maize fields. I was informed that the plots had been 
allocated, but that the farmers who held user rights had not yet moved in. 
Hence, on the ground the 'project' continues to evolve long after its official end 
or, as we say, 'its sell-by date'. 
Farmers act in accordance with their personal knowledge and experience. 
With different levels of knowledge about the resettlement area, they decide on 
the pace of response to the resettlement framework of timing. Some farmers 
respond quickly. But this does not mean they are working to the same time 
scale of the planned intervention. On the contrary, they are processing and 
12
 In ADB involuntary resettlement policy, a similar concept was introduced phrased as "a social 
preparation phase". The policy stated: "Where adversely affected people are particularly 
vulnerable, resettlement and compensation decisions should be preceded by a social 
preparation phase to build up the capacity of the vulnerable people to deal with the issues." 
13
 For detailed timeline of the development of the resettlement area, please see the Brief Profile 
of the Development of the Resettlement Area in Chapter VI 
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transforming government intervention so it fits with the exigencies of their own 
lifeworlds. In the case of Ningxia, some farmers decided to move because they 
knew that wage labour opportunities existed in the resettlement area that 
offered them a promising future in the resettlement area. Poorer farmers, 
however, are frequently much slower in responding to the emerging 
opportunities than the better off. This is not only caused by their different 
economic capacity, but also by their different perception of the situation. 
Moreover, the superior economic situation of the better off allows them more 
mobility than is the case for poorer farmers and therefore they may acquire a 
broader experience and knowledge. 
Rising Power of Society in Negotiating Government Policy 
The tradition of planned intervention puts trust in the state's dominant role in 
the allocation and management of resources and believes in the state's 
authority, mandate and capacity for implementation in social and economic 
planning. Such a tradition is still dominant in China's policy process. A 
pluralist view of the state - a popular liberal image - is not directly relevant to 
the predominantly central planning system of China. Nevertheless, it is 
undeniable that there are pressures in China from various sectors of civil 
society to engage in negotiation with government over specific policies. There is 
also a clear move by government and the party to decentralise administratively 
and to encourage greater regional and local autonomy. 
The perspective of state-society synergy discussed in chapter two offers a 
positive view of the development of state-society relations. However, such 
synergy relies on the existence of a strong state and a well-balanced alliance 
between the state and private/civil interests. Strictly speaking, this model may 
not be relevant to situations where one or either of the parties is weak or 
underdeveloped. In China, the development of civil society is weak and thus 
Chinese researchers face the difficulty of identifying what in other contexts is 
described as 'civil society'. However, this does not mean that there exists no 
space for claim making and for negotiating with the state. Indeed there is 
growing evidence that in many multifarious ways 'citizens' (also a difficult 
concept to pin down in the Chinese context since there are many words for this 
type of political-cum-cultural 'belongingness', see Goldman and Perry, 2002) 
can advance their socio-political projects. In short there are a host of other kinds 
of social power besides that of the state or party. This is illustrated by the 
struggles that took place in the formation of the resettlement in Ningxia. 
The story about the origins of the Minning resettlement project in Ningxia 
shows how farmers lobbied to have the area recognised legally as a resettlement 
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zone14. From this case we can see how a farmer leader, supported by the mass of 
farmers, engages with government to get approval for what is essentially a poor 
farmers' project. The Minning resettlement area was originally not an officially 
recognised resettlement area. Seeking development opportunities, farmers from 
a dryland area, under the leadership of a village secretary, succeeded in 
shaping a government resolution to officially recognise the area and thus to 
include it in government plans for the construction of a new irrigation 
infrastructure. Most people, especially the Chinese, are accustomed to thinking 
that government is the most powerful body in shaping their actions. However, 
in this case, we may conclude that, while government had the authority which 
could be turned into the power to shape people's actions, it was a network of 
agricultural labourers who working on the nearby state farm and officials who 
succeeded in pushing the state into acknowledging their claims to land and 
their status as settlers That is, this network of actors created enough strategic 
agency to win the battle (cf. Long, 2001:19,240). 
The other case that illustrates the rise of social power concerns the issue of 
land sales within the resettlement area in Ningxia15. The irrigated land in the 
resettlement area has become very valuable, especially after several years of 
investment by both government and farmers. According to my field interviews, 
the price of land in the Minning resettlement area has increased about 50 times 
since 1990. Land is being sold and purchased even though smallholder arable 
land in China is not yet privatised. Governments at different levels have 
formulated policies to stop such trade in land. However, I was told in the field 
survey that the Resettlement Office was unable to halt the process because 
resistance was too great. It was estimated that more than 30% of the resettlers 
had purchased their land. 
The implications of the two cases are complex. We may interpret the 
situation as one where the government is now giving more room to farmers' 
interests and voice, which represents a positive movement towards a more 
'open' state. Or we may interpret it as showing how the increasing economic 
power of individual farmers enables them to acquire space for "invisible" 
negotiation (invisible in terms of having no trace in official documentation). 
However, another aspect of this is the negative effect all this has on the poorer 
households, since it is the socially and economically advantaged groups who 
manage to wield such powers of leverage. Also my research clearly documents 
how it is predominantly the better-off families who mobilise support from their 
existing networks in order to make the move to the resettlement area. Thus 
interpersonal social ties are, at least in this regard, more productive for the 
better off and are often quickly depleted among the poor. 
14
 For the detailed story, see chapter six: 6.1 Farmers' Agency - A force to press their interests. 
15
 For the detailed story, see chapter six: Discussion of section 6.1. 
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These issues concerning the differential power relations evolving in rural 
China raise more questions than they can provide answers. There is in fact a 
great deal of detailed empirical research yet to be carried out if we are to come 
grips with the development of state-society synergies in the Chinese context. 
Implications for policy practice 
Resettlement under the current policy and implementation model is not an 
appropriate approach for alleviating the poverty of the poorest sectors of the 
population. Firstly, the development belief systems dominated by the economic 
growth model and modernisation approach tend to divert planned 
interventions away from the goals of poverty reduction towards the pursuit of 
economic growth. Secondly, the dynamics of local communities tend to 
consistently favour the better-off groups whenever opportunities emerge, even 
when on the surface they appear to hold promise for both the better-off and 
poorer groups of farmers. 
Being powerless to change the development belief systems in the short-
term, one might hope that the poorer might obtain some benefits from what the 
better off do not need. But this would depend on charity. A pragmatic way 
forward would simply be to make better use of funds earmarked for poverty 
reduction and thus to draw a clear distinction between projects aiming at 
poverty reduction and at economic development. Ideological and 
methodological distinctions between economic growth and poverty reduction 
may be defined as follows: 
(1) Economic growth and poverty reduction follow different laws. Economic 
growth should follow the laws of the market economy, while poverty 
reduction must make special policy provision for the poorer segments that, 
as a rule, find themselves vulnerable and easily exploited in a free market 
economy. 
(2) Economic growth and poverty reduction follow a different pace. The linear 
approach can be applied to economic development, whereby the 
cost/benefit analysis of inputs/outputs and the expectation of quick 
returns are paramount. However, due to the complexity of the causes of 
poverty and its linkage with institutional arrangements and power 
configurations, it is hard to predict the pace of any poverty reduction 
project, which as a rule tends to be slow. 
(3) Economic growth and poverty reduction have to be measured differently. 
The measurement of economic growth is purely based on economic 
achievements, with income as the single most important indicator. In 
contrast, the measurement of poverty reduction is more complex, and, 
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while addressing the root causes of poverty, frequently eludes purely 
quantitative indicators. 
The rationale for such distinctions is based firstly on the recognition of social 
and economic stratification within poor populations, and secondly, on the need 
to tackle the different segments of the poor in different ways. My research 
findings and analysis show that the impact of planned intervention varies for 
different segments of the poor in relation to their position in the social and 
economic pyramid. The terms 'the better-off and 'the poorer' are used 
throughout and catch the two extremes of such stratification. Vague in 
themselves when taken out of context, the categorisations and indicators used 
for defining social and economic stratification or relative levels of livelihood in 
my research have been established on the basis of group discussions with 
farmers in the research communities. The recognition and the identification of 
the different levels of livelihood of the poor thus become a pre-condition for 
any action to assist the poorer groups. 
If projects aimed at poverty reduction are to benefit the poorer, the 
following two practical proposals may be considered: (1) Projects should offer 
something that the better off do not want but that the poorer need, such as 
micro-credit schemes. Clearly both the better off and the poorer are in need of 
credit. However, in a couple of micro-credit projects16 that I have personally 
visited, the majority of the poorer did become involved and benefited, while the 
better-off became disinterested because the loans were too small and the 
requirement for borrowers to meet once a week was too cumbersome. (2) 
Projects should make sure that the poorer are not left out when they offer 
something that both the better off and the poorer want. In community-based 
projects, such as those aimed at returning land to forestry and pasture, and in 
drinking water supply schemes, special efforts should be made to inform the 
poorer, involve them and give them at least equal access. Such affirmative 
action should be designed and implemented in order to ensure that the poorer 
are not left out. 
This line of argument is not meant to ignore the linkage between economic 
growth and poverty reduction. However, as my research has shown, the 
distinction between the two processes is essential for approaching the goal of 
poverty reduction. The distinction does not imply that the poorer are never part 
of the overall stream of economic development. Indeed the aim of affirmative 
policy and action is geared to shielding the poorer from the negative impacts 
that economic growth models tend to entail. 
"The evaluations of micro-credit schemes are mixed. I here do not want to open up the 
discussion on micro-credit schemes here, but to use it as example to raise up possibilities. 
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Considering now the issue of resettlement projects, we can formulate the 
following proposals and concerns: 
(1) Resettlement projects, especially large scale ones involving huge 
infrastructural investment, should be largely regarded as economic 
development projects. From this it follows that: 
• Resources earmarked for poverty reduction should not be used, or 
investments justified in terms of poverty issues. 
• A socio-economic assessment should be conducted in order that relevant 
social and economic policies can be formulated. 
• A cost/benefit analysis of the investment and its likely economic returns 
must be based on sound baseline economic studies. 
• An environmental impact assessment should also be conducted. 
• Monitoring mechanisms should be well designed and implemented. 
(2) Resettlement projects aiming at poverty reduction or having components of 
poverty reduction should consider the following dimensions: 
• The units of places of origin should be small enough to allow for the 
proper targeting of the poorer communities. 
• Clear and site-specific selection criteria of places of origin should be 
formulated and implemented. 
• A dual approach should be adopted whereby equal emphasis is paid to 
places of origin as to resettlement sites. 
• Investment in places of origin is often considered economically 
inefficient and therefore not promoted. Yet, precisely because the 
response of farmers to resettlement is often slow, it becomes necessary to 
do so in order to assist those who remain or who cannot mobilise 
sufficient resources to make the move. Thus a fair level of investment 
must also be considered for places of origin as well as for resettlement 
areas. 
• Investment contributions by prospective resettlers should be as low as 
possible; for instance, housing standards should not be set. 
• The time framework for the resettlement process should reflect the 
poorer farmers' own pace of change. Concomitantly, difficulties with the 
completion of the social and physical infrastructure are likely to arise 
when the pace of resettlement is too slow. Therefore special provision is 
needed to address this risk. 
• Throughout the resettlement process, farmers should be encouraged to 
participate fully in processes of decision-making, implementation and 
monitoring; and of course male and female farmers should be eligible. 
• A policy assessment should be conducted in order to formulate an 
appropriate policy framework for meeting project goals. 
• A monitoring mechanism should be formulated and implemented. 
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While the above proposals and considerations arise out of the arguments 
presented in this thesis, they must necessarily remain sketchy and indicative. 
They can only delineate roughly the terrain explored in the main body of the 
thesis. Yet they certainly warrant more systematic research and could, with 
more serious attention, result in the design and practice of more beneficial 
modes of government intervention. 
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Summary 
The primary concern of this research is the justice of using government resources 
for poverty reduction, in other words investigating whether or not such 
investment has served its claimed purpose. My central argument is that 
government organized resettlement projects have mobilized many resources and 
some have brought potential prosperity to the resettled farmers. However, they 
have not sufficiently benefited the government claimed target groups, namely the 
poorer populations of the places of origin. Many of the beneficiaries are not the 
poorer members of the population but come instead from the more affluent of 
those places. 
This central argument is elaborated in three dimensions: the socio-economic 
dimension (Chapter IV), the development sociology dimension (Chapter V), and 
the policy dimension (the focus of Chapter VI). These three dimensions are not 
seen as parallel analyses but are used in a complementary way. Government policy 
is seen as an important pre-condition for large-scale resettlement. Socio-economic 
factors are evaluated to illustrate the outcome of resettlement projects. Sociological 
debates about development are explored to interpret the processes that have 
brought about this outcome. The socio-economic analysis provides evidence of 
who has benefited and in what ways. My argument in regard to development 
sociology is that given the dynamics of resettlement, better-off fanners will take 
economic advantage, utilize their knowledge and use their well-established social 
networks to benefit directly from the resettlement while poorer farmers, who are 
supposed to be the first to benefit, get left out. The argument in the policy 
dimension is that when modernization theory and the economic growth model 
dominate the rationale of policy formulation and implementation, a poverty 
reduction policy will not serve its aim. 
This thesis consists of seven chapters. The first chapter introduces the issues of 
resettlement by outlining why I chose the research topic, the relevance and 
significance of the research in China, and the position of the form of resettlement I 
studied in relation to the different forms of population movement. Chapter II 
discusses the development of the research methodology for responding to the 
research hypothesis and research questions identified. The thesis adopts an actor-
oriented approach as the basic theoretical orientation and combines ethnographic 
and participatory research (PRA) methods with a questionnaire survey. Chapter III 
introduces the research areas. It emphasises community level information and 
farmers' reflections on their own living places. Chapter IV analyses the structural 
outcomes of the resettlement projects. It gives data on how the resettlers have 
benefited from resettlement. Chapter V examines the social dynamics at 
community and household levels and their impact on the outcome of resettlement 
while Chapter VI provides information about achievements in the resettlement 
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areas and explores policy dimensions in order to show the roles played by specific 
policies in generating resettlement outcomes. Critiques are made about the 
rationale and consequences of the policies. Finally, in Chapter VIII pull together 
the findings and arguments made throughout the thesis and draw conclusions in 
terms of understanding why the goal of poverty reduction is not met as claimed. 
My research is basically qualitative research, though it uses a quantitative 
method - a questionnaire - to conduct the sample survey, the results of which 
basically serve the purpose of fact finding. It uses the case study, which I 
understand to be a general summary of all qualitative research methods. In this 
sense, my whole research project is a case study. I justify the use of the case study 
by Mitchell's argument that: 
'the process of inference from case studies is only logical or causal and cannot be statistical and that 
extrapolability from any one case study to like situations in general is based only on logical 
inference. We infer that the features present in the case study will be related in a wider population 
not because the case is representative but because our analysis is unassailable.' (Mitchell, 1983: 
200) 
Chapter four evaluates and compares the outcomes of the two resettlement 
projects chosen for study, giving specific attention to socio-economic factors. My 
analysis focuses on who has benefited and in what ways. 
The research findings from two resettlement projects show that the resettled 
population has greatly benefited from resettlement. Those who resettled in 
Ningxia benefited economically in that they now have higher net cash incomes. 
The value of their productive fixed assets over the years in the resettlement area 
has also increased. Resettlers now enjoy much better food security than those who 
remained behind and they have access to better water sources and to irrigated 
land. Resettlers have much better access to markets in terms of distance. 
Furthermore resettlers have access to telecommunications and their children enjoy 
much better educational facilities. The resettlers to the site in Yunnan had only 
moved about one year prior to the research, so it was still too early to assess the 
outcomes of their move at household level. The benefits at community level, 
however, were already evident. Like the resettlers in Ningxia they are much closer 
to markets and can therefore go more often and they likewise have access to 
telecommunications and better and school facilities. 
My assessment as to who the beneficiaries of resettlement are extends to two 
levels, the village and the household. The villages selected for the resettlement 
project are amongst the relatively better off villages within the overall areas of 
origin. At household level, the majority of those who eventually re-settled are the 
better-off farmers, while the poor population from the villages of origin constitutes 
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only a very small percentage of the re-settled total. The Administrative Village of 
Xiapu in Ningxia is one of the two best-off villages of the seven such villages in 
Xiapu Township. Among the total population resettled in the research site in 
Xiapu sub-village or hamlet, the poor population constitutes only 7 percent. 
In Manggang Administrative Village of Yunnan, the income levels of farmers 
before resettlement were the highest of the nine Administrative Villages of Nanla 
Township. Here the share of the poorer population reaches 14 percent of the total 
number resettled in the research site in Shangwantang, in Shangwantang and 
Huoshaozhai sub-villages. 
Chapter 5 identifies the social factors that have contributed to the outcome of 
resettlement and examines how economic factors operate within existing social 
dynamics. My argument is that in the process of resettlement the better-off farmers 
are better placed to take economic advantage, manoeuvre within local power 
configurations, utilize their knowledge, mobilize their well-established social 
networks, and thus benefit directly. In this situation, it is the poorer farmers - the 
supposed beneficiaries - who are generally left out. Economic factors, then, are 
important but they do not offer a complete and satisfactory explanation for these 
outcomes. Indeed, economic benefit is frequently the result of other social factors. 
This chapter uses 'social dynamics' as an umbrella concept to embrace the flux 
of a complex reality. An actor-oriented approach and the use of orientating 
concepts such as agency, kinship, networks, knowledge and power configurations 
were offered as a way of coming to grips with these dynamics. The departure point 
for this actor-oriented perspective has been micro-level processes. However, this 
should not imply that its contribution to macro-level analysis is negligible. On the 
contrary, the understanding of macro policy must in the final analysis be evaluated 
at the end of the policy implementation chain. 
Chapter 6 falls into two parts. Part I is a detailed description of policies and 
policy implementation. It covers information at national and regional/provincial 
level, and at the level of the research sites. The information is drawn from 
government documents, secondary data and interviews with government officials. 
Part II builds upon the empirical findings and analysis of these two case studies in 
order to offer a research-based assessment of Chinese resettlement policy. 
The outcome of the resettlement projects researched are the joint products of 
the ambivalence of policy processes on the one hand, and an ignorance of the 
social dynamics at community level in the resettlement process on the other. The 
ambivalence of policy processes refers to (1) the discontinuity between central 
government policy formulation and local policy formulation and implementation, 
(2) misleading development belief systems (Long, 2001:46) on the part of 
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government institutions and officials, and (3) the dichotomy between policy 
statement and policy implementation. The ignorance of social dynamics at 
community level in the resettlement process relates to the fact that government-
organised voluntary resettlement projects are carried out under a planned 
intervention approach driven by ideologies and development beliefs that fail to 
correspond with the social dynamics of rural communities. Any pragmatic way 
forward to making better use of scarce poverty reduction resources, assuming that 
it is not possible to change development belief systems in the short-term while 
hoping that the poorer may obtain benefit from what the better-off do not need, 
would first and foremost need to distinguish between projects aiming at poverty 
reduction and those aimed at economic development. 
The rationale for such distinctions is based firstly on the recognition of social 
and economic stratification within poor populations, and secondly, on the need to 
tackle the different segments of the poor in different ways. My research findings 
and analysis show that the impact of planned intervention varies for different 
segments of the poor in relation to their position in the social and economic 
pyramid. The terms 'the better-off and 'the poorer' are used throughout and catch 
the two extremes of such stratification. Vague in themselves when taken out of 
context, the categorisations and indicators used for defining social and economic 
stratification or relative livelihood levels of my research have been established on 
the basis of group discussions with farmers in the research communities. The 
recognition and the identification of the different livelihood levels of the poor thus 
become a pre-condition for any action to assist the poorer groups. 
If projects aimed at poverty reduction are to benefit the poorer, the following 
two practical proposals may be considered: (1) Projects should offer something 
that the better off do not want but that the poorer need, such as micro-credit 
schemes. Clearly both the better off and the poorer are in need of credit. However, 
in a couple of micro-credit projects1 that I personally visited, the majority of the 
poorer got involved and benefited, while the better-off were disinterested because 
the loans were too small and the requirement for borrowers to meet once a week 
was too cumbersome. (2) Projects should make sure that the poorer are not left out 
when they offer something that both the better off and the poorer want. In 
community-based projects, such as those aimed at returning land to forestry and 
pasture, and in drinking water supply schemes, special efforts should be made to 
inform the poorer, involve them and give them at least equal access. Such 
1
 The evaluations of micro-credit schemes are mixed. I do not want to open up the discussion on 
micro-credit schemes here, but to raise it as example of a possibility. 
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affirmative action should be designed and implemented in order to ensure that the 
poorer are not left out. 
This line of argument is not meant to ignore the linkage between economic 
growth and poverty reduction. However, as my research has shown, the 
distinction between the two processes is essential for approaching the goal of 
poverty reduction for the poorer members of communities. It does not imply that 
the poorer are never part of the overall stream of economic development. Indeed 
the aim of affirmative policy and action is geared to shielding the poorer from the 
negative impacts that economic growth models tend to entail. 
Samenvatting 
De voornaamste belang van dit onderzoek is de billijkheid van het gebruik van 
overheidsmiddelen voor armoedebestrijding, in andere woorden om te 
onderzoeken of zulke investeringen hun doel hebben gediend. Mijn kernargument 
is dat door de overheid georganiseerde hervestigingprojecten vele bronnen 
gemobiliseerd hebben, en sommige de mogelijkheid van voorspoed aan de 
hervestigde boeren hebben gebracht. Zij hebben echter de doelgroep van de 
overheid, namelijk de armere bevolking van de oorsprongsplaatsen, niet 
voldoende gebaat. Velen van de begunstigden zijn niet de armere leden van de 
bevolking, maar de meer welvarenden van deze plaatsen. 
Het kernargument van mijn proefschrift is in drie dimensies uitgewerkt: De 
socio-economische dimensie (het brandpunt van hoofdstuk vier). Socio-economische 
factoren worden geevalueerd om de uitslag van de hervestigingprojecten te 
bepalen. De socio-economische analyse verschaft getuigenis van wie er heeft 
gebaat en op welke wijzen. De gegevens voor de socio-economische analyse 
komen van zowel het vraagonderzoek als het participatieve onderzoek. 
De beleidsdimensie (het brandpunt van hoofdstuk vijf). Overheidsbeleid 
wordt gezien als een belangrijke voorwaarde voor grootschalige hervestiging. Het 
argument in de beleidsdimensie is dat beleid voor de bestrijding van armoede zijn 
doelen niet zal bereiken wanneer de moderniseringstheorie en het economisch 
groeimodel de logica van de beleidsformulering- en uitvoering beheersen. Dit 
hoofdstuk presenteert eerst in detail de officiele versie van het hervestigingbeleid. 
Verderop in de discussie toont het onderzoek de hiaten tussen de bedoelingen en 
de huidige uitkomsten van het hervestigingproces. Op dit punt toont de 
beleidsanalyse het belang van het 'ontmythologiseren van geplande tussenkomst'. 
De dimensie van de ontwikkelingssociologie (het brandpunt van hoofdstuk 
zes). Sociologische debatten over ontwikkeling worden onderzocht om de 
processen te verklaren die tot deze uitslag hebben geleid. Mijn argument met 
betrekking tot de ontwikkelingssociologie is dat, gegeven de dynamiek van 
hervestiging, beter gestelde boeren economisch voordeel grijpen en hun kennis en 
gevestigde sociale netwerken gebruiken om rechtstreeks nut uit de hervestiging te 
halen, terwijl armere boeren, die geacht worden de eerste begunstigden te zijn, 
buitengesloten worden. Het gebruik van een interface perspectief en van de 
kernbegrippen van de actor gerichte benadering stelt mij in staat om te verklaren 
wat er precies is gebeurd in het hervestigingproces, en waarom een 
ontwikkelingsproject niet enkel het uitvoeren van overheidsbeleid betreft. 
Dit proefschrift bestaat uit zeven hoofdstukken. Het eerste hoofdstuk beoogt 
de kwesties van hervestiging ter tafel te brengen door mijn interesse in dit 
onderwerp, de bijdrage van eerder onderzoek tot dit thema, en het belang van dit 
onderzoek voor China - zowel historisch als hedendaags - aan te geven. 
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Hoofdstuk twee beoogt een analytisch uitzicht op geplande tussenkomst te 
ontwikkelen. Daarin bekritiseer ik het economische groeimodel en de 
moderniserings-benadering, en bouw ik een analytisch kader gebaseerd op nieuwe 
kijkwijzen op relaties tussen staat en maatschappij, gebruik makend van actor 
gerichte analyse, de partidpatieve benadering, en gedachten over synergie tussen 
staat en maatschappij. Hoofdstuk drie stelt de onderzoeksgebieden voor. De 
nadruk ligt op informatie op en vanuit gemeenschapsniveau en op 
boerengedachten over hun eigen leefomgeving. Hoofdstuk vier ontleedt de 
structurele gevolgen van de hervestigingprojecten, en verschaft gegevens over hoe 
de hervestigden baat hadden bij de hervestiging. Hoofdstuk vijf biedt informatie 
over prestaties in de gebieden van hervestiging, en onderzoekt verschillende 
beleidsdimensies om aan te geven welke rollen bepaalde beleidsmaatregelen 
hebben gespeeld bij het bereiken van de uitslagen van hervestiging. De basis en de 
gevolgen van het beleid worden bekritiseerd. Het zesde hoofdstuk van het 
proefschrift onderzoekt de sociale dynamiek op gemeenschap- en 
huishoudenniveau en hun invloed op de uitslag van hervestiging. In hoofdstuk 
zeven tenslotte breng ik mijn bevindingen en argumenten uit de hele proefschrift 
bij elkaar, en trek ik conclusies om te begrijpen waarom het doel van 
armoedebestrijding niet is gehaald zoals wordt beweerd. 
Mijn onderzoek is in de grond een kwalitatief onderzoek, hoewel het een 
kwantitatieve methode gebruikt - een vraagonderzoek- om een steekproef-
onderzoek uit te voeren, waarvan de uitkomsten in de grond dienen om feiten te 
vinden. Het onderzoek gebruikt de gevalsstudie, welke ik beschouw als de 
grondslag van alle kwalitatieve onderzoeksmethoden. In deze zin is mijn hele 
onderzoeksproject een gevalsstudie. Ik verantwoord het gebruik van de 
gevalsstudie door Mitchell's argument dat: 
'het proces van gevolgtreldcing uit gevalsstudies is slechts logisch of oorzakelijk en kan niet 
statistisch zijn, en (..) de mogelijkheid om uit welke gemlsstudie dan ook naar vergelijkbare 
situaties is in het algemeen te extrapoleren slechts gegrond op logische gevolgtrekking. Wij leiden af 
dat de kenmerken die aanwezig zijn in de gevalsstudie verband houden in een bredere bevolking 
omdat onze analyse onweerlegbaar is, niet omdat het geval representatiefzou zijn.' (Mitchell 1983: 
200) 
De belangrijkste voor dit onderzoek gebruikte methoden zijn een vraagonderzoek 
en geselecteerde technieken ontleend aan participatory rural appraisal (PRA). Een 
interface perspectief en geslachtszaken lopen door de hele analyse en discussie van 
veldgegevens. Een interface analyse sluit methodologisch in dat zij onderzoekers 
leidt naar waar en hoe inzichten uit sociale gebeurtenissen en -processen te 
winnen. 
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Hoofdstuk vier evalueert en vergelijkt de uitkomsten van de twee 
hervestigingprojecten die zijn gekozen voor onderzoek, met specifieke aandacht 
voor sociaal-economische factoren. Mijn analyse concentreert zich op wie er baat 
had en op welke wijzen. 
De bevindingen van het onderzoek in twee hervestigingprojecten tonen dat de 
hervestigde bevolking veel baat had bij de hervestiging. Zij die in Ningxia 
hervestigden gingen er economisch op vooruit, zij hebben nu hogere netto 
geldinkomsten. Ook de waarde van hun vaste productiegoederen is over de jaren 
gegroeid. De hervestigden verheugen zich in meer voedselzekerheid dan de 
achterblijvers en hebben toegang tot betere waterbronnen en tot bevloeid land. De 
hervestigden wonen dichter bij de markt. Bovendien hebben de hervestigden 
toegang tot telecommunicatie, en hun kinderen verheugen zich in veel betere 
onderwijsvoorzieningen. Zij die in Yunnan hervestigden zijn pas een jaar voor het 
onderzoek verhuisd, het was dus nog te vroeg om de uitkomsten van hun 
verhuizing op huishoudenniveau te schatten. De baten op gemeenschapsniveau 
echter waren reeds duidelijk. Net zoals de hervestigden in Ningxia wonen zij 
dichter bij markten en kunnen daar dus vaker naartoe gaan, en zij hebben ook 
toegang tot telecommunicatie en betere onderwijsvoorzieningen. 
Mijn beoordeling wie de begunstigden waren van de hervestiging gaat uit 
naar twee niveaus, het dorp en het huishouden. De voor het hervestigingproject 
uitgekozen dorpen behoren tot de naar verhouding beter gestelde dorpen in het 
totale oorsprongsgebied. Op huishoudenniveau zijn de meeste van degenen die 
uiteindelijk hervestigden de beter gesitueerde boeren, terwijl de arme bevolking 
uit de oorsprongsdorpen slechts een zeer klein deel uitmaakt van de hervestigden. 
Het Administratieve Dorp Xiapu in Ningxia is een van de twee best gestelde 
dorpen van de zeven administratieve dorpen in de Gemeente Xiapu. De gehele in 
de onderzoekslocatie in het dorpsdeel of de wijk Xiapu hervestigde bevolking 
bestaat slechts voor 7 percent uit armen. 
In het Administratieve dorp Manggang in Yunnan waren de inkomensniveaus 
van de boeren voor de hervestiging de hoogste van de negen Administratieve 
Dorpen van de Gemeente Nanla. Hier maakt het aandeel van de armere bevolking 
14 percent uit van alle hervestigden in de onderzoekslocatie in Shangwantang, in 
de dorpsdelen Shangwantang en Huoshaozhai. 
Hoofdstuk vijf valt in twee delen uiteen. Deel I is een gedetailleerde 
beschrijving van beleid en beleidsuitvoering. Het beslaat informatie op nationaal 
en regionaal/provinciaal niveau en op het niveau van de onderzoekslocaties. Deze 
informatie is verkregen uit overheidsdocumenten, secundaire data, en interviews 
met overheidsambtenaren. Deel II bouwt voort op de empirische bevindingen en 
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de analyse van de twee gevalsstudies, om een op onderzoek gebaseerde 
inschatting van Chinees hervestigingbeleid te bieden. De beleidsanalyse van dit 
onderzoek beoogt om geplande interventie te 'ontmythologiseren'. Om dit te 
bereiken moeten wij letten op een aantal zaken: (1) Geplande ontwikkeling is 
samengesteld uit 'meervoudige werkelijkheden'; (2) Wij moeten onderscheiden 
tussen theoretische en beleidsmodellen. (3) Geplande tussenkomst wordt zelden 
ondersteund door afdoende analyse aan het benedeneinde van het 
tussenkomstproces. (4) 'Overheidsbeleid is niet zo consistent en vaak niet eenvoudig te 
identificeren' (Long 2001:47). 
Hoofstuk zes identificeert de sociale factoren die bijdroegen tot de uitkomst 
van de hervestiging, en onderzoekt hoe economische factoren werken binnen de 
bestaande sociale dynamiek. Mijn argument is dat in het hervestigingproces de 
beter gestelde boeren beter gesitueerd zijn om economisch voordeel te behalen, 
binnen de locale machtsconfiguraties te manoeuvreren, hun kennis te gebruiken, 
hun goed gevestigde sociale netwerken te mobiliseren, en dus onmiddellijk te 
baten. In deze situatie worden de armere boeren - de veronderstelde begunstigden 
- over het algemeen buitengesloten. Economische factoren zijn dus belangrijk, 
maar zij bieden geen volledige en bevredigende verklaring voor deze uitslagen. 
Economische baten zijn vaak het resultaat van andere sociale factoren. 
Dit hoofdstuk gebruikt 'sociale dynamiek' als overkoepelend begrip om de 
voortdurende verandering van een complexe werkelijkheid te omvatten. Het volgt 
interface analyse en kernbegrippen van een actor gerichte benadering. Het gebruik 
van orienterende begrippen zoals agency (werking), verwantschap, netwerken, 
kennis en machtsconfiguraties worden aangeboden om grip te krijgen op deze 
dynamiek. Het startpunt voor dit actor gerichte uitzicht waren processen op 
microniveau. Maar dit zou niet moeten inhouden dat zijn bijdrage aan een analyse 
op macroniveau verwaarloosbaar is. In tegendeel, het begrip van macrobeleid 
moet in de eindanalyse, aan het einde van de uitvoeringsketen van het beleid, 
beoordeeld worden. 
De uitslag van de onderzochte hervestigingprojecten is het gezamenlijke 
product van de ambivalentie van beleidsprocessen aan de ene kant en de 
onbekendheid met de sociale dynamiek op gemeenschapsniveau aan de andere 
kant. De ambivalentie van beleidsprocessen heeft betrekking op (1) het gebrek aan 
samenhang tussen beleidsformulering door de centrale overheid, lokale 
beleidsformulering, en uitvoering, (2) misleidende ontwikkelingsgeloof systemen 
(Long 2001: 46) bij overheidsinstellingen en -ambtenaren, en (3) de tweedeling 
tussen beleidsverklaring en beleidsuitvoering. De onbekendheid met de sociale 
dynamiek in het hervestigingproces op gemeenschapsniveau houdt verband met 
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het feit dat door de overheid georganiseerde vrijwillige hervestigingprojecten 
uitgevoerd worden onder een benadering van geplande tussenkomst die wordt 
aangestuurd door ideologieen en overtuigingen ten aanzien van ontwikkeling 
welke niet overeenkomen met de sociale dynamiek van plattelands-
gemeenschappen. Ervan uitgaande dat het niet mogelijk is om 
ontwikkelingsgeloof systemen op korte termijn te veranderen en ondertussen te 
hopen dat de armere mensen misschien baten van wat de beter gestelden niet 
nodig hebben, zou een pragmatische weg om schaarse middelen voor 
armoedebestrijding beter te gebruiken eerst en vooral moeten onderscheiden 
tussen projecten met het doel van armoedebestrijding en projecten die doelen op 
economische ontwikkeling. 
De grond voor zulke onderscheidingen is ten eerste gebaseerd op de 
erkenning van sociale en economische stratificatie in arme bevolkingsgroepen, en 
ten tweede op de noodzaak om verschillende segmenten van de armen op 
verschillende wijze aan te pakken. Mijn onderzoeksbevindingen en analyse tonen 
dat de uitwerking van geplande tussenkomst verschilt voor verscheidene 
segmenten van de armen in verhouding tot hun positie in de sociaal-economische 
piramide. De begrippen 'de beter gestelden' en 'de armere mensen' worden overal 
gebruikt en vangen de twee uiteinden van deze stratificatie. Hoewel zij vaag zijn 
wanneer zij uit hun verband worden gerukt, zijn de categorisering en de 
aanwijzers die zijn gebruikt om sociale en economische stratificatie of relatieve 
bestaansniveaus van mijn onderzoek te definieren, gegrondvest op 
groepsdiscussies met boeren in de onderzochte gemeenschappen. De herkenning 
en de identificatie van de verschillende bestaansniveaus van de armen worden dus 
een voorwaarde voor elke actie om de armere bevolkingsgroepen te helpen. 
Wanneer projecten met het doel van armoedebestrijding de armere mensen 
moeten baten, kunnen de volgende twee praktische voorstellen worden 
overwogen: (1) Projecten moeten iets aanbieden dat de beter gestelden niet willen 
hebben, zoals microkrediet projecten. Het is duidelijk dat zowel de beter gestelden 
en de armere mensen krediet nodig hebben. Echter, in een aantal microkrediet 
projecten1 die ik persoonlijk heb bezocht raakte het grootste deel van de armen 
betrokken en baten zij, terwijl de beter gestelden niet geinteresseerd waren omdat 
de leningen te klein waren en de eis aan leners om wekelijks bij elkaar te komen te 
hinderlijk was. (2) Projecten moeten zeker stellen dat de armere mensen niet 
buitengesloten worden wanneer zij iets aanbieden dat zowel de beter gestelden en 
1
 Microkrediet projecten zijn gemengd beoordeeld. I wil hier geen discussie over microkrediet 
projecten openen, maar het als een voorbeeld van een mogelijkheid inbrengen. 
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de armere mensen willen hebben. In projecten die in een gemeenschap zijn 
gegrond, zoals projecten met het doel om land weer tot bos en weide te laten 
worden, en in drinkwatervoorziening projecten, moet speciale inspanning worden 
geleverd om de armere mensen in te lichten, te betrekken, en hen op zijn minst 
gelijkwaardige toegang te geven. Zulke bevestigende handelingen moeten worden 
ontworpen en uitgevoerd om te verzekeren dat de armere mensen niet 
buitengesloten worden. 
Het is niet de bedoeling van deze argumentatie om het verband tussen 
economische groei en vermindering van armoede te verwaarlozen. Echter, zoals 
mijn onderzoek heeft aangetoond is het verschil tussen deze twee processen 
essentieel om het doel van armoedebestrijding onder de armere leden van 
gemeenschappen te benaderen. Het houdt niet in dat de armere mensen nooit deel 
hebben aan de algemene stroom van economische ontwikkeling. Het doel van 
bevestigend beleid en handelen is inderdaad ingesteld op het beschermen van de 
armere mensen tegen de negatieve effecten die economische groeimodellen 
gewoonlijk meebrengen. 
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